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ABSTRACT
Concessions are the crucially important benefits that individuals seek when they decide to partic-
ipate in collective action, yet they are poorly understood. In particular, it remains unclear why
authoritarian governments, which rely on coercion to maintain control, promise concessions to
protests that do not pose a revolutionary threat, despite the frequency with which this occurs. Even
less is understood about the extent to which those promises are fulfilled once protest ends. In this
dissertation, I advance our understanding of when protest campaigns achieve the promise of con-
cessions from autocratic governments and when those promises produce real-world policy change.
To do so, I address three questions: (1) Under what conditions do autocratic governments concede
to protesters’ demands?; (2) How do concessions affect mobilization? and (3) How does reneging
occur and how does it affect protest campaigns?
In Chapter 2, I provide an original conceptualization of concessions that defines concessions as
a response to collective action that occurs when an agent of authority makes a public commitment
to initiate a policy change that will potentially yield some benefit to protesters. I establish conces-
sions as a process of policy change, rather than an instantaneous event. The lags in this process
can allow for the government to renege, or deliberately fail to implement the promised concession.
Though previously overlooked, reneging is a key element of how authoritarian governments use
concessions, particularly given the weakness of commitment mechanisms in these settings. To
understand how concessions are used, I shift focus from commonly-studied revolutionary protest
campaigns to what I call everyday protest campaigns, which driven by policy-specific demands.
Chapter 3 covers my novel approach to collecting quantitative data on concessions. I also
present my original database, the Protest Campaigns of Moscow database, which contains data
about everyday protest campaigns operating in Moscow, Russia, from 2013-2018, that made de-
mands of the local government.
I present empirical analysis in chapters four through six. In Chapter 4, I consider the condi-
tions under which the Moscow government responds to protest with concessions and repression. I
find that when everyday protest campaigns convey new information about grievances to the govern-
ment, repression is less severe, concessions are common and reneging is rare. In contrast, when the
government has sufficient information to anticipate protest, it deploys more severe repression and
reneging is common. I illustrate these campaign types with empirical examples, and use regression
xii
analysis to test hypotheses.
In Chapter 5 I motivate new theories about the link between concessions and demobilization.
I find strong evidence that these concessions are associated with an immediate decline in mobi-
lization, and that concessions are more demobilizing than detentions. This association is stronger
when concessions correspond more closely to the campaign’s core demands. This demobilizing
effect also appears conditioned on the campaign event history prior to the concession, which is in
turn likely tied to the government’s motivations in making concessionary promises.
Chapter 6 focuses on reneging. In most cases, reneging is immediate and the concession is
never implemented. To illuminate this dynamic, I present a case study of the protest campaign to
prevent construction near a park. Last, I analyze interviews that I conducted with urban activists in
Moscow in 2018 and 2019 to demonstrate that they largely distrust the Moscow government and




Power concedes nothing without a demand. It never did and it never will. Find out
just what any people will quietly submit to, and you have found out the exact amount
of injustice and wrong which will be imposed upon them.
— Frederick Douglass, An Address on West India Emancipation, 1857
My overall opinion on people’s problems is that one must always aspire to help
them. The reason the state exists is to help people.
— Vladimir Putin, Direct Line with Vladimir Putin, 2015
Concessions are the crucially important benefits that individuals seek when they decide to par-
ticipate in collective action. For citizens and other subjects of authoritarian rule, this decision
requires more than just a consideration of time, money and resources: would-be protesters must
weigh the risk that they will experience repression against the likelihood that they will win a con-
cession. Yet despite the importance of concessions to the dynamics of contention, they are poorly
understood. In particular, it remains unclear why authoritarian governments, which rely on coer-
cion to maintain control, promise concessions to protests that do not pose a revolutionary threat,
despite the frequency with which this occurs. Even less is understood about the extent to which
those promises are fulfilled once protest ends.
This gap in knowledge persists for three reasons. The first is selection bias: Most studies of
protest select cases of exceptionally large, politically threatening movements that are unlikely to
receive concessions. The second is focus: Repression is the state response that yields the greatest
interest, given its potentially severe consequences and its intersection with human rights. The third
concerns data limitations: Concessions are largely unobserved in the daily news reports typically
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used to compile protest datasets. As a result, there has also been insufficient attention to the long-
term implications of concessions for policy change, and we know little about the true impact of
collective action in authoritarian settings.
This dissertation addresses this gap. In doing so, it makes three important contributions. First,
I provide a robust and original conceptualization of concessions that takes into account the real-
world possibility of reneging. I define concessions as a response to collective action that occurs
when an agent of authority makes a public commitment to initiate a policy change that will po-
tentially yield some benefit to protesters. Further, I establish concessions as a process of policy
change that takes place over time, rather than an instantaneous event. The lag between when the
concession is promised and the realization of policy change can allow for the government to re-
nege, which I define as deliberately failing to fulfill the promised concession. Though previously
overlooked, reneging is a key element of how authoritarian governments use concessions, as this
strategy allows them to demobilize protest without truly submitting to protesters’ demands.
Second, to understand how concessions are used, I shift focus from commonly-studied revolu-
tionary protest campaigns to what I call everyday protest campaigns. Everyday protest campaigns
are policy-driven. They arise in response to a policy grievance—an issue with a rule, law, regula-
tion, program or enforcement decision issued by the government— and their demands pertain to
policy changes that would redress that grievance. Everyday protest campaigns therefore stand in
contrast to revolutionary protest campaigns, which pertain to regime change or other major social,
economic or political transformations. Because everyday protests are not existentially threatening,
the regime has a reduced need to rely on repression and can respond with concessions, if desired.
Thus, while everyday protests provide insight into a lesser studied yet common form of contention,
they are also an optimal case for studying the dynamics of concessions.
Third, I develop a systematic and replicable approach to compiling data on concessions. Until
now, scholars studying protest politics have lacked comprehensive quantitative data on conces-
sions. For my analysis, I piloted a method to collect this information. I collected an original
database focused on protest campaigns against the government of Moscow, Russia, from 2013-
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2018, from online Russian-language sources. This database consists of three interrelated datasets
of protest campaigns, the individual protest events those campaigns organized, and the concessions
those campaigns were promised. To catalogue and track concessions, I created an original strategy
to consistently identify the issuance of a concessionary promise, rate its quality, and evaluate its
implementation over the longer term.
This introductory chapter proceeds as follows. In the next section, I begin by elaborating on ev-
eryday protests. I then review why autocratic response to these types of campaigns, especially the
use of concessions, constitutes a puzzle, and briefly summarize my theoretical intervention. The
remainder of the chapter establishes scope conditions for this study and justifying why Moscow,
Russia, is an appropriate case for this study.
1.1 Everyday Protest
Everyday protest campaigns are a form of protest campaign1 that originates around a specific
policy grievance2 and make demands related to that policy grievance. These campaigns may ask
that the government intervene to enforce the rights of protesters, provide them with services, or
incorporate their opinions into its programs. This focus on how state power is used distinguishes
everyday protest campaigns from revolutionary campaigns that are concerned with the existence
of state power, who wields it and why. Revolutionary protests are inherently ideological: their
grievance is the existence of the regime and their core demand is regime change. In keeping with
this, revolutionary protests may not be tied to specific policies or even a particular precipitating
event. In contrast, everyday protests often center on social or economic grievances, the extent
to which they are politicized varies. Everyday protest can also emerge against policies that are
1Per Tilly (2004, 3), a campaign is a “sustained, organized public effort making collective claims on target au-
thorities,” that links a group of claimants (protesters), the object of their claim and a public. A protest campaign is
lower capacity and more limited in scope than a social movement.
2It is well-established that grievances alone, also known as the relative deprivation hypothesis (Gurr, 1970) are
insufficient to explain the emergence of mobilization, see e.g. McCarthy and Zald (1977); Tilly (1978); Skocpol
(1979); McAdam et al. (1996). Explaining how mobilization happens or when protest emerges is beyond the scope of
the present work.
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political in the sense that they pertain to individual freedoms, the use of state power, national
identity, corruption and so on. However, when everyday protest campaigns challenge political
policies, the focus remains on policy change, rather than revolutionary transformation or other
ideological goals. As a result, political everyday protest campaigns are more likely to focus on a
lower-level or local manifestation of political power, as campaigns that are national in target and
scale usually have revolutionary aims.
The everyday protest distinction is not founded on the politically moderate attitudes of partic-
ipants. It is common in studies of revolutionary conflict and collective action to identify organiz-
ers as radicals and others as moderates (for instance Lichbach, 1998; DeNardo, 1985; Bueno de
Mesquita, 2010). Everyday protesters may be radical critics of the regime, or they may be regime
supporters who simply object to the actions of a particular official and do not see their demands as
political. Often, anti-regime politics are not incorporated into the campaign’s framing or demands.
This can be strategic, to avoid attracting the ire of the government, but not necessarily. After all, the
resolution of policy grievances requires that the government retain the power to determine policy,
at least in the short-term. Everyday protest campaigns are also not distinguished by moderate tac-
tics: everyday protesters may use more confrontational tactics, like blockades and hunger strikes,
than many oppositionists would dare.
This policy focus renders everyday protest campaigns inherently unlikely to existentially
threaten the regime. That existential threat is further checked by the fact that the pool of potential
everyday protesters is often limited to individuals affected by the policy grievance. For instance, a
policy might only affect residents of a certain neighborhood or members of a certain professional
group. Thus, although their policy grievances may be legible to a wider sympathetic audience, the
risk that an everyday protest could escalate into a broad-based campaign is low.3
3Some everyday protest campaigns do scale into broader movements. A notable example is the movement to de-
fend Istanbul’s Taksim Gezi Park in 2013, which escalated into a national conflict marked by extreme state violence.
Solidarity protests supporting prominent campaigns in other cities occur with some regularity in Russia, the case I
consider here. However, these are exceptional cases that are unusually visible to observers, rather than the norm. For
example, of the 66 everyday protest campaigns in Moscow that I collected data on, none of the neighborhood-level
campaigns attracted significant turnout at their events from participants not directly affected by the grievance. The
campaigns that drew support from across the city were mainly against policies that affected upwards of tens of thou-
sands of people from dozens of neighborhoods simultaneously, for example a new housing tax or the implementation
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1.2 The Puzzle of Authoritarian Response to Everyday Protest
If everyday protests have both limited intent and limited ability to existentially threaten the regime,
as revolutionary protests do, how should the regime react to them? While ignoring protests
(Bishara, 2015) or delaying response (Chen, 2012) are strategic options, the regime’s repertoire
is commonly understood to include two approaches: repression and concession.
The strategic use of repression is founded in the fact that protests in general are undesirable
to authoritarian regimes. Frantz and Kendall-Taylor (2014) demonstrate that popular revolution is
an increasingly common avenue by which autocrats leave office, and some of these originate as
everyday protests. Repression is often seen as the first line of defense against protest, given that
it is inherent to autocracies (Wintrobe, 1998; Escribà-Folch, 2013), and it is consistently observed
to increase in response to dissent (Davenport, 2007a). But cracking down on less threatening
protest can create the appearance of weakness on the part of the regime, and repressing “average
citizens”—like those who often make up the ranks of everyday protests—can increase dissent
(Francisco, 1995; Rasler, 1996). On the local level where everyday protests often originate, control
over the repressive apparatus may be less uncertain (Earl, 2011). That can lead to the use of “softer”
forms of repression that are easier to control (Fu, 2018), or the use of non-state actors to execute
it, which can undermine state legitimacy (Ong, 2018).
On the other hand, the regime can respond to protests with concessions, but the costs and
benefits of doing so are unclear. Concessions are conventionally associated with the cooptation
of regime challengers, most often through sharing spoils, redistribution or patronage (Bueno de
Mesquita and Smith, 2010), or via incorporation into authoritarian institutions such as legislatures
(Lust-Okar, 2005; Gandhi and Przeworski, 2007). Lipsky (1968) classifies such concessions as
protest bargaining, and underscores that they can only occur when the protesters have political
resources the government wants. Everyday protest campaigns would therefore appear poor can-
didates for such bargaining, given that they are may have few political resources at their disposal
and are only sometimes organized by political parties. In fact, the political representation that
of paid street parking in residential neighborhoods.
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cooptation can entail often falls beyond the bounds of their demands: these protesters want the
government to change a policy, not to join the government and change it themselves.
If everyday protest campaigns are offered concessions, the question remains as to how those
concessions impact the underlying policy grievance over the longer term. For the most part, con-
cessions cannot be accomplished instantly. They characteristically entail policy changes or bu-
reaucratic procedures that take days, if not weeks or months, to accomplish. This means, as I will
argue, that concessions are subject to a credible commitment problem. The credible commitment
problem arises when actors must be bound to agreements over time when incentives vary over
time (North, 1993). If incentives change, fulfilling that agreement may no longer be in one actor’s
interest.
Credible commitment problems are especially common in autocracies, due to the weakness of
enforcement mechanisms external to actors who must be bound by agreements, and the imbalance
of coercive power between actors. Credible commitment problems have largely been identified in
the autocrat’s relations with the elites whose support he requires to retain power, but who lose the
power to constrain him once they furnish that support (Bueno de Mesquita et al., 2003; Myerson,
2008; Magaloni, 2008; Svolik, 2012). Institutions are seen as the solution to this problem, by en-
suring elites retain some ability to compel the autocrat (e.g. North and Weingast, 1989; Gandhi and
Przeworski, 2007; Gandhi and Lust-Okar, 2009; Magaloni and Kricheli, 2010; Boix and Svolik,
2013; Brancati, 2014).
But the credible commitment problem that arises in response to popular protest differs signifi-
cantly from that with elites. First, elites have inherent structural power—the very thing that makes
them elites also means that the autocrat requires their support. In contrast, an autocrat does not
require popular support from the masses, because he is not elected, and only with extraordinary
effort can they remove him from office. Second, the exclusive nature of elite status allows elites to
coordinate at comparatively low cost (Olson, 1965), which for citizens at large, the coordination
of mobilization is costly, fleeing and sporadic. Successful collective action today is no guaran-
tee of successful collective action tomorrow, as Acemoglu and Robinson (2005) have famously
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noted. In their model of democratization, the masses recognize their limited capacity to organize
over the long term and the lack of incentives for elites to follow through on their promises of re-
distribution—in other words, a concession. The masses therefore demand democratic institutions
to ensure that those promises are fulfilled. While Acemoglu and Robinson recognize part of the
credible commitment problem, they fail to observe that the establishment of institutions is a slow,
frequently elite-driven process that is rife with opportunities for reneging. in fact, the agreement to
establish these institutions can also be a concessionary promise that may or may not be fulfilled.
It is clear, then, that promises made to protesters lack inherent credibility in autocracies and
reneging is possible. Moreover, reneging may make concessions a potentially optimal strategy for
autocrats in some settings. Reneging can allow them to reap the benefits of appearing concilia-
tory without having to implement undesirable policy changes. Yet at the same time, if reneging
is prevalent, concessions should be wary of concessions, and they should be less effective at de-
mobilizing protest. Understanding this dimension of concessions is essential to understanding the
extent to which everyday protesters can compel non-consultative governments to incorporate their
views into policy.
In this dissertation, I advance our understanding of when protest campaigns achieve the promise
of concessions from autocratic governments and when those promises produce real-world policy
change. To do so, I address three questions: (1) Under what conditions do autocratic governments
concede to protesters’ demands?; (2) How do concessions affect mobilization? and (3) How does
reneging occur and how does it affect protest campaigns?
1.3 Taking Concessions Seriously
To answer these questions, I argue that concessions are far more than a simplistic victory for
protesters. Just as repression can, concessions encourage or inhibit mobilization, and reinforce
or undermine regime stability. In the first of three empirical chapters, I adopt the perspective of
the authoritarian regime to examine how the same institutional processes that produce the pol-
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icy grievances that catalyze everyday protest, also shape how the government responds to those
protests. The government’s reaction to protest is determined by, first, whether the grievance
emerged against a policy that the government was actively modifying, and second, the level of
information available to the government about popular opinion related to that policy.
Variation in these institutional factors produces two ideal types of everyday protest campaigns.
First, some everyday protests provide a forum for citizens to provide feedback about policies to the
government, where institutionalized methods for collecting such information are weak, misused or
absent. These campaigns simultaneously constitute a venue in which the government can respond
to that feedback and use concessions to bring policies in line with popular needs or respond to
other deficiencies that could create longer-term problems. A similar informational role has been
attributed to protests in China by Lorentzen (2013) and O’Brien and Li (2006), as well as to other
forms of contentious behavior such as the online submission of complaints (Chen, Pan and Xu,
2016), individualized challenges (Fu, 2018) and the creation of civil society organizations (Teets,
2014). This phenomenon, sometimes called authoritarian responsiveness, is less well-explored
outside the context of China. I examine it in Russia, a regime that is not normally considered
consultative. Whereas protest may traditionally be viewed as a font of contention that threatens
to undermine the regime, this type of everyday protest campaign is in fact part of what makes
autocracy work.
The fact that everyday protest can be complementary to regime goals does not mean that it
necessarily is. While some protests convey important missing information to the government, this
is a stop-gap measure that should arise only in situations where more institutionalized modes of
information collection have failed. In the many cases of everyday protest, the members of the gov-
ernment have reasonably good information about opinion on its policies, so protests communicate
little new information. These everyday protests simply obstruct policy change that the govern-
ment desires. In studies of large social movements with maximalist demands, Tarrow (2011),
Piven and Cloward (1978) and McAdam (1983) all observe that the goal of collective action is
the disruption of status quo politics; I demonstrate that these dynamics are at play even when the
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campaign is lower capacity and lacks the potential to existentially threaten the regime. The gov-
ernment’s treatment of these types of everyday protests, which is characterized by reneging on
promised concessions and higher-intensity violence, demonstrates the limitations of authoritarian
responsiveness.
While institutional factors influence the government’s response to everyday protest campaigns,
the state does not solely determine how everyday protest campaigns unfold: Contention is a dy-
namic interaction between the state and protesters. As such, it is not enough to say that the state
uses concessions to demobilize; we also need to understand how those concessions affect protest
campaigns. This is especially important when it comes to reneging: if protesters learn that the
state’s promises are not credible and that concessionary promises are not secure, reneging would
become an ineffective strategy. In the second and third empirical chapters, I focus on theory de-
velopment. In the second empirical chapter, I examine how concessions that are not undermined
by reneging impact mobilization. Concessions do appear to be associated with a comparative de-
crease in protest activity. Not all concessions are have an equal effect, however. Concessions that
hew more closely to the campaign’s stated aims are more demobilizing. In this section, I also
look at how the timing of concessions may be driven by the government’s objectives to pre-empt
campaigns before they develop the capacity for more enduring conflicts. In the third empirical
chapter, I analyze data on reneging and show that the majority of reneging happens immediately.
To understand why this occurs and its effect on campaigns, I review transcript evidence from in-
terviews I conducted with activists in Moscow. This data suggests that although activists do not
trust the government to fulfill its concessionary promises, more casual members of the campaign
whose support is essential to hold demonstrations and other larger protest events, tend to see the
government’s promises as credible.
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1.4 Consolidated, High-Capacity Autocracies
I analyze the implications of this theory in the context of consolidated autocracies with high-
capacity states. These scope conditions put the strategic choice between repressing and using
concessions into sharpest relief.
Consolidated autocracies by definition include features that make repression highly feasible.
Consolidated authoritarianism is a designation used by Freedom House to indicate states where
political leaders “prevent political competition and pluralism, and are responsible for widespread
violations of basic political, civil, and human rights.”4
Like all autocracies, consolidated autocracies rely on coercion to maintain political control
(Wintrobe, 1998) and have the capacity to deploy repression at any level. They are also more
likely to have entrusted political power to coercive agents, which may increase repression (Gurr,
1986). Moreover, many consolidated autocracies have successfully weathered existential threats
“from below,” including anti-regime protest, terrorism and insurgency. This means that they have
experience reacting with violence to these types of events and are more likely to have cultivated a
unified, loyal security service (Greitens, 2016) and a more authoritarian elite (Slater, 2010). It is
also worth noting, however, that Davenport (2007b) finds that single party regimes, many of which
are consolidated autocracies, are actually less likely to violate civil liberties and personal integrity,
with comparison to other types of authoritarian regimes.
I have chosen the term consolidated autocracy (and, interchangeably, consolidated authoritarian
regime) here because it captures canonically authoritarian features such as the absence of free
and fair elections as well as undemocratic practices that are particularly important to the study of
collective action, specifically regarding civil society and the judiciary. I am not interested purely in
cases where Robert Dahl’s (1971) conditions of polyarchy are violated, but in cases where political
competition and constraint are absent and that absence is reinforced by highly constrained civil and
4Freedom House identifies consolidated autocracies regimes using expert evaluations of national democratic gov-
ernance, electoral process, civil society, independent media, local democratic governance, judicial framework and
independence, and corruption; consolidated authoritarian regimes perform consistently poorly across these measures
(Freedom House, 2021).
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human rights. Generally speaking, regimes classified as consolidated autocracies are also coded as
the most autocratic in other regime datasets.5
An equally important condition is that the state must be high capacity. The state must be able
to implement policy and distribute public goods in order to make the concessions that everyday
protesters demand. I define state capacity as the capability of the government to formulate and
implement official objectives.6 This approach echoes Skocpol (1979) and Mann’s (1984) “infras-
tructural power.”
High state capacity is an essential scope condition for three reasons. First, it ensures that the
state can make concessionary promises that are plausible and concievably persuasive to protesters.
Second, it enables the state to fully implement those promised policy changes if so desired. Third,
it likewise enables the state to deliberately manipulate the policy change process to avoid imple-
menting those promises, if desired. These last two conditions are necessary to justify the assump-
tion that if concessions are not realized, it is the result of deliberate reneging, rather than a lack of
resources, insufficient logistical ability or another source of non-purposive failure.
However, imposing restrictive criteria for state capacity imperils external validity. Relatively
few authoritarian states can be unequivocally classified as high capacity, particularly if coercive
capacity is excluded (Andersen et al., 2014). Common measures of state capacity calculate taxes
as a share GDP, yet states with economies driven by natural resource extraction are not dependent
on taxation (Ross, 2001) and nonetheless have the ability to penetrate society, distribute benefits,
and coerce (Okruhlik, 1999). Further, as Ding (2020) underscores, capacity is relative and signif-
icant variation in bureaucratic capacity exists within states. Even a high-capacity state like China
exhibits weaker capacity in some areas, like pollution. That subnational variation matters when it
comes to everyday protest, because policy is often implemented locally.
5POLITY-V’s similar designation “institutionalized autocracy” (Marshall and Gurr, 2020) corresponds highly to
“consolidated autocracy”. Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) ranks regimes based on combined polyarchy index and
liberalism index but leaves it to the researcher to impose cutoffs to determine regime type. The cases I consider here
typically fall in the bottom quartile of V-Dem’s liberal democracy index.
6For more detailed reviews of the state capacity literature, see Soifer (2008); Williams (2018). An alternative
approach to state capacity, in the tradition of Charles Tilly (1975), holds that the monopoly on violence is a key
element of state capacity. Indeed, investment into coercion is also an investment in capacity (Bellin, 2004; Andersen
et al., 2014; Yom, 2015).
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To address these issues, I focus this study on subnational regions of consolidated autocracies
that are typically the highest capacity areas of the state: capital cities. Capitals tend to be the
wealthiest, most densely governed and politically salient areas in the country. They are also dis-
proportionately important for contention, given that they are home to high concentrations of middle
class citizens whose participation is believed central to civic revolutions (Moore (1966); Hunting-
ton (1991); Wallace (2014); Ong and Han (2019) but see Rosenfeld (2020)). These types of urban
uprisings are increasingly common (Frantz and Kendall-Taylor, 2014), but for several decades have
been a particular concern of autocrats in a region where Color Revolution is a regular occurrence
(Bunce and Wolchik, 2011).
Capital cities offer a few additional benefits to this study in particular. First, in the post-
Soviet region, most capital cities are also independent administrative regions, meaning that the
city or municipal government is the regional government. Whereas other regions may encompass
many municipalities and smaller administrative units with local governments with unique dynam-
ics—including variation in capacity—the government of the capital is centralized and in principle,
protest anywhere are subject to the same government response.
Second, the capital city helps control for the alternative explanation that the use of concessions
and reneging may be a function of principle-agent problems. There is some evidence that in China,
where the central government struggles to monitor the performance of its agents in far-flung ar-
eas, citizens use protest to demand that the central government hold local officials accountable
(O’Brien and Li, 2006). In this context, concessions may be the result of dynamics arising from
the hierarchical state. Relatedly, reneging may be a form of shirking. While monitoring dynamics
demand close scrutiny, they are not the subject of the present study. In the capital, the national
government’s ability to monitor its local agent is at its highest. Not only do the municipal and
national governments often work closely together, national government officials spend significant
time in the capital and can directly monitor issues there. Additionally, in autocracies, where the
risk of popular revolution is always keenly felt, governing the capital is normally entrusted to a
close ally of the autocrat, no doubt in part to address monitoring issues.
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1.4.1 External Validity
The scope conditions of this dissertation were set to ensure that concessions were observed and to
isolate conditions where reneging would be the likely cause of the failure to implement a conces-
sion as promised. However, high-capacity, consolidated autocracies are only one setting in which
concessions may be used. Of particular interest to scholars of authoritarianism are regimes where
governing capacity is weak. These states may struggle with the provision of basic services, like
electricity or water. In these cases, the use of concessions is conditioned on the availability of
finite resources, and the state’s delivery of those concessions is more likely to be a function of
an inability to implement promises rather than strategic choice. These constraints mean that the
concessionary dynamics in a lower-capacity states will differ from those in high-capacity states.
Nonetheless, this dissertation can builds our understanding of concessions in lower-capacity states
as follows. The conceptualization of concessions that I advance in Chapter 2 is generally applica-
ble. Regarding reneging, lower-capacity states are also capable of deliberately failing to implement
concessions as promised. In these settings, however, reneging may not be the most common way
in which concessions are not fully realized. Still, further research into how concessions are used in
lower-capacity states is needed to understand the conditions in which they are used, their effect on
mobilization, and the incidence of reneging as compared to other causes of failed implementation.
A key difference between high- and low-capacity states is the availability of resources. Lower-
capacity states are more likely to be resource-constrained. I have argued that high-capacity author-
itarian capitals have the necessary resources to enact the policy changes they promise. Below, I
describe the resources of the City of Moscow, which has one of the largest municipal budgets in
the world. This does not mean, however, that high-capacity governments are not constrained in
what they can promise. Even for a well-financed government, resources are finite. For instance,
Iza Ding’s (2020) work on environmental activism in China notes that the government has limited
leeway to address environmental concerns because they are so difficult to resolve, leading agents
to limit the promises they make to complainants. Similarly, the Moscow government, despite its
enormous budget, is strategic about concessions. Several interview subjects expressed that they felt
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that the government of Moscow did not promise concessions that were beyond its capacity to im-
plement. Similarly, there is no evidence that the government was inclined to promised concessions
that would tax the municipal budget. It is therefore possible that a more constrained government
may simply be less inclined to promise concessions, or to make promises that are less financially
costly, for instance holding meetings with protesters. Likewise, further research on how conces-
sions are used in lower-capacity settings would help clarify how constrained resources affect the
use of this strategy across cases.
1.5 Moscow under Sergei Sobyanin
1.5.1 Case Selection
Prior to data collection, I considered it possible that concessions would be used very rarely, con-
sistent with the expectations of studies of protest under autocracy. The lack of detailed data about
concessions and the absence of data about reneging constituted a problem for case selection, as
there was limited basis on which to select a case where the phenomenon of interest could be ob-
served. In light of this, I established additional criteria that would allow me to select a case where
concessions would be most likely:
1. Restrictions on freedom of assembly and the use of repression must not be so severe that
protest is rare or only revolutionary protests are observed. The regime must be sufficiently
tolerant of protest that everyday protesters, whose demands are lower stakes and who often
have alternative paths to conflict resolution, still engage in collective action. This excludes
the most repressive autocracies.
2. There must be evidence that government responses to protest varies and sometimes includes
concessions.
3. To make data collection about a range of campaigns feasible, information about protest
events must be available at online. To be able to monitor the implementation of conces-
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sions, a reasonable level of online freedom that would allow reporting and discussion on
government policies was also necessary.
Based on these scope conditions and selection criteria, I evaluated a dataset that I created of
protest in post-Soviet autocracies from 2000-2017, as reported in Radio Free Europe/Radio Lib-
erty’s near-daily Newsline.7 Of these, the consolidated autocracies were Azerbaijan, Belarus,
Kazakhstan, Russia, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan. The first criterion excludes Uzbekistan and
Turkmenistan. Among the remaining capital cities, Moscow was home to the most protest activ-
ity. Qualitative data indicated that the Russia government used concessions with some frequency.
I conducted additional research into prominent cases of socio-economic protest in Moscow and
interviewed experts to corroborate this. Finally, internet penetration in Moscow is extremely high,
with widespread use of social media and a limited but robust independent media.
Moscow8 is the political, economic and cultural capital of Russia. It is the seat of the govern-
ment of the Russian Federation, and home to all federal ministries except the Constitutional Court.
The country’s top universities, world-famous museums and theaters, most iconic historical sites
and financial, tech and scientific industries are located in Moscow. The city regularly hosts events
of national and global importance, from presidential inaugurations to serving as the primary host
city of the 2018 World Cup. It is home to over 12 million people; 20 million people, or around
13% of Russia’s population, reside in the broader metropolitan aren. By territory, Moscow is one
of the largest cities on earth.
Per the Russian Constitution, Moscow is designated a federal city, meaning that its executive
serves a function equivalent to a governor. The city has its own legislature, the Moscow City
Duma, as well as its own constitution and legislation. The city is subdivided into 12 administrative
7Newsline summarizes news for 23 post-Soviet and Eurasian states and is published on most business days, see
https://www.rferl.org/Newsline. Data was collected on protests of an estimated 25 participants or more
for Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Ukraine, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan.
Years collected for each country vary.
8Moscow City is surrounded by Moscow Oblast’. The City and Oblast’ are distinct federal subjects that together
constitute the Moscow metropolitan area, or capitol region. Though closely linked, these units have separate govern-
ments, constitutions, and regional executives. Throughout I use Moscow to refer to the city of Moscow, not Moscow
Oblast’ or the Moscow metropolitan area.
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okrugs and 125 districts.9
1.5.2 Local Authoritarianism in Moscow
Nationally, Russia is a consolidated autocracy, but locally, the Moscow government is authoritarian
as well. Although not subject to election monitoring, elections in Moscow cannot be considered
free and fair, and political competition is limited. At all three levels of elected government in
Moscow (local, legislative and mayoral), the Moscow City Election Commission uses candidate
registration procedures to exclude non-systemic opposition candidates from elections. In recent
years opposition parties have largely failed to achieve representation at the legislative level and
struggled to win representation at the local level at which municipal deputies are chosen. While
largely politically powerless, municipal deputies are instrumental in the management of the may-
oral elections. In Russia, to appear on the gubernational ballot, a candidate must pass the “munic-
ipal filter” by collecting the signatures of 6% of representatives from 75% of municipalities. The
municipal filter was established when direct election of governor-level offices (including the Mayor
in Moscow) were restored throughout Russia in 2013. Its purpose is to limit competition (Golosov,
2012). Because municipal representatives can only support one candidate, and are largely mem-
bers of the dominant party United Russia (or United Russia partisans posing as independents), the
municipal filter effectively allows the regime to choose who competes in regional elections. In
Moscow, the municipal deputies, who represent districts equivalent to neighborhoods, fill this role.
The current mayor of Moscow, Sergei Sobyanin, entered office by appointment by then-
President Dmitri Medvedev in 2010. He previously served as a Deputy Prime Minister under
Prime Minister Vladimir Putin as well as the Chief of Putin’s Presidential Administration. In
2013, Sobyanin called an early mayoral election, the first in which he would compete. Alexei
Navalny, a prominent anti-corruption activist, was vocal about his intention to run, however he was
only able to acquire the required endorsements of municipal deputies when Sobyanin instructed
9In 2012, the city annexed 1,420 square kilometers from the surrounding oblast’. This new land included
small cities and towns that became administrative units of Moscow City while retaining some aspects of local self-
government, essentially classified as towns within the City of Moscow.
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United Russia deputies to support his candidacy (The Interpreter, 2013). Though Sobyanin only
narrowly avoided a run-off election with Navalny in 2013, he won the 2018 election handily, in
party by excluding any legitimate opposition candidate from competing.
Moscow has been the stage for the majority of Russia’s protest activity, much of which is
directed to the national government and to President Vladimir Putin (Robertson, 2009; Lankina,
2015). The city also hosted a revolutionary protest wave in 2011-2012. The Moscow Police are
the largest police force in the country. They are supplemented by the country’s largest unit of
OMON, a riot police-cum-gendarmerie that operates under the motto “We know no mercy and do
not ask for any” and is known for brutal crowd control techniques and human rights abuses. The
Moscow OMON includes the Zubr Detachment, a special force believed to be designed to respond
to revolutionary collective action. Unsurprisingly, repression of protesters is common in Moscow.
Protest watchdog OVD-Info documents that, from 2011 to 2017, between 23.6 to 57.1% of all
charges filed in Russia for illegal protest behavior occurred in Moscow, with indictment rates as
high as 91% (OVD-Info, 2016a). Further, despite the healthy size of the police force, it is often
unable or unwilling to defend activist citizens from harassment, threats and violence by non-state
actors such as private security, motorcycle gangs, right-wing religious thugs or groups identified
only as “Chechens.” Indeed, the police themselves terrorize activists with midnight raids, searches
and seizures, threats to child custody and more.
In recent years, the most severe protest repression in Moscow has been directed to opposition
protests, particularly those organized by Navalny and his cohort. Navalny’s events specifically see
high rates of detention as the city refuses to issue permits that the organizers are willing to accept.
However, outside of these events, the city is not maximally repressive of protest. It regularly
issues protest permits10 to demonstrations, large and small, and has also established a few “Hyde
Parks” where larger protests can be held without requesting a permit.11 The law also stipulates
10Technically, and in line with international human rights standards, the government does not permit protests. Citi-
zens and other subjects submit notifications of the intent to hold a demonstration or similar gathering, and the relevant
administration agrees, refuses, requests changes or fails to respond. Functionally, this system operates like a per-
mit system. Throughout this work, for clarity, I refer to protest permits, although they are technically agreements
soglasovaniye.
11OVD-Info, an NGO that supports individuals detained at protest, has documented the locations of Hyde Parks and
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that meetings with elected officials, including municipal deputies, cannot be broken up as long as
they do not display placards or other signifiers of protest. These meetings are often used to skirt
permitting requirements.
1.5.3 Governing Capacity in Moscow
By any metric, local state capacity in Moscow is very high. Moscow has one of the largest munic-
ipal budgets in the world. Between 2013 and 2018, Sobyanin oversaw annual budget expenditures
ranging between $23 and $35 billion USD. The city generates around one fifth of of Russia’s GDP;
most of this is generated by taxes. In terms of bureaucratic capacity, the municipal government’s
ability to implement city-wide policy is very high. Most government services, such as the police
and transportation system, are centralized. Beginning in 2014, dozens of multi-service centers
have been constructed around the city, providing a one-stop shop for government services. One of
the objectives of this initiative is to “promote greater openness of public authorities, establish a dia-
logue and strengthen mutual understanding between citizens and the government” (mos.ru, 2021).
The city’s ability to implement policy is perhaps best demonstrated by the so-called renovation
project, which will see a considerable portion of the city’s low-rise housing stock12 demolished
and residents resettled in state-constructed high-rise apartment complexes.
The city has significant resources to collect information about policy grievances. Since 2012, a
network of over 1,500 elected municipal deputies represent constituents at the micro-neighborhood
level. These municipal deputies, some of whom belong to opposition parties, lack real political
power but among other functions, serve to identify grievances before they escalate. An online
portal for Muscovites to vote in opinion polls13 boasts of having registered nearly 160 million
opinions in 4,873 unique polls as of March 2021. Another portal14 allows Muscovites to easily re-
areas where protest is categorically banned in Moscow and other cities, see Territoriya Nelz’ya (Forbidden Territory),
https://tn.ovdinfo.org/msk.
12Initially the program aimed to replace ten percent of the city’s housing stock, essentially all five- and nine-story
apartment buildings constructed under Khrushchev. The first list of included buildings numbered around 8,000, but
subsequently fluctuated and eventually settled around 5,000 buildings in 85 districts.
13Aktivny Grazhdanin (Active Citizens), https://ag.mos.ru
14Moskva Nash Gorod (Our City Moscow), https://gorod.mos.ru/
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port problems with city facilities, from poorly maintained housing to potholes; a response from the
responsible city authority is promised within 8 days. Users can also rate city services like health
clinics and transportation. The government regularly holds roundtables with citizens. Public hear-
ings about construction over a certain budgetary limit—the source of many protest grievances—are
required by law.
Temporally, I limited my scope to the full second mayoral term of Sergei Sobyanin, from his
inauguration on September 12, 2013 to the inauguration for his third term on September 18, 2018.
Sobyanin was appointed mayor in October 2010 and called an early election for September 2013.
Sobyanin’s second term is therefore his first complete term for which he competed in an elec-
tion, but his three prior years in that position by appointment means that continuity around the
2013 election can be assumed. In 2011-2012 unprecedented opposition protests against fraudulent
elections, United Russia and the Putin regime rocked Moscow and the country. These protests
transformed the culture of opposition mobilization in Moscow. By late 2013, with the passage of a
spate of new repressive laws and Navalny’s defeat in the 2013 mayoral election, opposition protest
activity had subsided. Sobyanin’s second term therefore corresponds to a “re-normalization” of
protest in Moscow.
1.5.4 Is Moscow Russia?
Although Moscow was chosen as a case because it is comparable to other authoritarian capitals, it
is worth asking to what extent Moscow is representative of Russia’s other regions. The most direct
response to this is, not at all. As most Russians will emphatically argue, Moscow is not Russia.15
It is significantly more developed, wealthier, better educated, and more liberal than rest of the
country. An expert survey conducted (McMann and Petrov, 2000) found Moscow to be among
Russia’s most democratic regions—though to be sure, this is a “best of the worst” designation.
Finding a region representative of a state as enormous and diverse as Russia is impossible. Rus-
sia is a federal state constituted by 85 subjects of eight different types.16 Subjects vary widely
15See, for example, “Why Moscow and St. Petersburg aren’t Russia” Sinelschikova (2018).
16The Russian Federation consists of oblasts, ethnic republics, krais, autonomous okrugs, federal cities and au-
19
in population, size, climate, distance from Moscow, economic development, infrastructure, and
natural resource extraction. Local respect for human rights and civic liberties, the use of repres-
sion, salience of ethnic politics and independence from the center also vary. Moreover, as Natalia
Zubarevich (2013) has argued, Russia’s large territory has produced marked differences in eco-
nomic development and ways of life. Zubarevich proposes four cross-regional “Russias” defined
by development. The Russia of post-industrial cities is dominated by Moscow and St. Petersburg,
but it includes an additional 73 cities to which Moscow could be compared.
Setting aside representativeness, understanding Moscow is important for understanding politics
in the rest of Russia. In recent years, policies piloted in Moscow, such as the 200 Churches initia-
tive and the renovation project, have been exported to the regions (Zupan, Smirnova and Zadorian,
2021), meaning that it is possible that conflicts similar to those that occur in Moscow may be
echoed elsewhere. Further, national protest campaigns normally unfold in Moscow, and residents
from other regions may travel to Moscow to protest about regional issues at offices of the federal
government like the Presidential Administration or high-profile locations like Red Square (Robert-
son, 2010; Lankina, 2015). This means that Moscow authorities, particularly repressive agents,
are sometimes the responsive agents even when protest originates elsewhere. Greater insight into
municipal-level protest dynamics can also bring clarity to national-level campaigns.
Last, this work advances the study of collective action in Putin’s Russia. The notion that Rus-
sians do not like to protest has persisted since the 1990s, despite inconsistent evidence to support
that claim (Robertson, 2010). Partly as a result, when large, anti-regime protests broke out in De-
cember 2011, a number of studies followed seeking to understand who mobilized and why (e.g.
Volkov, 2012; Koesel and Bunce, 2012; Rosenfeld, 2017). In the years since these protests, Smyth
and Soboleva (2016) have shown that the opposition reoriented toward electoral strategies, even as
Russians seem to be more engaged in civic activism and more politicized (Lankina, 2015). Less is
known about the effect on policy-oriented protests. Russia may in fact be an ideal setting to observe
everyday protest as, policy-driven protests traditionally frame themselves as “social” rather than
tonomous oblasts. In 2014, territories of the Republic of Crimea and Sevastopol were classified as federal subjects of
Russia.
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“political” because foregrounding political motives makes them vulnerable to cooptation that un-
dermines their demands and repression (Gabowitsch, 2018). When it comes to managing protest,
Russian governors have a mandate to keep regime-challenging protests in check, especially fol-
lowing 2011 (Golosov, 2012), but when it comes to other types of protest their responses are more
varied. Greene (2014) profiles several civil society movements in Russia, and shows that the often
chaotic response of state and its disengagement with civil society have made it difficult for these
movements to succeed. I propose that what may seem like inconsistency may in fact be the result
of competing objectives and the deliberate failure to deliver promised policy changes.
1.6 Plan of Dissertation
This dissertation consists of six chapters in addition to this introduction. In the second chapter,
I develop my theory of concessions. In presenting a new definition of concessions, I underscore
that they must be understood as a process that takes place over time and are inherently vulnerable
to reneging. Chapter three concerns data and measurement. I detail my approach to collecting
systematic quantitative data on concessions, including the measurement of policy change imple-
mentation and present the Protest Campaigns of Moscow database, on which the empirical chapters
are based.
I present my empirical analysis in chapters four through six. In Chapter 4, I consider the con-
ditions under which the Moscow government responds to protest with concessions and repression.
I find that when everyday protest campaigns convey new information about grievances to the gov-
ernment, repression is less severe, concessions are common and reneging is rare. In contrast, when
the government has sufficient information to anticipate protest, it deploys more severe repression
and reneging is common. I illustrate these two ideal campaign types with empirical examples, and
then use regression analysis to test related hypotheses.
In Chapter 5, I leverage my uniquely detailed dataset to motivate new theories about the link
between concessions and demobilization. Do concessions demobilize protest campaigns? If so,
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what makes demobilization more or less likely? How do features of the concession, such as how
closely the promise hews to the campaign’s demands, affect mobilization? To develop answers to
these questions, I examine cases of concession where reneging did not occur. I find strong evidence
that these concessions are associated with a decline in mobilization, particularly in the first thirty
days after a concession is promised, and that concessions are more demobilizing than detentions, a
very common form of repression. This association is stronger when concessions correspond more
closely to the campaign’s core demands. This demobilizing effect also appears conditioned on the
campaign event history prior to the concession, which is in turn likely tied to the government’s
motivations in making concessionary promises.
In the final empirical chapter, I focus on reneging. This chapter combines aggregate quantitative
analysis of the concessions data to determine what features of concessions are most associated with
reneging. I determine that in the majority of cases, reneging is immediate: the concession is never
implemented, as opposed to being undermined after implementation. To illuminate this dynamic
of immediate reneging and its relationship to mobilization, I present a case study of the protest
campaign Save Park Dubki! which sought to prevent the construction of an apartment building on
the edge of a park. Construction-related grievances are the most commonly documented in PCoM,
and this campaign in context can be considered higher-capacity. Still, it was unable to prevent im-
mediate reneging on all five concessions it was promised. Last, I seek to understand how activists
understand concessions and reneging. I analyze interviews that I conducted with urban activists in
Moscow in 2018 and 2019 to demonstrate that they largely distrust the Moscow government and
see its promises as a manipulation, though they believe the general public feels differently. This
variation in beliefs about the government may contribute to the difficulty of resisting reneging.
Chapter seven concludes and discusses directions for future research.
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CHAPTER 2
A Theory of Concessions
In this theoretical chapter, I make several contributions. First, I provide theoretical clarity about
concessions that resolves tension around how concessions seemingly constitute success for a
protest campaign while undermining its capacity to mobilize. Second, many approaches to conces-
sions envision them as a mode of elite cooptation, without taking into account that many campaigns
are not elite-driven and that concessions can affect campaign participants without the mediation
of an elite. I position concessions as a tool that affects authoritarian citizens directly. Finally, I
emphasize that temporal elements must be taken into account to understand concessions. A con-
cession requires that a policy change occur, but changing policy regularly takes weeks or longer.
This period between when the government promises a concession and the realization of that pol-
icy change is critical, because in this window, the government may renege, or deliberately fail to
implement the concession as promised. In authoritarian regimes, where institutional mechanisms
for enforcing credibility are weak or absent, the risk of reneging is particularly high. Building on
this theory, I compare concessions to repression and discuss the strategic tradeoff between the two
responses. I argue that, although repression is at the disposal of every autocratic regime, everyday
protests are in fact good candidates for concession, and there is some evidence to support that this
occurs. Last, I briefly discuss what is meant by mobilization and demobilization.
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2.1 A New Definition of Concessions
At the most basic level, a concession is a response to protest campaign. A concession is initiated
when an agent in a position of authority makes a publicly observable commitment to undertake a
policy change that will potentially yield some benefit to participants in that campaign. A conces-
sion is not characterized by the realization of a reform or the distribution of a benefit. Rather, it is
the stated promise, or commitment to engage in policy change, that characterizes a concession.
Several important aspects of this definition that distinguish concessions from related phe-
nomenon warrant expansion. First, concessions arise only in the context of pre-existing collective
action, as characterized by a protest campaign. A protest campaign, as defined by Charles Tilly,
is a “sustained, organized public effort making collective claims on target authorities.” that links a
group of claimants (protesters), the object of their claim and a public (Tilly, 2004, 3). These cam-
paigns use protest to make those claims. I use protest to denote demonstrations, rallies, marches
and similar events, of either group or individual participation, to express a grievance, opposition
or other message to a target audience in a publicly observable manner. Campaigns use other forms
of activism as well, for example legal challenges. In defining concessions as a response to protest
campaigns, I distinguish them from benefits that authorities allocate in other contexts. For in-
stance, populist policymaking is distinct from concessions. Similarly, policy change in response
to popular opinion or the distribution of benefits for future political support, as characterized by
patronage or clientelism, are not concessions. Policy changes to comply with legal rulings are typ-
ically not concessions. Further, because protest campaigns are inherently public, benefits allocated
exclusively through covert lobbying or elite bargaining are not concessions.
Second, a concession must be initiated by an agent in a position of authority, meaning that
the person or entity making the concession credibly embodies the authority to actually fulfill the
commitment. The agent may speak on behalf of the state or on behalf of a private entity or other
group, like a religious organization or company. In the following I assume that the agent speaks
on behalf of the state, but this can easily be relaxed. In practice this means that some statements
that seem like concessions are in fact simply empty words, because the agents behind them have
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no power to realize the concession. In other cases, informal networks may mean that an agent in
fact has greater power than their official position grants them.
The statement of the concession must be publicly observable, in that it is commonly observed
by the claimants of the protest campaign and by actors who would be responsible for implement-
ing or overseeing the promised change. A concession should therefore be promised in a public
setting, such as a press conference or open meeting with protesters, or, if made in a private setting,
immediately publicly reported by the government in an official statement, or by other witnesses,
including campaign participants and the media. In authoritarian settings, or others where few or no
institution failsafes exist to enforce that commitment, the public performance of the commitment
partly mitigates that institutional weakness by establishing the concession as common knowledge
(Chwe, 2013).
The requirements that the agent speak on behalf of the authority that can fulfill the concession
and that the statement be made publicly are necessary because concessions entail a commitment
to future action. The agent who initiates the concession is in fact beginning a process of policy
change. That process, which I elaborate on below, is almost never instantaneous. In fact, the
concessionary process normally takes weeks, months or longer.
Finally, concessions only potentially yield a benefit to protesters. Intuitively, concessions are
something positive, and are often seen in counterpoint to the negative experience of repression. At
the same time, concessions often fall far short of unequivocal success. Even the positive impacts
associated with a concession are difficult to objectively evaluate. Further complicating things is
the fact that concessions often have consequences that may be considered adverse, such as inter-
fering with mobilization or exacerbating divisions within a campaign. As I will show, concessions
can also have a limited impact on policy in the longer term if reneging occurs. The notion of a
concession as a potential, rather than realized, benefit is meant to address this.
That potential benefit takes the form of a policy change, a term I use broadly to capture a wide
range of reforms. The policy change may be formal, as in a regulatory reform, or informal, as in
an alteration to practice, enforcement or the distribution of a one-time benefit. It may establish an
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on-going procedure or pertain to a single-case application of pre-existing rules. It may more or less
closely adhere to the stated demands of the campaign. Last, the apparent benefit of the concession
may accrue to all claimants, to some subset of claimants, or to the general public without exclusion.
The following chapter explores measuring dimensions of concessions in greater detail.
2.2 Existing Approaches
2.2.1 Carrots and Cooperation
The above definition introduces much-needed nuance and complexity to concessions. Although
concessions figure prominently into notions of successful collective action and are salient in some
studies of protest campaigns, definitional work on this topic is sparse and suffers from variation
without innovation. This is partly due to the aforementioned sense that concessions are a positive
outcome, sometimes construed as the opposite of the state’s use of repression. Indeed, often if a
protest campaign is described as “successful”, it is because it achieved concessions. As a result,
some definitions of concessions focus exclusively on those positive outcomes; for example, Chen
(2012) defines concessions as meeting demands. This simplification is particularly common in
formal modeling, where concessions are represented as “positive incentives” or “carrots” (Svolik,
2012, 10), or moving closer to the opposition’s ideal point (Pierskalla, 2010).
Yet even if concessions are an obvious improvement over repression, they may not constitute
a truly positive outcome. Social movement scholars have understood that concessions more often
arise out of the government’s desire to coerce and control, than out of the benevolent intention
to resolve grievances. To emphasize the strategic action of the state, some scholars eschew the
word “concession” altogether. Tarrow (2011, 190) uses the term “facilitation,” wherein the state
“satisfies at least some of the claims of contenders” while others speak of accommodation (Rasler,
1996; Lichbach, 1998) of movement demands. Followers of Gamson (1975), including Daven-
port (2014), see concessions as grievance depletion, a strategy where the state meets demands to
undermine the grievance motivating citizens to participate in contention. Mazur (2013) character-
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izes the elimination of grievances as preemption. In some formal models of contention, a similar
assumption defines concessions as cooperation with protest claimants (Moore, 2000; Carey, 2006).
While these definitions enhance our understanding of the underlying construct, in practice they
are difficult to apply, because they rely on teleological reasoning that requires that the outcome
of the concession to be observed in order for the concession to be identified. If concessions are
defined based on their impact on protesters (e.g. satisfying protesters’ claims), questions arise
about what share of protesters must be satisfied and how much. Participants in protest campaigns
regularly see concessions as unacceptable half-measures, hypocritical contradictions, or unrelated
to their grievance. If a concession is characterized by the resolution of a grievance, one must know
if the grievance is fully resolve, at what point in time that resolution occurs, and to whose satis-
faction. Consider, for example, an environmental protest to which the government concedes the
remediation of a toxic waste site and an end to environmental degradation. The former concession
may take years to realize, which raises questions about when exactly the concession has occurred.
Does partial remediation “count”? What about ten years of remediation, followed by a return to
dumping? The second concession likely falls outside the scope of the government’s ability to fully
realize. It is unclear if policy changes designed to work toward that goal could be classified as con-
cessions. Even more a simplistic focus on concessions as meeting demands raises similar issues
when we consider that protest campaigns normally make numerous demands. How many should
be resolved and to what extent?
Perhaps most importantly, outcome-focused definitions mean that it almost impossible to iden-
tify when a concession occurs in real-time, because they rely on information that will only become
available months or years after the concession is initially promised. While this may be acceptable
for scholars engaged in historical study, it is problematic for observers of campaigns in real-time.
In particular, these definitions may not resonate with activists, oppositionists and protest partici-
pants—the subjects of research on protest, who deserve to benefit from its findings.
My definition addresses these issues in several ways. First, I capture the sense that a conces-
sion is an ostensibly good thing that can have adverse effects by representing it as a potential,
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rather than actual, benefit. Second, I separate the government’s intent in making concessions and
protesters’ evaluations from the definition of a concession. In doing so, I also create space for
broader theoretical consideration of the purpose and impacts of concessions. Third, in underscor-
ing that a concession is a statement followed by a policy change process, my definition makes it
possible to identify concessions in real-time, as they happen, rather than years later. The definition
also captures common intuitions about the nature of concessions with robust identification criteria
that can be easily observed and operationalized for data collection.
2.2.2 Cooptation
Other approaches to concessions are less concerned with the popular response to the concession
and instead see concessions as a form of political cooptation.1 These works adopt an elite-politics
focus that is common to the literature on comparative authoritarian institutions. In this view,
protests are just one element of a larger threat to regime survival that is embodied by elites. Elites
who amass excessive power can pose a critical danger to the autocrat (e.g. Wintrobe, 1998; Gandhi
and Przeworski, 2007; Svolik, 2012). Elites who can coordinate a larger public via opposition
political parties or other similar organizations constitute one such threat. To defuse this threat, the
autocrat tries to coopt elites via incorporation into authoritarian institutions (Smith, 2005; Blaydes,
2010; Frantz and Kendall-Taylor, 2014), most commonly legislatures (Lust-Okar, 2005; Gandhi
and Przeworski, 2007). Cooptation can also be achieved via economic means such as sharing
spoils, redistribution or patronage (Boix, 2003; Acemoglu and Robinson, 2005; Bueno de Mesquita
and Smith, 2010).
It is important to establish concessions and cooptation as distinct phenomena. Cooptation is
the formal representation of a group in the political process without the chance to meaningfully
influence policy (Mazur, 2013). Describing bureaucratic authoritarianism, O’Donnell uses “encap-
sulation” in a similar sense to mean a political configuration where “[social] sectors were politically
1Protest is not a pre-condition of cooptation, which has been observed in many other settings, including around
elections (Magaloni, 2006), through state employment (Rosenfeld, 2020) or unions (Kim and Gandhi, 2010), via
clientelism (Stokes et al., 2013; Ang, 2016) and patronage (Golden and Min, 2013), among others.
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represented by organizations whose legal existence was dependent upon government authorization.
Bargaining and interest representation would be limited to leaders at the top.” (O’Donnell, 1979,
88). This system of relationships between a group, elites, and the state is the result of a variety
of factors that accumulate over time. Concessions can enter into that process. For example, an
opposition protest can win the concession of a new legislative election. But that concession is not
equivalent to cooptation, even if it creates to conditions where cooptation is more likely. For that
concession to lead to cooptation, a legislature must exist, the party or candidates must be regis-
tered, the election must occur relatively fairly, and delegates must be seated. Even then, cooptation
may not occur. Thus although the risk of cooptation may loom over a concession, that outcome
should not be conflated with the concession.
Elite-focused theories provide a compelling explanation for elite behavior, but if we widen our
view to include the members of these movements, they do less well at explaining how concessions
affect mobilization. In the elite-driven model of protest, opposition elites have with the power to
coordinate others in collective action via political parties, other organizations or unique charisma
and status. By implication, without elites, collective action does not occur at a salient level. Con-
cessions are then used to co-opt those elites into the legislature, where they are rewarded with rents
or limited access to policymaking in exchange for their collaboration with the regime (Gandhi and
Przeworski, 2007). Having achieved these and other personal benefits, elites become less likely to
engage their supporters in protest (Reuter and Robertson, 2014). The existence of a legislature can
also force opposition groups to compete for formal recognition or representation, which in turn
obstructs intra-opposition collaboration and decreases the risk that broad-based protest emerges
during economic crises (Lust-Okar, 2005). The benefits of cooptation for an opposition elite are
clear. What is less apparent is why the participants in collective action should be satisfied with
this outcome. Many citizens in authoritarian states are fully aware that opposition elites are sub-
ject to cooptation. Nothing prevents them from defecting from a coopted elite to other or newly
established opposition figures. This is particularly true given that citizens might obtain few or even
no side benefits from fraudulent representation that does nothing to advance their goals. This is
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particularly true if the campaign’s objective are related to socio-economic policies. For example,
protesters against pension reform may not perceive legislative inclusion to be any kind of ben-
efit, when they want a lower retirement age included in the bill that the legislature is voting on
this month. Last, though many campaigns are elite-led, a significant share are not. Leaderless
campaigns are a common occurrence. Although these campaigns have no elite to coopt, they still
sometimes receive concessions.
2.3 Concessions as a Process
I have already hinted at the steps that constitute the concessionary process. First, a public commit-
ment is made by a state agent to initiate a policy change. Second, the government undertakes some
steps characteristic of changing that policy, during an implementation period. Last, the outcome
represents the culmination of the policy change; even if the policy change may not be fully or even
partially implemented, no further reform is made. I elaborate on these steps in turn.
The commitment is a public statement made by a state agent, establishing the intention to initiate
a policy change that pertains to a grievance expressed by some participants in a protest campaign.
The commitment establishes a shared expectation of future action by the government. To do so, it
must be sufficiently specific to establish the nature of that future action. Conciliatory statements
acknowledging the existence of the grievance are not concessions (“This is a very serious prob-
lem.”), nor are most vague statements (“We’ll resolve this.”).2 This public commitment to future
action uniquely characterizes a concession. While the implementation of the promised change
may never occur and the grievance may be affected in no way by the outcome, once this commit-
ment is established, a concession has occurred. Conversely, a concession cannot occur without a
public commitment. Intuitively, this emphasis on commitment matches up with common usage
of “concession,” as referring to the symbolic act of granting demands or recognizing a grievance.
2An exception arises when the state agent is powerful enough such that their acknowledgment of the grievance is
akin to escalating the issue’s priority level. For instance, when the autocrat says, “This will be resolved,” an expectation
of its resolution is created that is not established when a low-ranked bureaucrat says the same.
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Throughout I rely on the terms “commitment” or “promise”, in normal parlance “concession” is
often synonymous with these.
The implementation period is a span of time during which steps characteristic of the promised
policy change may be taken. This is the period in which policy is actually changing, at least in prin-
ciple: bank transfers of wage arrears are being arranged, the building permit is being reevaluated,
a constitutional amendment is being drafted. Actions taken by the state during implementation
are dependent on the type of policy change that has been promised. Ideally, all the steps nec-
essary to enact a policy change will occur during implementation, but that need not be the case.
Indeed, during the implementation period, it is possible that the state takes no steps consistent with
changing policy, or only a few. For example, bank account information of unpaid workers may be
collected though the funds are not transferred the planning commission may never reevaluate the
permit, or the constitutional amendment may not contain the promised reform. Nonetheless, the
implementation period coincides with an interval in which the process necessary to change policy
would conceivably occur in order for the commitment to be completely fulfilled. Implementation
may last days or months. Its duration depends on a variety of factors, most saliently the nature
of the promised policy change and effort. State agents can deliberately extend the implementa-
tion period by procrastinating or delaying, though occasionally, they will establish a timeline for
implementation of the concession by announcing a policy change by a certain date.
The concession process concludes with an outcome. The outcome arises when the policy in
question becomes significantly more difficult to alter, such that changing it further would require
a full re-engagement with the policy change process. In some cases, the outcome is obvious be-
cause the the initial commitment has clearly been fulfilled: the workers receive their back wages,
for instance. Alternatively, action may be taken that makes fulfilling that commitment impossi-
ble: construction workers have irreversibly damaged the disputed building site, so the legality of
the permit is no longer of consequence. The end of a policy change process may be difficult to
identify, particularly as the government can extend the implementation process: the constitutional
amendment requires additional legislation to take real effect. Context is necessary to identify when
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a concession has been de facto abandoned by the state. Again, the outcome does not need to be
satisfactory to claimants, nor must it meet the shared expectations for policy change established in
the commitment.
2.4 Reneging and Time Inconsistency
It follows from this conceptualization of concessions that the shared expectation of policy change
established by the initial commitment may not match the ultimate outcome. This failure can happen
for a variety of reasons. In some cases, the state has over-promised and lacks the capacity to fulfill
the commitment it set for itself, for instance if the state lacks financial resources. It may also occur
where a third party, over whom the state has incomplete control, fails to comply with the state’s
demands. In still other cases, this failure may be deliberate. The state may establish a commitment
with no intention of providing the outcome. In other words, the state may renege, or deliberately
fail to fully implement the policy change.
Reneging can occur in a few different ways. Most obviously, the state may simply make no
effort to implement the concession, proceeding as if no commitment had been established. This is a
classic “cheap talk” situation where the commitment was truly nothing more than empty words. In
other cases, some preliminary steps characteristic of the promised policy change can occur, though
they fall short of the full commitment. The state can then stall the implementation process, either
indefinitely or long enough to render the promised outcome unattainable. This can be achieved by
adding consultation or feedback periods, holding investigations, requiring additional approvals and
so on. The result is that the concession is never more than partly implemented. Alternatively, some
progress may be taken toward changing policy, only to have those steps reversed. For example,
the initial legal authorization to hold a referendum is granted, but a subsequent challenge in court
revokes that authorization. A final option entails the technical completion or near completion of
the promised policy change, coupled with its immediate undermining by another act that directly
contradicts the aim of the concession. For instance, the state follows through on its promise to
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cancel plans to construct a shopping mall in a park, but a few months later approves the construction
of high rise condos in the same location.
The possibility of reneging has largely been ignored by most studies of collective action, but its
impact on movement success cannot be overstated. A completed concession requires that the state
do much more than make a public promise to change a policy; it must take steps to actually change
that policy and realize the expected outcome. For this to occur, the state’s incentives must remain
aligned such that it prefers to change policy, from the commitment stage to the outcome. If its
incentives change, the state can derail the concessions process and renege, ensuring the concession
has no impact.
The difficulty of fulfilling commitments when incentives change over time is a form of the time
inconsistency problem, and is not new to autocratic systems (North, 1993). One type of time incon-
sistency problem—credible commitment problems,—have largely been identified in the autocrat’s
relations with the elites whose support he requires to retain power (Bueno de Mesquita et al., 2003).
Generally, the credibility problem theorized with respect to autocrat-elite interactions relates to the
elite’s inability to constrain the autocrat once they have ceded the power necessary for him to
secure his position (Myerson, 2008; Magaloni, 2008; Svolik, 2012). Institutions are seen as the so-
lution to this problem, in that they resolve information deficits by facilitating monitoring (Gandhi
and Przeworski, 2006, 2007; Boix and Svolik, 2013), by establishing judicial venues for dispute
resolution (North and Weingast, 1989), or structures like parties and elections that make long-term
spoils sharing credible (for example Gandhi and Lust-Okar, 2009; Magaloni and Kricheli, 2010;
Brancati, 2014). In these cases, the autocrat has what Shepsle (1991) calls imperative credibility,3
where the actor is coerced into fulfilling his promises and agreements become self-enforcing: the
autocrat upholds his end of the agreement, because he knows the elite will punished him if he does
not.
Imperative credibility only applies where actors on the receiving end of a commitment can
3Shepsle (1991) argues that commitments made absent an external authority can be credible if there is motivational
credibility, when incentives do not change over time so commitments become self-enforcing; or if there is imperative
credibility. Absent one of these two forms of credibility, agreements fail.
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reliably coerce the actor making the commitment. This dynamic is considerably rarer when the
actors are an autocratic state and a group of citizens. Whereas elites have inherent structural
power—the very thing that makes them elites generates imperative credibility—the masses must
rely on continuous collective action to apply coercion. This is also a considerably greater challenge
than that faced by elites, because collective action becomes more difficult with scale (Olson, 1965).
In their classic work on revolutionary mass mobilization, Acemoglu and Robinson (2005) note
that as difficult as it is to achieve massive collective action in the present, sustaining it over time is
nearly impossible. In their model of democratization, the disenfranchised masses recognize their
limited capacity to organize over the long term and that, absent on-going rebellion, elites have no
incentive to follow through on their promises to implement more populist policies. To correct this
problem, the masses demand the immediate creation of democratic institutions to transfer power
between groups and ensure redistribution in the future. Elites comply to forestall losses due to
conflict. Though Acemoglu and Robinson capture several key temporal dynamics of protest and
concession, their theory does not acknowledge that the elites’ agreement to establish democratic
institutions is also a concession that requires imperative credibility to be implemented; it is no
more credible than elites’ untrustworthy commitment to redistribute is. Democratic institutions
cannot be created overnight and their complexity creates many opportunities for manipulation in
favor of those with power. Nonetheless, Acemoglu and Robinson demonstrate that credible com-
mitment and reneging are critical concerns when revolutionary movements face down authoritarian
governments.
Recognizing this time inconsistency means recognizing that in some cases, concessions do not
lead to a deviation from the government’s preferred policy. To interpret this via a rational choice
framework, there are cases where the government never pays the cost of the promised concession,
and protesters (and free-riders) never reap the anticipated benefits of protesting. As I discuss in the
next section, taking into account reneging affects how authoritarian governments react to protesters
and protesters ability to organize.
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2.5 Concessions versus Repression
The possibility of reneging can affect the strategic calculus of the government and citizens alike.
Authoritarian governments are generally seen as selecting from two options,4 when responding
to protest: concessions and repression.5 A popular line of inquiry in the rational choice tradition
seeks to understand the trade-offs between the two strategies (e.g. Svolik, 2012).6 This requires an
estimation of their relative costs. Because autocrats have sunk costs into coercive capacity, which
they rely on to retain office (Wintrobe, 1998; Escribà-Folch, 2013), repression is typically thought
to be “cheap”. In contrast, concessions are assumed to be “costly” and therefore a less desirable op-
tion for an efficient autocrat. Formal work has found that the simultaneous use of concessions and
repression is irrational in that it sends mixed signals of the regime’s willingness to meet protesters’
demands (Rasler, 1996; Lichbach, 1987; Moore, 2000), or in that it maximizes the autocrat’s cost
of ending a conflict (Franklin, 2009). Empirically, that repression is consistently observed to in-
crease in response to dissent (Davenport, 2007a) seems to support these assumptions — despite
the fact that the incidence of repression tells us nothing about the incidence of concessions.
The idea that concessions are a costly undertaking is based on an underlying assumption that
is seldom acknowledged: that concessions are credible and actually result in policy change. As I
have argued, this is not necessarily the case, and the costs of a concession change over time. The
initial promise may be very low-cost to the government, as all it requires is a publicly observable
statement. The promised policy change, if implemented, may be costly, but if reneging occurs, that
cost can be avoided. While costs may be incurred to achieve reneging, these can be limited. Just
as autocrats invest resources in the coercive capacity that makes repression “cheap”, they likewise
direct significant resources into institutions and non-violent mechanisms of control. These sunk
4Their actual repertoire is wider. See Chen (2012) on the wider repertoire, including the delay tactics, and Bishara
(2015) on ignoring protest.
5For the purposes of this work, I follow Davenport (2007a, 2) and define repression as “the actual or threatened
use of physical sanctions against an individual or organization, within the territorial jurisdiction of the state, for the
purpose of imposing a social cost on the target as well as deterring specific activities and/or beliefs perceived to be
challenging to government personnel, practices or institutions.” For other definitions and typologies of repression, see
Goldstein (1978); Earl (2003, 2011); Ritter (2014); della Porta (1997).
6Some social movement theorists argue that mixed responses that combine both costs and benefits are common
(Tarrow, 2011, for example), but this approach has not gained traction elsewhere.
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costs facilitate the manipulation of the concessionary process and mitigate its costs.
The direct implication of this is that repression is not strictly cheaper than concessions. There
are cases where concessions may be preferable, particularly given that repression has an unpre-
dictable effect on dissent.7 There is evidence to suggest that when “average citizens” — such as
those that participate in everyday protests — are targeted with repression, the resulting outrage in-
creases mobilization (Francisco, 1995; Rasler, 1996). Moreover, as Johnston (2012) emphasizes,
repression is hierarchical and administrative: the local agents that are typically tasked with the
management of everyday protests likely do not have the same level of access to or control over
repressive agents that the autocratic center does. This lack of control may make concessions more
appealing than resource-intensive repression.
Further, many theories of the strategic tradeoff between repression and concession are both
derived from and tested on a particular type of protest campaign: highly politicized campaigns
that make transformational or existentially threatening demands of the regime. I call these revolu-
tionary protests. Examples include regime-change movements such as those that emerged during
the Arab Spring or around the fall of the Soviet Union; campaigns against election fraud, like the
Color Revolutions; and mobilization for the observance of human rights, such as the US Civil
Rights Movement or the campaign against apartheid. Given the demands of these campaigns, the
regime is unlikely to make concessions if they can be avoided. That occurs when repression be-
comes untenable, either due to the size of the campaign or non-compliance of the security services.
In other words, in these cases, the assumption that repression is much less costly than concessions
is reasonable.
The rarity of highly politicized, very large, national protest campaigns in autocracies is what
makes them compelling objects of study. When applying theories derived from and tested on
these cases to other protest campaigns, we must consider the extent features of these campaigns
lie outside the scope conditions of the original theory. First, everyday protest lack the opposi-
7The effect that repression has on mobilization remains unclear. Work on the dissent-repression nexus has shown
that repression increases mobilization, decreases mobilization and has an inverted U-shaped relationship to mobiliza-
tion, see Hibbs (1973); Lichbach (1987); Muller and Opp (1986); Opp and Roehl (1990); Gartner and Regan (1996);
Moore (1998); Carey (2006); Pierskalla (2010); Loyle, Sullivan and Davenport (2014).
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tional, anti-regime framing of revolutionary protests. They do not question the foundations of
the regime’s power, but rather its specific application. For instance, in China, social protesters
and petitioners regularly seek to appeal to the autocratic center to defend them against local pre-
dation (O’Brien and Li, 2006; Chen, 2012). Everyday protesters often believe that as framings
become oppositional, they depart from the core policy concern and a successful outcome becomes
less likely. Some campaigns adopt platforms that emphasize their “non-political” character. In
Russia, policy-driven protests traditionally frame themselves as “social” rather than “political”
because foregrounding political motives makes them vulnerable to cooptation that undermines
their demands and repression (Gabowitsch, 2018). This was a sentiment that several urban ac-
tivists I interviewed in Moscow corroborated. Also telling is the fact that none of the everyday
protest campaigns I observe in Moscow allied themselves with opposition leader Alexey Navalny
or his Anti-Corruption Foundation, despite the prevalence of concerns related to corruption, which
would have instantly politicized their cause; in one case, Navalny was physically removed from
the premises of a protest by its organizers to avoid undermining their demands.8 The absence of a
politicized framing allows both sides to potentially compromise on specific policy issues.
Second, everyday protest campaigns are less likely to reach the massive scale that successful
revolutionary protests achieve. The scope of everyday protest campaigns is limited to a specific
policy grievance, meaning that their pool of potential participants is likewise limited to individu-
als directly affected by or invested in that policy, so in most cases, the potential for an everyday
protest campaign to scale into a national movement is low.9 The absence of a threatening fram-
ing and the more limited scale of these campaigns complicate expectations of when the regime
8Urban activists also avoided collaborating with Navalny and his various organizations because his political party
is unregistered, meaning it cannot assist in the coordination of protest permits, which is the main utility that political
parties provided to everyday protest campaigns in Moscow.
9The fact that this is unlikely does not mean it never occurs. Policies that policy affect a large swath of the
population can generate mass protests; nationwide resistance to reforms to benefits for pensioners in Russia in 2005
and 2018 demonstrates this. Additionally, solidarity protests organized by individuals who are not directly impacted
by the policy do occur; protests in support of a campaign for free and fair elections to the Moscow City Duma in 2019
were held across Russia. Finally, though the risk that an everyday protest escalates to a national campaign might be
low, it is not zero. For instance, in 2013 a protest campaign against the destruction of Taksim Gezi Park in Istanbul,
Turkey, evolved into a protracted, violent conflict that spawned national solidarity protests and attracted significant
international attention.
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will use repression or concessions. While repressing a revolutionary protest is expected, such a
strategy can easily backfire against everyday protests. The disproportionate use of force against
citizens who are making reasonable policy demands can make the regime appear weak or morally
bankrupt—particularly as women, the elderly, and children often participate in these protests. On
the other hand, if everyday protest campaigns are not threatening enough to warrant repression,
they should likewise not warrant concessions. Yet as I show in Chapter 4, everyday protest cam-
paigns are met with a range of repressive and concessionary responses. These responses, I will
argue, are driven by goals related to the grievance, rather the need to defuse revolutionary threats.
I am not the first to suggest that protests are not inherently threatening to autocratic regimes.
There is increasing recognition that grassroots protest is an important form of “pressure release”
for authoritarian citizens (O’Brien and Li, 2006), and that it provides valuable information on
dissatisfied citizens to the regime (Lorentzen, 2013). Moreover, it is well established that China
has in some settings supported civic activism as a tool of informal control (Chen, 2012; Fu, 2018;
Mattingly, 2019) and encouraged officials to respond to activists’ concerns, so long as they were
not politically sensitive (Truex, 2016).
Many of these studies have assessed strategies of protest management in China; in particular,
China has been the subject of a burgeoning literature on authoritarian responsiveness. This may be
partly due to the fact that China is a single-party state without direct elections above the local level,
making other sources of responsiveness a greater necessity and of greater interest. By the same
token, China is also a relatively unique political system and it differs from Russia in a number
of ways. Russia holds multiparty elections from the local to the federal level, which generates
some of the information that some of these strategies in China are compensating for. Russia is also
not a single-party state, meaning that the legitimacy and stability of the regime is not as closely
tied to ensuring that citizens are satisfied with the performance of a single party. Finally, for the
majority of Putin’s tenure, Russia has cultivated an image of itself as a democracy that upholds
international human rights (though less so in recent years). While this image has not squared
well with many policies and actions the government has undertaken, it is generally more tolerant
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of protest, including anti-regime protest, than China. In a comparative study of environmental
movements in Russia and China, Elizabeth Plantan (2018) finds that Russian activists have become
more likely to choose mass protest tactics than their Chinese counterparts.
Still, the scholarly tendency to study authoritarian responsiveness in China and more conven-
tional strategies of dealing with protest in Russia does not mean that Russia is not using such
tactics.10 The extent to which the Putin regime tolerates or manages non-political protest is less
well understood. Civil society in Russia under Putin is considered weak and poorly consolidated
(Evans, 2006; Henry, 2006). While civil society and protest campaigns are distinct, many civil
society movements do engage in protest to advance their aims and so are worth briefly considering
here. Greene (2014) analyzes the trajectories of several civil society movements from across Rus-
sia, including several that I would classify as everyday protest campaigns, and determines that the
weak institutionalization of the state and prevalence of informal elite ties in Russia has produced a
system that is fundamentally non-responsive to the demands of civil society. As a result, the state
response to these movements is chaotic and driven by individuals seeking their own advantage. He
identifies as the lack of success of civil society in achieving or consolidating their successes is a
function of this institutional setting. While I do not dispute that governance in Russia is highly
corrupt and weakly institutionalized, I contend that the government leverages the apparent success
of a concession to undermine mobilizing capacity. The apparently erratic effect concessions have
on long-term policy is therefore not simply evidence of the capriciousness of government officials,
but rather representative of a lack of intention to implement changes.
2.6 What is Mobilization?
Thus far I have referred to concessions as a government strategy of demobilization. Before turning
to data and analysis, it is necessary to establish what mobilization itself is. Mobilization and its
inverse, demobilization, have been used in a range of ways by political scientists, sociologists, and
10I am not aware of any evidence that the Russian government has learned from or deliberately adopted responsive
strategies from China.
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others who study protest and social movements. When I use the term mobilization, I refer to the
willingness of individuals or groups to participate in acts that support a collective goal. Mobi-
lization is therefore a question of people rather than of resources, ideology or consensus (Tarrow,
2011; Klandermans, 1988). This definition also emphasizes the undertaking of a particular action,
rather potentially passive support for a campaign. In this way it differs from Gamson (1975, 15),
who defines mobilization as the development of readiness to act collectively among a politically
challenging group’s constituency and activation as efforts to get those supporters to undertake a
particular action.
The purpose of mobilization is to engage in acts that disrupt the status quo, in the hopes of
achieving change. Disruption is a function of movement size (i.e. number of participants) and
tactical choice (DeNardo, 1985).11 The need to for disruption means that leaders of all contentious
movements face a fundamental problem of recruitment. In writing about rebel movements, Lich-
bach (1998) terms this the Rebel’s Dilemma, in which movement leaders and the regime dynam-
ically compete for public support. This problem is particularly dramatized in insurgencies, which
must recruit combatants to participate in violence (Fearon and Laitin, 2000; Wood, 2001; Wein-
stein, 2005), yet it is no less prevalent in non-violent movements. Because non-violent movements
avoid using maximally disruptive, violent tactics, disruptive leverage is acquired with a larger
number of supporters across society (Stephan and Chenoweth, 2008). Among transformative so-
cial movements or revolutionary protest campaigns, mass non-cooperation with the regime, such
as strikes, boycotts or national protests, may be attainable. Even for smaller movements, such as
the everyday protests considered here, size matters. A large demonstration or march elicits gov-
ernment attention, disrupts the flow of daily life, and attracts media coverage in a way that a small
picket does not.
I refer to a campaign as mobilized when it has the capacity to engage individuals, who are
outside the core of campaign organizers, in acts of protest. Campaign organizers form the core of
leaders whose efforts make a campaign possible. They may be considered analogous to the rebels
11See also Gamson (1975); Piven and Cloward (1978); McAdam (1983); Tarrow (2011); Franklin (2009).
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or radicals of other models, but I eschew those terms here to avoid assumptions about protesters’
political beliefs. Campaign organizers translate a grievance from a problem to a cause for protest.
They manage the holding of protest events, including filing permits, negotiate safety concerns
with the authorities, securing amplification and often delivering speeches. They run social media
communities, manage digital outreach and develop linkages to the community and other activist
groups. Campaign organizers are typically the authors of resolutions that formalize the campaign’s
demands, and they may arrange the use of other tactics, such as formal complaints, lawsuits or
petitions. If the government chooses to negotiate, it negotiates with the campaign organizers.
But campaign organizers are few in number; in an interview with a park defender, she recalled
that the organizational core was around 25 people. Campaign organizers need to mobilize protest
participants to be able to hold events like demonstrations and marches, as well as to support higher-
intensity protests like hunger strikes if necessary. When this is possible, the campaign is mobilized.
Thus when an observable protest event is happening, it is easy to gauge the campaign’s level of
mobilization. Trouble arises when we recognize that most of the time, an observable protest event
is not happening. Participation in an act of protest is normally short-lived, but this does not mean
that an individual participant is “demobilized” once they put down their placard and head home
from the square—although it can. Moreover, the everyday protests examined here generally hold
protests sporadically, particularly when compared to higher-capacity national campaigns. Weeks or
months may pass between events. Even everyday protest campaign organizers struggle to estimate
their campaign’s level of mobilization. As reported in a focus group of protesting Muscovites I held
in 2019, one of the main reasons that everyday protest campaigns in Moscow hold demonstrations
is to assess the level of commitment to their cause. They also obtain rough estimates from signature
collection drives, and participation in online communities, including RSVP-ing to protest events
on Facebook or VKontakte.
Further, observable protest events are not the only type of act that can be undertaken to benefit
a collective goal. Some forms of protest are difficult to observe or deliberately covert, such as the
everyday peasant resistance identified by Scott (1985). I was made aware during fieldwork that at
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least one campaign and potentially several had engaged in illegal acts. Additionally, the majority
of campaign organizers’ work occurs during periods where protest events are not observed, from
apply to protest permits to filing lawsuits to meeting with government representatives. Campaign
organizers often maintain vigilance during periods of demobilization, as they monitor the motivat-
ing grievance and the implementation of any promised concessions, which allows them to identify
moments when further protest needs to be engaged.
This means that when a protest event is not observed, the campaign may be in a state of de-
mobilization, wherein it cannot hold a protest that requires mass participation. Alternatively, the
campaign may have the capacity to hold a protest, but it chooses not to, which could be described
as inactive mobilization. These states are observationally equivalent. I revisit this issue in Chapter
5 when exploring the relationship of concessions and mobilization.
2.7 Conclusion
To summarize, I have advanced a definition of concessions as a potential benefit to protesters, char-
acterized by a publicly issued promise by a figure in a position of authority. From the initiation
of that promise, concessions take the form of a process, as the government takes steps to imple-
ment the concession. That level of implementation can vary over time, which creates a credible
commitment problem and opens the door to reneging. Though novel, this definition is compatible
with notions of concession that already in use in scholarship, such as the idea that concessions are
a benefit or that concessions are a tool of cooptation.
An important innovation of my approach to concessions is that it produces observable impli-
cations that allow scholars and other observers of world events to identify a concession and stay
attuned to its implementation in real time if necessary. In other words, this definition can be oper-
ationalized for data collection. Yet at the same time, collecting that data also demands innovation.
First, the fact that change over time is fundamental to concessions means that it should be funda-
mental to how data is collected, yet this raises issues about how concessions data should comport
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with the daily event catalogues collected about protest and data collected about campaigns, which
is rarely panel data. Second, evaluating policy implementation consistently across a diverse range




Although new protest event datasets are released each year, quality data on concessions is rarely
collected. This is because neither the data-generating process nor the structure of daily event
datasets are designed to include concessions. Concessions exist at a meso-level between the daily
protest events to which they are a response and the campaigns that articulate grievances and de-
mands and exhibit organizational capacity that affect the type of commitments and follow-through.
As a corrective to this, and to produce data appropriate for my analysis, I developed an approach
to protest data collection that produces linked datasets about protest events, concessions and cam-
paigns. This approach allows concessions, which are not discrete events, to be connected to daily
events, such as demonstrations and detentions, and to campaigns, which unfold over multiple years.
I pilot this data collection approach by focusing on a single case: protest campaigns that targeted
the municipal government of Moscow, Russia from 2013-2018. The resulting database is Protest
Campaigns of Moscow, or PCoM.
This chapter reviews common approaches to collecting data on collective action and why these
datasets fail to observe concessions. The next section elaborates on my original approach to col-
lecting data about concessions. I present a typology of concessionary policy changes, a measure
of proximity of the concession to campaign demands and a measure of the extent of policy change
implementation that can be used to measure reneging. I then describe the datasets that consti-
tute PCoM and explain how they were collected. A descriptive and quantitative overview of the
database follows. I address the representativeness of PCoM, by comparing it to national protest
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data from January 2016 to July 2017 collected by pro-government think tank, the St. Petersburg
Politics Foundation for the Development of Public Relations
3.1 Why don’t we have data on concessions?
The data that we collect is a function of the questions that we ask. These questions determine our
sources, the structure of the data, and the information we record. When it comes to protest, most
available datasets are a response to one of two questions: first, what is the relationship between
dissent and repression? and second, how do people mobilize? The former requires the collection of
daily event data, while investigating the latter often produces campaign-level data. Concessions, as
I will argue, exist between these two observational levels: they are linked to daily event dynamics,
but they cannot be quantified on a daily basis, and though they are also the result of campaign-level
features, an individual concessions evolves over the course of a campaign. Concessions have fallen
through the cracks of data collection projects that are simply not designed to observe them, and
as a result, our ability to explore the dynamics of concession in a systematic, comparative, and
quantitative fashion remains limited.
With datasets designed to investigate the repression-dissent nexus, scholars are typically trying
to understand the relationship between the incidence of contentious events and the use of state
repression. The resulting event data is ideal for observing protests and repressive responses that
occur during them. These datasets are normally compiled from a corpus of daily news reports,
usually international newswire services and databases like LexisNexis to maximize cross-national
coverage1 using keyword searches for terms relevant to protest types, such as protest, rally, strike,
and riot. In studies of protest and contention in Russia, where media coverage may be censored
or uneven, national daily event datasets have been compiled from special-interest websites such
as Marsh Nesoglasnikh (March of the Dissenters, namarsh.ru) which focuses on the liberal op-
position, Konfederatsiya Truda Rossiya (Confederation of Labor of Russia, ktr.su), which mainly
1Bias in this source material is well-documented, including over-sampling of events in capitol cities and in areas
of interest to Western media audience (Mueller, 1997).
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covers labor protests, and The Institute of Collective Action (ikd.ru). Protest data has also been
collected directly from the Communist Party of the Russian Federation. This type of data typically
provides a snapshot of an event. Reports of protest are usually filed during or immediately after a
protest occurs, most often on the same day, and contain information about the topic of the protest,
estimated turnout, and whether detentions or other more serious forms of repression occurred dur-
ing the protest. Events that occur outside of this window (including longer-term repressions) are
not systematically searched and recorded. As a result, these datasets cannot systematically observe
concessions, because concessions are rarely made in during or shortly after a protest.
Concessions do not normally occur during protests. These are deliberative, bureaucratic ac-
tions. If an official were to want to interrupt a protest with the announcement of a concession,
timing would make this difficult: protests only last a few hours, and, to maximize attendance, are
not usually held during the work week. This means the concession would require an elaborate
contingency plan, with the promised policy change prepared and authorized in advance, before the
protest and any related information is observed. This might occur, if the government had an incen-
tive to disrupt protests with concessions, but this is rarely the case. Submitting to popular demands
makes the government appear weak, susceptible to popular challenge, and arbitrary. This does
not mean that concessions are never mentioned in articles about protest, but varying journalistic
house standards may mean that some news outlets never or always include government statements
in their coverage of protests. Newswires may post multiple stories during a protest, but cover the
following concessions separately, whereas a newspaper could summarize a week of protester-state
interactions in a single article that is more likely to include concessions.
Perhaps in recognition of this, some contentious event datasets, like the Armed Conflict Loca-
tion and Event Data (ACLED)(ACLED, 2021) and PRIO’s Urban Social Disorder dataset (Bahgat,
Buhaug and Urdal, 2017) simply do not contain information about concessions. Some datasets do
record when news reports mention concessions. For instance the Mass Mobilization Protest Data
Project (Clark and Regan, 2016, hereafter, MM), includes the variable “Accommodation” which
indicates “Accommodation of demands, indicated by agreeing, negotiating, etc.: this is indicated
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by reports that the authorities met with protest leadership; that the demand was met or that the
authorities agreed to take the protester demands up in a formal meeting.” However, even when
such variables are included, it is difficult to evaluate this information, because it is not the product
of a search designed to systematically collect it. MM’s data generation process uses the search
string “Protest OR Demonstration OR Riot OR Mass Mobilization”. These terms may be optimal
to observe protest, but not concessions. The Central Asian Protest Tracker (Jardine, Khashimov
and Lemon, 2020), produced from a wide array of region-specific sources not limited to newsme-
dia, includes separate variables for whether the protest target agrees to meet with protesters and
whether the target promises to resolve the issue. Distinguishing these responses from concessions
and from their potential effect on protesters is a welcome innovation and should be adopted by
other data collection efforts.
It is not wholly fair to criticize these datasets for not doing what they were not designed to do.
However given the fact that the literature often treats repressions and concessions as two sides of
the same coin and regularly attempts to probe the relationship between them, it is significant that
the datasets we use often do not contain meaningful information about one of the outcomes. Data
about repression is collected in far greater exhaustiveness and detail than data about concessions.
MM, for instance, separately records arrests, beatings, crowd dispersal, killings and shootings,
without distinguishing between holding a meeting with protesters and meeting their demands.
Though the turn toward automated coding has produced several large datasets in the last several
years, these projects cannot correct for these problems. As a result, our assessments of the efficacy
of protest in authoritarian regimes are likely inaccurate.
Correcting this data imbalance requires more than adding new sources and variables to con-
tentious event data: it requires a different data structure. An individual concession should not be
construed as the outcome of an isolated protest event—not least because, as discussed, concessions
are rarely made in the middle of a demonstration. A concession is the result of the aggregate of
previous events and activism. Events that immediately precede the commitment to concession may
appear determinative, but concession are fundamentally linked to the smaller actions that precede
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them and to the threat of continued future action as well as campaign-level features, like media
attention and the size of the group affected by the grievance.
In addition to event history, then, features of the protest campaign are necessary to understand-
ing when and why concessions are made. However, the complexity of studying campaigns, which
may be sustained over periods of years and have national or even international reach, has made
small-N or single case studies the methodological weapon of choice when analyzing protest cam-
paigns. This has produced a large number of excellent, nuanced case studies but limited our ability
to make cross-case inferences. Many of these cases are drawn from campaigns that successfully
achieved their objectives, meaning we know less about the many ways in which campaigns fail.
Further, many examine massive, national protests that can tell us little about lower capacity cam-
paigns.
Nonviolent and Violent Campaigns and Outcomes (NAVCO), a dataset collected by Chenoweth,
Pinckney and Lewis (2018), marks a great advance in this area. NAVCO contains data on maximal-
ist resistance campaigns—such as those that sought regime change, the end to foreign occupation,
self-determination and major social change—that used either violent or non-violent methods, from
1900-2019. NAVCO focuses on campaigns in part because “resistance campaigns involve much
more than just events; the involve planning, recruiting, training, intelligence and other operations”
that a focus on events would ignore (Chenoweth and Shay, 2020, 4). Campaigns are classified as
failed, having limited success, or fully successful. Limited success is defined as achieving some
“stated goals within a year of the peak of activities; the target makes concessions to the campaign
or significant reforms short of complete campaign success”, while success is defined as achieving
“100% of its stated goals within a year of the peak of activities and the success was a direct result
of campaign activities” (Chenoweth and Shay, 2020, 12). These variables are helpful for providing
high-level perspective on concessions, but, as a necessity of campaign-level data, they obscure the
more granular process by which those concessions were achieved.
In sum, concessions do not fit with daily event datasets, as they are not observed at the daily
level, yet they are an outcome generated partly by protest events and that is highly linked to protest
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events. Similarly, they do not fit into campaign-level datasets, as they unfold at a different temporal
level, and may be constitutive of a campaign’s success. Shoehorning concessions data into cam-
paign or event datasets are second-best options, and systematic evaluation of campaigns success
remains elusive.
3.2 Measuring Concessions
In recognition of this gap, I develop an original strategy for collecting and coding information
about concessions. My approach takes into account that, first, concessions are inherently linked
to both protest events and campaigns. As such, this strategy does not attempt to fold concessions
into a pre-existing data structure, but rather produces one that is compatible with micro-level event
data and macro-level campaign data. Second, my approach recognizes that the temporal dynamics
of concessions demand that they be evaluated over time. As a result, this data structure is designed
to take into account the potentiality of reneging.
Per my definition, a concession occurs when a government official makes a public or publicly
reported statement in response to collective action that promises a policy change that would ben-
efit protesters. Operationalizing this definition is relatively straightforward: a concession occurs
when such a statement is observed. These statements can be observed in news articles (particu-
larly if a campaign is large and has already received news coverage) but they are also visible in
reports from activists to campaign participants, such as accounts of a meeting with officials, and
in official government statements. Because identifying a concession does not require observing
the outcome of the promise, making inferences about the government’s purpose in making such
a statement, or evaluating campaign success, it is possible to identify these concessions in “real
time,” as a campaign unfolds, as well as retroactively. In the following I elaborate on the criteria
for observing a concession, then describe coding rules used to generate variables on the type of
concession, proximity to campaign demands and policy implementation, from which reneging can
be measured.
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3.2.1 Identifying a Concession
Not every statement a government official makes can be classified as a concession. Statements
must meet three criteria, which require additional knowledge of the context in which the campaign
unfolds. First, the statement must be made in response to collective action. This may be evident
from the content of the policy change being promised, because it addresses specific demands of
the campaign, or from the context in which the promise is made, such as during a meeting with
activists to resolve the grievance. In other cases, however, officials do not make a connection
between a policy change and the campaign demanding that policy change, or may even deny that
such a connection exists. In these cases, I recommend deferring to how campaign participants and
observers with knowledge of the issue interpret the promise: if they understand it as a concession,
it can be coded as such. I exclude the outcomes of legal action relevant to the grievance from this
criterion, as well as government statements stating intentions to comply with legal rulings, as these
are the outcome of judicial processes that operate differently from protest. However, depending on
context, these might be included.
Second, a statement of concession must contain the promise of an actionable, specific policy
change. This is necessary because it must be possible to identify what the government has obligated
itself to do and whether or not it fulfills that obligation. This criterion distinguishes sympathetic
acknowledgments of the grievance from concession. Generally, it also excludes vague promises
to resolve the problem. There are, again, exceptions to this depending on context. First, there are
instances where the words spoken by an official do not contain an explicit policy change but one
is strongly implied by context, to the extent that it is generally believed by campaign participants
that a specific policy change has been promised. For example, if in response to a direct question
from an activist such as “Will you investigate the illegal construction permit?” the official replies
“Yes”, it can reasonably be understood as a commitment to undertake a specific action. Second,
there are cases where the official promising the concession has exceptional power by virtue of
their position and makes a general statement promising the full resolution of the grievance. This
occurs most often when the grievance rises to the attention of the autocrat himself, and takes a form
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similar to the vague statement previously described. For instance, in response to learning about the
grievance, the autocrat may respond with “It will be taken care of” or similar. While not obligating
the government to a specific policy change, it does obligate it to resolve the conflict and grievance.
Third, the government official delivering the statement must occupy a position that grants them
the power to enact the promised policy change, or to speak on behalf of an entity that has such
power. Members of opposition parties and officials at very low levels of government may be in fact
unable to affect policies. Opposition politicians in particular may make promises to protesters that
are very similar to a concession in form, but actually require that the politician to request members
of the dominant party to make the concession. Another common issue pertains to conflicts that
involve a non-government third-party that had a special relationship with the government, such as
a religious body or a private companies that primarily hold government contracts. Commitments by
these entities that are made as a direct result of negotiations involving the state, or at its direction,
can be recorded as concessions. As always, knowledge of context is required.
3.2.2 A Typology of Concessionary Policy Change
Each concession is characterized by a specific promised policy change that may or may not ulti-
mately occur. A policy change is an action that involves a typical series of steps and an observable
result. Given the diversity of grievances, demands and possible government actions, the range of
variation in promised policy changes is enormous. To aid in conceptualizing the common types
of concessions, I identify five types of policy changes based on the core type of action required to
effect the policy change. These types were developed inductively from demands made by protest
campaigns in the former Soviet Union and concessions those campaigns were promised. The types
of policy changes are Reform, Enforcement, Investigation, Distribution, and Recognition. Exam-
ples of each type of policy change are available in appendix A.
• Reform: Formal modification, ratification or repeal of new or extant laws, policies, rules,
or procedures. These are formal policy changes that relate to laws and policies as they are
written, not as they are actually practiced or enforced.
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• Enforcement: Change in how existing laws and policies are used or enforced, without al-
tering how those rules are formally written. These concessions involve the informal use of
rules, laws and policies, as well as decisions about when and to what degree enforcement of
formal laws should occur and whom they should apply to.
• Investigation: Official investigative inquiry into events or persons, via administrative or
criminal investigation and related outcomes such as indictment, tribunals, committees, spe-
cial investigations, or reports.
• Distribution: Disbursement of material benefits, either directly, through changes to eco-
nomic policies, or the enforcement of existing economic policies. These can be public goods
that would benefit a large share of the population, or they can be particular to the protesters.
They also encompass both micro- and macro-economic concerns.
• Recognition: Consult or hold meetings with affected citizens in the future.
3.2.3 Proximity of Concessions to Demands
In the course of analyzing the efficacy of collective action, it is often of interest to understand the
extent to which the grievance that motivated the campaign is ultimately resolved. Concessions
can be part of that resolution, when the concession addresses the heart of the campaign. This is
not, however, always the case: many concessions do not resolve the underlying grievance. Some
concessions address very minor elements of a grievance, leaving the overall problem unchanged,
while others benefit campaign participants without altering the grievance in any way. Quantify-
ing how closely the concession hews to addressing a campaign’s demands allows us to answer
questions about the extent to which the government submits to collective action, when it attempts
half-measures, how often it makes unrelated but still beneficial commitments and so on. In this
section, I explain how I classify the concessionary promise’s proximity to campaign demands.
This variable can be used to analyze the extent to which concessions are effective at resolving
grievances.
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First, the campaign’s demands must be identified. Ideally, this can be done using official state-
ments or resolutions put forth by the campaign, text on a campaign website, or transcripts of
speeches at rallies. Using this information, the core demand can be identified and distinguished
from other demands. The core demand is the central concern motivating the campaign, which, if
addressed, would eliminate it. It is the one-sentence answer to the question, “What is this cam-
paign about?” It may appear in the name the campaign uses to refer to itself, and is the demand
that most commonly appears on placards at demonstrations.
Analyzing campaign demands is challenging because demands tend to evolve over the lifecycle
of a campaign. Demands may grow more numerous as the campaigns develops, or can be scaled
back to more attainable goals. This can be a response to changing prospects for “success” or
to evolution in the grievance itself that displaces earlier demands. Further, there is variation by
campaign in how formalized demands are. Some campaigns have a fixed set of specific demands,
while others issue a new resolution with each event, lack formal agreement on a set of demands, or
never publish an official list of demands. For this reason, although quantities such as the number
of demands may be of interest, it is unlikely to capture meaningful variation.
Consider the hypothetical example of a campaign called “Against Raising the Pension Age,”
which issues a resolution demanding that the pension age not be increased, the head of the pension
fund be removed, and that pensioners receive discounted fares on public transit. As evident in the
campaign’s name, its core demand is that the pension age not be increased. The two additional
demands are ancillary to that core demand.
Using this information and knowledge of the motivating grievance, each concession based on
three factors: 1) whether the concession addresses the core demand; 2) whether the concession
addresses an ancillary element of the main grievance; and 3) whether the concession addresses
an demand explicitly expressed by the campaign. These factors produce four observable types of
concessions, represented in table ??.
Core concessions are an answer to the core grievance that produced the campaign. A core
concession, if fully implemented, would demobilize the campaign by eliminating or undermining
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its motivating grievance. Subcore concessions correspond to ancillary demands that are formally
expressed by the campaign but would not eliminate its core grievance. Returning to the example
of the hypothetical “Against Raising the Pension Age” campaign, a core concession would be a
promise not to increase the pension age, whereas a subcore concession would be a promise to
discount transit fares for pensioners. Adjacent concessions pertain to the grievance but do not
correspond to a demand expressed by the campaign; they represent the state attempting to mitigate
the grievance in its own way. For instance, a concession distributing a small monthly cash sum to
pensioners that would pay for a limited number of transit journeys. Finally, wildcard concessions
are in some manner beneficial to campaign participants but do not correspond to an expressed
demand, and are tangentially related or not related to the grievance. A wildcard concession to
“Against Raising the Pension Age” might be the organization of a Pensioners Appreciation Day.
A final caveat: Proximity to demands should not be interpreted as a measure of acceptability of
concessions to campaign participants. “Acceptability”, though interesting to consider, is difficult
to operationalize and harder still to measure, not least because participants in protest are diverse
and have heterogenous opinions on what is acceptable.
3.2.4 Measuring Policy Implementation and Reneging
A concession is not simply the promise of a future policy change; it also encompasses the im-
plementation of that policy change. Assessing this is essential for understanding the contexts in
which reneging occurs, but not only. Monitoring how the implementation of a concession unfolds
can also generate insight into how the government manages obstacles to policy change made in
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response to collective action, for instance internal opposition or capacity issues.
Implementing policy change is a process that takes place over time, meaning that it must be
evaluated at multiple points in time. Moreover, because reneging can occur after a policy appears
settled, the policy must be evaluated past the point where the outcome appears fixed. It is this
temporal feature that truly makes a concessions-specific dataset, which can capture panel data,
necessary.
To assess implementation over time, research into the promised policy change must be con-
ducted. In many cases, this research must be conducted in addition to other efforts to observe
collective action or the activities of a campaign. The objective is to assess what actions have been
undertaken by the government to change the policy, with attention to the specific commitment that
the government has made. This may entail recording actions undertaken by the government to
make implementing the concession impossible. In particular it is important to collect the dates on
which milestones of implementation occurred, or to form estimates of them.
It is common for campaign participants to attentively follow the implementation of the conces-
sion and report updates to each other. These individuals are deeply invested in their causes and in
many cases communicate extensively about them on social media, from posting communications
with government officials such as official letters or reports of conversations, to documenting with
photographs of relevant sites, to checking in with each other about receipt of benefits. It is possible
these sources are biased and under-estimate the extent of the government’s effort or the implemen-
tation of the concession; indeed, it comes as no surprise that campaign participants are often highly
critical of the government’s response. When possible, their reports should be corroborated with
other sources. Government documents are preferred, however news reports, data from online map-
ping services, reports from industry-specific outlets, NGOs such as labor watchdog organizations,
or other sources as the concession demands, should also be used. When researching concessions
to everyday protests, which are often centered on low-profile grievances, the media—including
independent media—may not be particularly helpful, because policy change may lack a defined
“event” that can be reported on. When campaign participants and government assessments of im-
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plementation conflict and no additional information is available, I defer to campaign participants’.
For the data collected here, I researched policy change implementation for a period of up to
four years whenever possible. This period was selected to provide sufficient time for the govern-
ment to implement the policy change, which mainly occurs within the year following the promise,
and to assess the longer-term maintenance of that policy change. In other words, observing this
extended period it possible to observe reneging. In some cases, data was collected about conces-
sionary promises that were still within the four year period; these were evaluated up to the time
at which data collection occurred. All concessions had been promised at least one year prior to
data collection. In some cases, the concessionary promise obligates the government to complete
the policy change within a specific timeline. Unless the policy change is implemented within this
window and later reneging is theoretically possible, I do not evaluate it moving forward. For ex-
ample, commitments made to a campaign against the 2018 World Cup FanZone were not assessed
after the end of the World Cup.
Based on this information, I generate panel data by evaluating the implementation of each
concession at three-month intervals for the first year following the statement, and at yearly intervals
thereafter. I selected the three-month interval for the first year because during that period, the most
progress on the concession could be expected, yet at the same time daily or weekly information is
often not available. At each interval the policy change is scored as having most, some, limited or
negligible level of implementation or effect on real-world policy. Criteria are summarized in table
3.2. When the implementation score changes within a time period, the score that is in effect for the
majority of the time period should be used.
0 and NA codings are used where implementation cannot be scored. This occurs in several
scenarios. I do not score implementation where fulfilling the commitment made in the concession
has become impossible. An example of this is a concession where the government promised to do
something immediately, but did not do it for more than three months. After three months, a the
“immediate” component of the concession is no longer achievable. As another illustration, if the
government promises to prevent the destruction of a property or object, but the destruction subse-
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Table 3.2: Evaluation of Policy Change Implementation
Score Description
1 Concession has no or negligible implementation, no effect on policy.
No evidence suggests that the government is working to change the policy,
or the government has taken steps to make the policy change impossible.
2 Concession has limited implementation.
One or a few steps associated with the commitment have occurred.
3 Concession has some implementation.
Considerable aspects of the commitment are realized.
4 Concession is mostly or totally implemented, effects policy as promised.
Commitment is fully realized.
0 Concession is clearly in progress and implementation cannot be assessed.
NA Assessment of implementation not logically possible.
quently occurs, that concession is no longer scored. Conversely, concessions that were completed,
such as the repayment of wage arrears, were not scored after that completion. Also, concessions
that were invalidated by other concessions, making their fulfillment impossible, were not scored;
promises from higher-ranking officials or with more accelerated timelines are two examples of
concessions that might supplant others. Last, I do not score concessions where efforts to enact
the concession were conceivably underway but could not be observed, and that unobservability
did not violate the commitment in the concession itself. As an example, the campaign against
the renovation project earned concessions that would alter the terms of the resettlement of citi-
zens in new apartments, but it was several months before the program officially began and it was
evident whether the government completed the changes as promised. On average, about 65% of
concessions are scored for implementation in any given period.
This index has two important limitations. First, scoring implementation requires expert but
to some extent subjective judgment. In practice, cases of full reneging or full implementation
are easily identifiable: it is almost impossible to mistake one for the other. The border between
the middle two scores, limited and partial implementation, is somewhat less clear—although it
is likewise unlikely that concessions might mistakenly be coded at this level when they are in
fact fully implemented or fully reneged on. As the coding of implementation relied on expert
57
knowledge that I acquired in researching these campaigns and Moscow City politics, I was the sole
coder and unable to conduct any inter-coder reliability tests. For empirical analysis, these scores
can be operationalized in a number of ways to correct for this, if desired, including rescaling to a
three-level scale. Measures of reneging, discussed below, are designed to minimize this potential
source of error.
Second, this scale does not capture deliberateness. Reneging, as I have defined it, is a deliberate
strategy to avoid implementing promised concessions. To use this implementation data to measure
reneging, then, I must assume that the level of implementation is also deliberate. This scale, and
indeed the data available to researchers, cannot convey whether implementation is observed at a
certain level because of a deliberate attempt to block the concession, or for some other reason, like
a sluggish bureaucracy. The scope conditions of a high-capacity state were designed to minimize
this issue, as the state has the resources to change policy and distribute public goods in principle.
Moreover, in collecting data the concessions promised by the Moscow City government, I never
encountered a commitment that the government did not have the power or capacity to implement,
nor did I discover cases where campaign participants, the media or the government blamed the
failure to implement a concession on overpromising beyond the government’s capacity. Typically,
its commitments were soundly achievable. Many concessions only require that an institution prop-
erly perform the function it was designed for. In interviews with activists in Moscow, subjects also
believed that the government generally had the capacity to implement its promises; as one activist,
who had served in local government and ran a program that trained others to become engaged in
civic politics said, “I do not know of a single case when they sincerely wanted to do something and
did not.”2 The assumption of deliberateness is highly plausible in Moscow.
In the following empirical analysis, I operationalize my data on implementation to measure
reneging by creating an indicator of whether, at any time in up to four years following the conces-
sionary promise, no or negligible elements of the concession were in effect (i.e. if at any point, the
observed level of implementation was 1). This indicator was selected to avoid excessive reliance
2Interview with civic activist, September 24 2019.
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on the precision of measurement of implementation. This measure can be thought of as partition-
ing concessions where nothing or nearly nothing was done, and from those where some effort was
evidenced. As such, it is among the weakest possible definitions of reneging. If officials were
indeed making an effort to implement concessions but were prevented from doing so by exigent
factors, the incidence of reneging, per this measure, would be relatively low, since it captures cases
where the government has made no apparent attempt to implement the concession. In fact, as I
demonstrate in the following chapters, that scenario is quite common.
3.3 Protest Campaigns of Moscow Database
In this section I introduce the three interrelated datasets, of protest events, concessions and cam-
paigns, that together comprise the Protest Campaigns of Moscow Database (PCoM). PCoM covers
events, concessions and campaigns held in Moscow, Russia, about grievances that the Moscow
City government had the authority to resolve, from September 12, 2013 to September 18, 2018, a
time period that corresponds to Mayor Sergei Sobyanin’s second term in office. The three datasets
are linked by a campaign identifier that allows the user to connect information across the three
levels and aggregate or disaggregate as analysis demands. PCoM includes 66 campaigns, 122 con-
cessions and 795 protests.3 In focusing on a single, salient case over a limited time period, PCoM
serves as a pilot for a larger data collection effort and a template for future expansion. In the fol-
lowing, I describe the method of searching for campaigns, concessions and protest events, coding,
and then compare the data to other available data about protest in Russia.
3.3.1 Data Collection and Coding
To identify a sample of campaigns, I searched the websites of four news outlets that reported on
protests in Moscow: Marsh Nesoglasnikh (March of Dissenters), a liberal opposition website;4
3A number of protest events appear multiple times in the protest event data, a result of collaboration across cam-
paigns. PCoM contains 677 unique events.
4Marsh Nesoglasnikh (March of Dissenters), http://namarsh.ru/
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Kommunisti Stolitsi (Communists of the Capital), a site for non-KPRF leftists in Moscow;5 ar-
ticles tagged with the “Rallies and Marches” tag in the archives of the newspaper Kommersant6
and Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty’s (RFE/RL) English-language newswire.7 A key purpose of
both March of the Dissenters and Communists of the Capital is the promotion of protest events.
These sources were selected to provide coverage of activism from the liberal-democratic and leftist
extra-systemic opposition as well as from mainstream sources. From these four sources I created
a preliminary database of all protests in Moscow during the period in question, which contained
approximately 550 observations. I then grouped these protest events into campaigns, based on
grievance. From this campaign list, I identified those organized around issues that the Moscow
government had the authority to resolve independently of the national government and of private
actors, based on my knowledge of the case and additional research as needed. This excludes cam-
paigns over national policies, except when the grievance pertained to the city government’s local
implementation of national policy. In reality, the Moscow government does not operate indepen-
dently of the national government or other private interests, however I impose this restriction to
ensure that the full range of responses, specifically concessions, were available to the government
in principle in each case. Campaigns that were solely against private or non-state entities were also
excluded. This process yielded the 66 campaigns that appear in PCoM.
I then compiled timelines of the activities of each campaign and relevant events. My objective
was to create as exhaustive a record as possible of each campaign during the 5-year period of
concern. To do so, I did not rely on news sources. First, it had become clear during the first phase
of data collection that formal news outlets reported on protest with considerable less frequency
than activist-oriented websites. Kommersant and RFE/RL were both affected by this problem,
suggesting that the issue is not censorship, but newsworthiness.8 Many local protest events are
5Kommunisti Stolitsi (Communists of the Capital), http://comstol.info
6textit“Arkhiv - Federal’nyye izdaniya - Mitingi i shestviya”, Kommersant, https://www.kommersant.ru/
archive/theme/366/month/2017-12-01
7“Newsline”, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, https://www.rferl.org/Newsline
8Major news outlets do not report on all protests. They are more likely to cover new movements, where a large
turnout is expected, where violence seems likely and the participants are not typically seen at protests (Interview with
Moscow correspondent from major American newspaper, July 2018).
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simply too small and too niche to interest the general public. For example, the mass filing of
complaints at government offices and single-person pickets constitute about one third of the events
directed to the Moscow government, as observed in PCoM, but these are almost never reported
by the media. Still, these events are visible to activists and the government, so their missingness
from data may be problematic. In light of this I consulted a wider, more flexible set of online
sources. I relied on digital venues where citizens congregated to discuss their grievance, organize
collective action, and monitor the city’s response. While these documents are not fact-checked
as a newspaper article would be, they provide more comprehensive information about campaigns
before they hit the media’s radar. Where possible, I triangulated using multiple sources.
For each campaign I consulted approximately 25-200 Russian-language sources. I relied on
those that served activists and citizens affected by specific grievances where possible. My primary
sources of information were social networking communities on Facebook and VKontakte, blogs
(mainly LiveJournal), websites set up by the campaign to chronicle their activities, and activist
clearinghouse sites like Activatica.org and Mossovet.tv. I also used state affiliated and independent
news media; interest group-specific news sources; neighborhood or topic-specific initiative group
websites; message boards; online petitions such as Change.org and Demokrator.ru; OVD-Info,
an independent organization that collects information about protest detentions; mapping services
from Google and Yandex; and other sources. A full record of archived webpages will be available
online when the data is released.
Digital censorship is a concern in Russia, however it likely had minimal effect on my source
material. First, online censorship in Russia is less severe than in other authoritarian states such
as China. While several concerning laws have been passed recently (Human Rights Watch, 2020)
my data collection largely pre-dated these measures, as did most of the campaign activities I was
researching. Online censorship in Russia is largely clustered around highly politicized issues,
largely relating to political freedom. Everyday protests are both insufficiently politicized and likely
too low-profile and low-capacity to warrant censoring. Second, the digital communities I observed
rarely complained of censoring or information takedowns. Some did report online harassment,
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such as DDoS attacks, but these are short-lived and did not impact my ability to view source
material. In a focus group with protest participants conducted in December 2018, respondents
actually complained that their online organizing was not subject to greater censorship by the state,
because such repression would indicate that they had the government’s attention.
Independent of censorship, several campaigns had set up websites to document their work but
did not maintain the domain registration, which prevented me from accessing that information.
In these cases, I was typically able to rely on social networking communities. Other campaigns
organized in private groups on social media, which, given that they were small, neighborhood-
focused groups, I did not attempt to join. These groups still promoted their events and discussed
their activities on accessible websites about activism in Moscow.
Of course, I can never know what information I was unable to observe. Despite this PCoM still
represents a significant improvement over datasets of protest in Moscow compiled from newsmedia
sources, and is likely the most granular protest data ever collected for the city.
From these timelines, I coded three datasets: protest events, concessions and campaigns. The
protest event dataset records events for each campaign, held between September 12, 2013 and
September 18, 2018. My objective was exhaustive documentation of all events. No threshold for
participation was imposed. Event types include the mass filing of complaints, demonstrations,
marches, strikes, individual unsupported pickets, coordinated simultaneous individual pickets or
serial individual pickets, full pickets,9 sit-ins and occupations, blockades, riots, self-mutilation
and hunger strikes, published open letters, physical signature collection campaigns, the in-person
submission of petitions, leafletting, and bannering. Other events not fitting these categories but
constituting protest were recorded. Where an event likely occurred but could not be verified (e.g.
an event announcement but no documentation of its occurrence or cancellation could be located),
9In Russia, single-person pickets are legal without a permit. Protesters exploit this by holding two types of events
that I call coordinated simultaneous individual pickets or serial individual pickets. In a coordinated simultaneous
individual picket, picketers stand 50 meters apart, relying on the legal definition of a single-person picket. At a
serial individual pickets, protesters take turns being the picketer, sometimes queuing up for their chance to hold the
sign. Coordinated simultaneous individual pickets and serial individual pickets are therefore actually collective events,
whereas a single-person picket is not. A full picket, where multiple protesters stand close together holding placards
typically in front of the entrance to a government building or other contested site, requires a protest permit. I classify
these three types of pickets separately to capture this variation in legal status and coordination.
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it was coded and indicated as unverified. While some campaigns held events before and after these
dates, for many campaigns, most activity was concentrated in this five-year period. Information on
each protest’s participants, location, permit status, turnout, tactic, grievance and demand, as well
as the incidence of over 20 forms of repression were also coded. The expansion of sources meant
that the protest event dataset is significantly larger than the initial data collection: the number of
observations rose from 170 local protest events to 795.
Concessions for each campaign were identified and evaluated per the process described in the
previous section. Finally the campaign dataset aggregates information from both the protest event
and concession dataset with additional variables such as the use of appeals to the president, mayor,
deputy mayors or other officials; campaign use of legal action and petitions; the prosecution of
participants on charges related to protest; and statements of support from government actors, and
more.
3.4 Campaign Descriptives
In the next three empirical chapters, I provide multiple case studies and examples of the protest
campaigns observed in this data. However, to contextualize that analysis I briefly describe the
campaign-level data here to situate the types of grievances that generated everyday protest from
2013-2018. Table 3.3 summarizes the types of campaigns included in PCoM.
Under the mayoralty of Sergei Sobyanin, the government of Moscow has prioritized urban de-
velopment by expanding the city’s network of highways and roads, expanding the metro system,
introducing paid parking, revitalizing public parks, developing new residential construction, and
renovating degrading housing stock, which includes a massive program to demolish 5-story apart-
ment buildings and resettle residents in newly constructed high rises. These initiatives gave rise
to protest, most saliently where public land, for instance in parks or apartment building court-
yards, was requisitioned for development. Additionally, the Moscow government is responsible
for providing social services, which did not expand as rapidly as residential real estate. The city
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has struggled to reduce a decades-long waitlist for subsidized housing, resolve conflicts over the
de-privatization of industrial housing, and prevent its contractors from absconding with workers’
wages. A spate of problems with wage arrears was ushered in by the financial crisis from 2014-
2016 that followed the annexation of Crimea and international sanctions. Also during this period,
the Moscow government implemented national policies on reorganizing the educational and med-
ical sectors, which liquidated dozens of institutions.
There were few overtly political campaigns against the city government. Those campaigns clas-
sified as political were policy-oriented, for instance against the installation of a massive monument
to St. Vladimir on a fragile hillside near Moscow State University. PCoM records no campaigns
whose primary demands were the resignation of Sobyanin or the dissolution of his government for
two reasons. First, anti-regime campaigns that would likely include such demands were classified
as national and not coded. Muscovites tend to see Sobyanin as a local manifestation of the regime,
rather than a personal locus of power, meaning that replacing him would change little. Second,
while a few events were held under the banner of a lack of confidence in Sobyanin and other
members of his government, under the period of consideration these events were never organized
by a campaign devoted to this goal. These demonstrations were one-off gatherings that united
smaller groups of urban activists on diverse issues from around the city to raise awareness for their
campaigns; opposition to Sobyanin was their only common cause.
These everyday protests do not account for all protest that occurred in Moscow. PCoM excludes
protests targeted to the national government. These protests constitute a major share of protest in
Moscow, and certainly most (if not nearly all) of the city’s larger protests from 2013-2018. These
campaigns were organized around grievances such as the Putin regime and human rights in gen-
eral, the conflict in Ukraine and annexation of Crimea, political prisoners, and repressive laws,
such as those affecting internet censorship. On the socio-economic side, campaigns targeting the
national government launched protests against the 2018 law raising the pension age. These are
not included in this data. Local everyday protest campaigns are therefore unfolding in a broader
environment of protest. At the same time, everyday protest campaigns are to some extent inde-
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Table 3.3: Total of Concessions per Campaign by Type
Topic Examples Campaigns
n %
City Labor Non-payment of wages by City or its direct contract- 15 23%
-ors; poor and/or unsafe working conditions
Construction Construction of apartment buildings in public parks; 26 39%
densification via construction in courtyards; demoli-
tion of architectural landmarks
Healthcare Closure of hospitals and clinics in healthcare sector 1 2%
restructuring
Education Difficulties enrolling children of non-registered par- 3 5%
ents in kindergarten; closure of school for the blind
Highways Construction of Northwest Chord highway; 2 3%
construction of roadway through local park
Housing Extremely long waiting lists for housing benefits; 6 9%
evictions associated with unresolved ownership of
workers’ hostels
Political Construction of Orthodox temples as part of 200 8 12%
Churches program; harassment of street musicians
using anti-protest laws
Renovation Demolition of Khrushchev-era apartments and re- 2 3%
settlement of residents into new high-rises
Transportation Elimination of historical trolleybus lines; introduc- 3 5%
tion of paid parking in residential areas
pendent of these campaigns. National campaigns typically protest at sites of significance to the
national government, such as the State Duma, whereas local everyday protesters are more likely to
protest at the Moscow City Duma. Local everyday protest is also more likely to be held at sites that
are visible to Muscovites but not necessarily to the national media; there are a number of squares
outside metro stations across the city that are common sites of permitted protest. Additionally, the
responsive agents differ between these two types of protest. Definitionally, national protests re-
quire a response from the national government, while local protest does not. The repressive agents
that respond to national protests are also more likely to be forces specialized in protest policing,
while the agents responding to local protests are normally police.
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3.5 Representativeness of PCoM
Though PCoM draws on a diverse set of sources and aims to capture the maximum number of
everyday protest campaigns against the Moscow City government, some campaigns have inevitably
been excluded. The representativeness of this sample therefore warrants examination. Further,
although Moscow differs from the rest of Russia in important ways, it is worth considering the
extent to which protest in Moscow is consistent with or departs from collective action in Russia at
large.
The most comprehensive dataset on protest in Russia, the Lankina Russian Protest Event
Dataset (Lankina, 2018), exploits a major datasource on which PCoM is built. In light of this
I use protest data from a report issued by the St. Petersburg Politics Foundation for the Devel-
opment of Public Relations, which covers January 2016-July 2017 (Vinogradov, 2017). The St.
Petersburg Politics Foundation is a government-allied organization. The purpose of this report was
to provide a survey of the major sources of discontent and protest around the country and the forms
of government response that can be used to resolve it.
The report documents 737 protests over a roughly 18-month period. Each protest is classified
in the report by topic and subtopic. To facilitate comparisons to PCoM, I recode the topic for
each protest in Moscow in St. Petersburg Politics Foundation data to comport with the grievance
types used in PCoM. Figure ?? graphs this comparison. First, the distribution of protests recorded
in both datasets is roughly similar. PCoM includes a greater share of protests about construction
than does the St. Petersburg Politics Foundation data, however this may be because PCoM covers
a longer time period. PCoM also records more protests classified as political. The low share of
political protests in the St. Petersburg Politics Foundation data is consistent with the fact that there
were few overtly political protests in Moscow during the five-year period PCoM covers.
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Figure 3.1: Comparison of protest in Moscow observed by PCoM and Pro-Government Think
Tank
PCoM: September 2013 - September 2018; St. Petersburg Politics Foundation, January 2016 - July 2017
3.6 Conclusion
In this section I have demonstrated an approach to the systematic collection of data about conces-
sions, an overlooked yet centrally important response to protest, and described the data collection
for PCoM, a database about everyday protest activity in Moscow, Russia. In the next three em-
pirical chapters, I analyze these three linked datasets. In Chapter 4, I present a theory of how
the grievance-generating process structures the government’s treatment of everyday protest cam-
paigns. I test related hypotheses using the campaign-level data, with dependent variables generated
from the concessions and protest-level datasets. In Chapter 5, I explore the relationship between
concessions and mobilization. In order to do so, I demonstrate how the concessions data can be
transformed to be incorporated into a daily event catalog when analysis requires it. Last, in Chapter
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6, I focus on he concessions data, to identify which of the variables described here made be most
associated with various outcomes of implementation.
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CHAPTER 4
The Dynamics of Everyday Protest
A lot of situations could be avoided if the officials representing the Moscow
Mayor’s office could listen to the people who ask them to.
— Interview with a park defender, Moscow, September 2019.
What the Moscow authorities are really good at is systematically destroying what
they have decided to destroy.
— Tat’yana Vasil’yeva, correspondent for Communists of the Capital, writing about
the optimization of health care in Moscow, 2015.1
In Chapter 2, I argued that the strategic value of concessions and reneging to authoritarian
governments has been under-recognized. Alongside this, less highly politicized protest cam-
paigns about specific policy issues—which I call everyday protests—have been overlooked as
well. Rather than making revolutionary demands, everyday protests often ask that the government
protect the rights of protesters, provide them with services, or incorporate their opinions into its
programs. These policy-driven protests constitute a distinct politics that supplements the consulta-
tive governance that is characteristically deficient in autocracies.
These gaps in our understanding are linked: everyday protests, with their concrete policy de-
mands, are potentially favorable candidates for concessions, even in authoritarian settings that
militate against the inclusion of public input into policies. Concessions provide several potential
1Vasil’yeva (2015)
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benefits to the government: the demobilization of a troublesome protest campaign; the opportunity
to redress a grievances that could produce negative impacts longer term; an occasion to incorporate
citizens’ demands into policymaking without liberalizing elections or other potentially destabiliz-
ing reforms; and the enhancement of the image of the government or regime as “democratic” or
responsive. Reneging provides its own strategic benefits. With reneging, the government reaps
the benefits of a concession without actually deviating from its desired policy course. Essentially,
reneging can allow the government to have its cake and eat it, too.
Despite these benefits, it is not clear how often this strategy is used. The report on protest
from the St. Petersburg Politics Foundation referenced in the last chapter details the pros and
cons of strategies that government agents in Russia can use to respond to protest. The argument
against concessions states that “it is better that we demonstrate excessive strength and cruelty2
than concede to some power. It is not terrible to look unpopular or to poll negatively [prityagi-
vayushchim antireyting]. It is much worse to look weak.” (Vinogradov, 2017) Repression may be
more straightforward for the government to execute, though it risks inciting further protest. As the
report notes, “increasing pressure” can forcefully demonstrate who holds power, but the downside
is that “in Russia, the government itself usually creates the protest agenda itself” (Vinogradov,
2017). Further, high-capacity, consolidated authoritarian regimes continually develop and hone
tools of popular control that allow them to coerce without violence. Other strategies discussed in
the report include ignoring protest, “intercept the protest agenda through the imitation of dialogue,”
exacerbating splits among protesters3 and delaying a decision on the issue (Vinogradov, 2017).
In this chapter, I ask how a high-capacity consolidated authoritarian government responds to
everyday protest. How are concessions and repression used, and with what relative frequency?
What underlying features of everyday protest explain variation in the government’s response? Are
everyday protests an effective avenue to resolve grievances under autocracy?
I begin by detailing my theory of everyday protests. I argue that everyday protest dynamics
are determined by the institutional factors that generate different types of policy grievances. These
2zhest’kost can also be translated as rigidity or inflexibility.
3Interestingly, the report notes that the have “neither the experience nor the leverage for this” (Vinogradov, 2017).
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grievances, in turn, form the basis of protest campaigns. While not all policy grievances give
rise to protest, those that do vary along two key dimensions: grievances related to new/changing
policies, about which the government has higher information, and grievances related to status quo
policies, about which the government has lower information. Protest campaigns that are organized
in response to the former are about policymaking exclusion, and those that respond to the latter
are campaigns about policy performance. Campaigns about policymaking exclusion form when
the government deliberately limits public input in the formation of new policies and accepts the
risk that doing so may cause protest. Campaigns about policy performance arise when an existing
policy breaks down or fails.
Different types of protest campaigns elicit different responses from the government. Because
campaigns about policy performance convey new information about issues with existing policies
that can worsen if left unaddressed, concessions should actually redress those concerns. As the
St. Petersburg Politics Foundation report recommends, concessions should be used when “[t]he
protest action is a consequence of obvious shortcomings, which were not given due attention”
(Vinogradov, 2017). Repression against these campaigns should be lighter, designed to signal the
boundaries of acceptable protest behavior.
On the other hand, campaigns about policymaking exclusion emerge in cases where the govern-
ment pursued a new policy regardless of popular support. Rather than conveying new information,
protests against policymaking exclusion obstruct policy implementation. Concessions can be used
to remove that obstruction, by undermining mobilization. Simultaneously, the use of compara-
tively more severe repression raises the costs of participation and further depresses mobilization.
The government can then use this window of reduced mobilization to renege on promised conces-
sions and implement the policy as initially planned. While the St. Petersburg Politics Foundation
report does not discuss this strategy, it does recommend using delays in resolving a situation to
“to wait for the concentration of protest activity to decrease, while taking all the necessary for-
mal actions that will look neither like weakness [i.e. concessions] nor administrative pressure [i.e.
repression]” (Vinogradov, 2017).
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I assess this theory using a mixed methodology. I begin by classifying the protest campaigns
in PCoM as policymaking exclusion or policy performance, and validate this classification with
an analysis of campaign tactic choice. I then illustrate the campaign types with two empirical
examples, which provide preliminary support for the hypothesized government responses. Next, I
use regression analysis for hypothesis testing.
I find that concessions were promised to both types of campaigns with regularity: on average
over the five-year period, the Moscow City government promised everyday protesters a concession
approximately every two weeks. Many of these promises, however, went unfulfilled. Reneging
affected 44.6% of all promised concessions. Campaigns about policymaking exclusion were sig-
nificantly more likely to experience reneging, with almost half of the concessions promised to these
campaigns having, at some point, no real impact. I also find that, in line with expectations, policy
performance campaigns are met with less intensive coercion, characterized by threats and warn-
ings. In contrast, policymaking exclusion campaigns face high intensity coercion, in the form of
violence by police or non-state actors or via the police’s failure to protect protesters from non-state
actors.
4.1 A Theory of Everyday Protest
4.1.1 Policy Grievances and the Authoritarian Information Problem
Everyday protest campaigns are a response to policy grievances. These campaigns arise when a
policy produces or threatens to produce an unacceptable outcome for a group of people, who then
protest to demand that the policy be altered with a concession. The use of concessions is structured
by the institutional settings that produce those policies and translate them into grievances. Two
factors are key here: first, whether the policy is being altered by officials when the grievance arises,
and second, whether the government has sufficient information to anticipate popular resistance to
the policy.
In general, a policy cycles between a phase of policymaking, and a phase where the policy
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is status quo. The policymaking phase includes any modification to the policy, such as the ini-
tial formulation, amendments and alteration, and ultimately, cancellation. In policymaking, the
government could be regulating a new area, amending a law, moderating the reach of an existing
policy, creating a new program, or taking a new position. Because it is a deliberate act, a pol-
icy only enters a policymaking phase when government officials choose to consider modifying
it. Once policymaking is concluded, the policy becomes status quo, and is part of the day-to-day
standard rules and procedures of governing. A policy might shift between these phases multiple
times over its lifecycle.
In each phase, policy grievances arise from different sources. During policymaking, grievances
often arise when citizens find proposed changes to the policy unacceptable. That may be due to a
desire to preserve the current policy, to avoid anticipated negative outcomes, or to alter the policy in
a way that better suits their preferences. Grievances against status quo policies typically center on
issues of deficient policy performance. It is important to note that even in the absence of intentional
policy modifications, status quo policies still evolve over time. This occurs because of institutional
drift (Mahoney and Thelen, 2010), breakdowns in the enforcement, or other developments that
cause a mismatch between the policy and real world conditions. While not a sufficient cause, the
existence of a policy grievance is necessary for an everyday protest campaign to emerge, as these
campaigns focus on policy-specific objectives. Put simply, policy grievances sometimes produce
protest.
Before proceeding it is worth considering why the government may find everyday protests un-
desirable, if they are not regime-threatening, as I have argued. Everyday protests can still have
negative effects, even if they are unlikely to destabilize the regime. Responding to protesters’ con-
cerns can require considerable time and resources. Protests are inconvenient: they interfere with
policy change, obstruct policy implementation, and spotlight the government’s failures. These
consequences might cost officials their positions, affect elections, aggravate elite divisions, or even
undermine regime legitimacy. Finally, though the risk that an everyday protest escalates to a na-
tional campaign might be low, it is not zero: in 2019 in Russia, protests in solidarity with opposition
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candidates who were excluded from a municipal election in Moscow were held around the country.
Additionally, officials have a range of reasons to monitor policies that are unrelated to protests.
First, even autocratic governments must provide a baseline of quality of governance to sustain the
economy and mitigate political instability. This is important in high-capacity consolidated authori-
tarian regimes, for whom prestige as international economic and cultural power is increasingly im-
portant. Second, assessments of policy performance aids in the monitoring of lower-level agents.
The need for this type of information has been identified as particularly acute in China (Lorentzen,
2013). Third, when policies go awry, they are grist for the mill of the opposition and may drive
people to seek alternatives to the status quo. In the former Soviet Union, for instance, support for
autocracy is regularly attributed to “performance legitimacy,” or the government’s ability to pro-
vide employment, social services and other goods (Cook and Dimitrov, 2017). Poor governance
outcomes can undermine that legitimacy (Zhao, 2009).
To avoid these consequences, the government should attempt to determine when policy
grievances and everyday protest might emerge. This anticipation allows the government to pre-
emptively redress the grievance if it desires, including for the purposes of averting protest. Alter-
natively, anticipation allows the government to pursue a strategy of deliberate non-response and
allow the grievance to persist, because the desired policy change is worth it. Forming these expec-
tations, however, requires information about grievances and protest propensity. In autocracies, this
type of information is notoriously difficult to observe, because the use of repression suppresses the
regime’s ability to collect it accurately.
Known as the authoritarian information problem, this issue arises from two sources. On the
individual behavioral level, fear of sanction prevents some individual citizens from publicly ex-
pressing dissent, and leads them to falsely represent support for the regime in public, what Kuran
(1997) terms “preference falsification.” At the institutional level, the use of repression throttles
institutional channels, such as elections and the independent media, that could function to aggre-
gate information (Wintrobe, 1998). These conditions suppress the quality of information avail-
able about regime support, which makes it exceedingly difficult to anticipate revolutionary protest
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campaigns. This is because support for the regime is among the most sensitive, and therefore
dangerous, information that one might hope to gather in any autocracy.
While the authoritarian information problem is important, it is unlikely to seriously undermine
a high-capacity regime’s ability to collect information on policy grievances.. First, the extent to
which preference falsification affects opinion polling may be limited in Russia. In 2015, Frye et al.
(2017) used an anonymous list experiment to assess how much of Vladimir Putin’s approval rating,
which for the preceding 15 years had hovered between 65% and 90%, was falsified. They found
that even when anonymity was assured, support for Putin was approximately 80%, which was
within ten percentage points of the approval rating estimated with direct questioning. Moreover,
preference falsification is a function of topic sensitivity: the more sensitive a topic, the more likely a
survey respondent is to lie. Many policy issues that the government may wish to gather information
are not sensitive. For instance, respondents to a survey about the planned implementation of paid
street parking in their district have little reason to fear they might be repressed for answering
honestly.
On an institutional level, although democratic-type institutions that gather citizen feedback are
characteristically flawed in authoritarian regimes, some are more flawed than others. Some institu-
tions may be fully repressed or coopted while others function relatively well, and this can change
over time. For example, since 2008 the Beijing government has increasingly encouraged the devel-
opment of non-oppositional civil society, as a supplementary source of consultation (Teets, 2013).
High-capacity regimes are aware of the information problem and able to establish institutions and
mechanisms to acquire information on important topics. Nathan (2003, 14) identifies “input insti-
tutions...that people can use to apprise the state of their concerns” as a key pillar of the enduring
legitimacy of the Chinese Communist Party. These input institutions are often developed through
local experimentation, based on the local government’s needs (He and Thøgersen, 2010). Exam-
ples range from maintaining offices where citizens may submit individual complaints to conducting
polls to holding regularized consultative meetings. In China, Teets (2014) has termed this system
“consultative authoritarianism”. All high-capacity authoritarian governments have the capacity to
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assess the need for more information and choose when to activate these institutional solutions to
address that need. Finally, flawed institutions still convey some information, just with added er-
ror. For instance, turnout at authoritarian elections often serves as a barometer of regime support,
though the vote share may be fraudulent (Magaloni, 2006; Gandhi and Lust-Okar, 2009). Greater
density of institutions in a policy area can compensate for the flawed operation of any individ-
ual institution. When more institutions provide some information about opinion, the government
can roughly estimate the level of negative opinion about a policy. In contrast, when institutions
are sparse, the quality of information that each provides matters more. When sparse institutions
are dysfunctional, the government is more likely to have insufficient information about policy
grievances.
4.1.2 A Typology of Everyday Protest
Variation in citizens’ willingness to report opinions, institutional effectiveness and institutional
density means that in some — but not all — cases the government has sufficient information to
anticipate policy grievances, and therefore everyday protest. If the government has sufficient infor-
mation to identify a grievance with a status quo policy, it should generally intervene to address that
issue before protest occurs. Grievances with status quo policies indicate governance approaches
that were once adequate may no longer be so. These issues with policy performance will persist
regardless of the occurrence of protest, and redressing them now allows the government to avert
undesirable consequences in the future. The government may reevaluate a program, make person-
nel changes, take emergency measures or initiate a policy change to eliminate the problem. This
kind of policy maintenance is a central part of governance in general, irrespective of regime type,
but is especially common in high-capacity states, which have developed and well-resourced bu-
reaucracies. As a result, fewer grievances with status quo policies should persist to the point that
everyday protest emerges.
There are scenarios in which the government lacks sufficient information to anticipate
grievances about status quo policies. Some business-as-usual policies are not closely monitored
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and may be evaluated only when a problem demands attention. Even then, officials may suppress
negative information to protect their positions. Further, institutions that collect information on
grievances with existing policies frequently rely on citizens to initiate complaint processes that
are complicated and resource-intense; moreover, complaining may incite retaliation. When citi-
zens do file complaints, the government may not react until many complaints are received. Thus
the information environment around status quo policies may be afflicted by missing information
and sparser, lower quality information. Protest campaigns over a deficient status quo policy may
break out before the government has identified the existence of a grievance. I call these protest
campaigns about policy performance, as these protests focus on unrecognized problems with the
performance of status quo policies.
Government officials do not always want to remedy a policy grievance. Authoritarian gov-
ernments implement policies that run counter to subjects’ preferences as a matter of course, not
simply because of insufficient information. The associated risks may be tolerated if the policy
serves higher priorities, for instance implementing the autocrat’s agenda, retaining political con-
trol, or generating income for elites and allies. Given that failing to achieve these aims can lead
to the loss of position and licit or illicit income for a government official, the decision to move
forward with an unpopular policy may not be a difficult one.
During the policymaking stage, information about grievances is comparatively abundant. Pol-
icymaking is a deliberate process that the government initiates and manages. It requires officials
to gather and assess information. Officials might use surveys, community meetings, consultations
with experts and lower level officials, among other resources. If existing sources of information are
insufficient, officials can allocate resources to improve that information or delay the policy change.
Thus, during policymaking, information institutions are likely to be denser and higher quality, and
that policy grievances are more likely to be observed and protest to be anticipated. That anticipation
does not mean that an authoritarian government will catering to popular demands by eliminating
the grievance. Instead, the government may actively exclude popular input from the policymaking
process, and move forward allowing a known grievance to persist, even at the risk of protest. I call
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these protest campaigns about policymaking exclusion, because they emerge when the government
deliberately excludes citizens’ opinions during the policy change process.




New/Changing Policy Few Many
Policymaking Exclusion
Status Quo Policy Many Few
Policy Performance
In sum, the grievances that produce everyday protest can emerge during policymaking or when
the policy is part of the status quo. In some cases the government has sufficient information to
identify the grievance and assess the risk of protest, whereas in other cases, information is insuffi-
cient. These institutional factors yield two ideal types of everyday protest campaigns: campaigns
about policy performance and campaigns about policymaking exclusion. Table 4.1 summarizes
expectations for the observed incidence of everyday protest campaigns. Note that these expecta-
tions apply in high-capacity consolidated autocracies, as these regimes have an advanced ability
to detect and, if desired, correct policy grievances before protest is observed. In a lower capacity
regimes, everyday protests may be distributed across the four quadrants of the typology, rather than
concentrated in the diagonal.
4.1.3 Government Response to Everyday Protests
Just as distinct types of grievances produce these ideal types of protest campaigns, features of
the grievance affect how the government responds. Though much work on autocratic response to
protest emphasizes the goal of immediate demobilization, that goal depends on the assumption
that protests are threatening. If protests serve other functions, the regime may use them as an
opportunity to advance other objectives. After all, high-capacity regimes can pursue multiple
goals simultaneously, and in complex ways. The actors who respond to protest balance the desire
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to eliminate troublesome collective action with long-term regime objectives, such as maintaining
a baseline quality of governance, and personal goals, like serving elite interests. This means the
strategic use of repression, concessions, or both
4.1.3.1 Concessions
Policy performance campaigns serve an informational function: they convey new information
about deficiencies with existing policies, that the government has difficulty observing otherwise.
Depending on those deficiencies, their severity and long-term consequences, the government may
wish to change the policy—in other words, to make a concession. While this has the effect of
remedying the protest-generating grievance, it also protects the government’s longer-term inter-
ests. Problems with policy performance may worsen down the road; addressing them early avoids
later headaches. For example, when workers building Moscow’s new metro lines went on strike to
protest unsafe working conditions and construction shortcuts, meeting their demands potentially
decreased the risk of later accidents once the line was operational—or at least reduced officials’
exposure to later accusations of negligence; I return to this campaign later in the chapter. In other
instances, making concessions over policy performance allows the government to correct earlier
failures to meet its own standards and expectations. These campaigns expose instances where sta-
tus quo policies have not performed as planned, providing embarrassing evidence of government
incompetence. Overall, concessions to policy performance campaigns that eliminate the policy
grievance should be common. They should be more likely to address the core grievance that mo-
tivated these campaigns, rather than an ancillary aspect of it. Finally, these promises should in
fact be fulfilled as promised, rather than undermined by reneging, because they align with the
government’s long-term goals.
Policymaking exclusion campaigns arise against policies that the government has chosen to
pursue in spite of anticipated opposition. When protest actually emerges, it confirms expectations,
rather than conveying new information. This means that, generally speaking, policymaking
exclusion protests do not impact the government’s desire to pursue a given policy. Instead,
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these protests obstruct the government’s policy agenda. Eliminating this obstruction drives the
government’s desire for demobilization. Concessions can advance that goal in the short-term,
because the promise of a concession—separate from its realization in policy — makes mobi-
lization more difficult to sustain. Some protesters may believe a successful outcome has been
reached, others may see it as a bargain that demands the suspension of protest, and yet others
may be confused about whether further protest is needed.4 Recruiting new participants to a
campaign also becomes more challenging. This disruption means protests are less likely to
interfere with the unpopular policy change that the government desired—the very policy it may
have just promised not to implement. With protest weakened or suspended, the government
can renege, or deliberately fail to implement the promised concession. Counterintuitively, by
promising concessions, the government is better able to achieve the initial policy change as desired.
H1: Governments promise concessions at a similar rate to campaigns against policy performance
and campaigns against policymaking exclusion.
H2: The concessions promised to policy performance campaigns are more likely to address the
core grievance that motivated the protest.
H3: Concessions promised to policymaking exclusion campaigns are more likely to be under-
mined by reneging than concessions to policy performance campaigns.
4.1.3.2 Repression
How should the government’s use of repression against everyday protest campaigns vary? Sim-
ilarly, the severity of repression should vary by campaign type. I follow Way and Levitsky’s
(2006) distinction between high-intensity and low-intensity coercion. High-intensity coercion en-
4Interviews with activists in Moscow corroborated this, see Chapter 6.
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tails more visible and more violent acts of coercion against well-known figures or large groups, and
more generally other acts involving highly visible anti-democratic behavior. To this I add that high-
intensity coercion requires greater coordination among repressive actors, such as police, non-state
actors, prosecutors, judges, the penal system and beyond. Examples of coordinated repression
abound in the annals of authoritarianism, from the persecution of individual activists like Saudi
Arabian women’s rights activist Loujain al-Hathloul, to national crackdowns as in the aftermath of
the Tiananmen Square protests in China.
In contrast, low intensity coercion is characterized by less visible and generally less violent
repression. It is designed to curb challenges before they escalate. Low intensity coercion includes
surveillance, harassment and short-term detainment of the opposition. It also does not require
significant coordination between repressive actors. For instance, a detention may be the result
from the choices of a single police officer. This is particularly true in authoritarian regimes, where
restrictions on freedom of assembly create myriad opportunities for police to identify violations of
the law at protest events.
Because costs rise as repression becomes more intense, the government should use high-
intensity coercion with discrimination.I assume that this decision is a function of expected
duration of the campaign. Typically, policy performance campaigns have a limited lifespan,
because the government intends to eliminate the underlying policy grievance. Still, protest may
continue until that happens, so lower-intensity coercion ensures that protest does not escalate and
remains within the bounds of acceptable dissent. In contrast, the government does not plan to
eliminate the grievances that inspire policymaking exclusion campaigns. These campaigns are
therefore potentially long-lasting. Concessions can achieve short-term demobilization, but they
may not fully eliminate a campaign—an issue I elaborate on in the following section. Protest
can return once concessionary promises are betrayed. Even if the campaign loses the capacity
to hold demonstrations, tactics like blockades and hunger strikes only require a few participants
to obstruct policy implementation and raise awareness of the campaign’s cause. High-intensity
coercion can be targeted to increase the costs that these stalwart activists pay for protesting.
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H4: Governments use low intensity coercion against policy performance campaigns, and high
intensity coercion against policymaking exclusion campaigns.
4.2 Classifying Everyday Protest Campaigns
The independent variable is campaign type, or whether a given campaign is about policymaking ex-
clusion or policy performance. Per my theory, this classification is based on whether the grievance
arose against a policy that was actively being altered, and the availability of information about that
grievance to the government. In this section, I describe how I classify the 66 campaigns in PCoM
as policymaking exclusion, policy performance or neither. This process yields 40 campaigns about
policymaking exclusion, and 22 about policy performance. I then validate this classification by
comparing the incidence of protest tactics designed to obstruct policy change and protest tactics
meant to convey new information.
Grievances arise around policies that are in a phase of policymaking, or around policies that
are part of the status quo. Identifying whether a policy is in a policymaking phase is relatively
straightforward. A policy is in the policymaking phase when it is being drafted, amended, altered,
cancelled, or otherwise subject to a deliberate change. Examples include the calibration and en-
forcement of a new utility tax for repairs to housing stock, the decision to close several health
clinics, and the decision to permit construction at a particular site. This last example deserves fur-
ther scrutiny, as construction generates a significant share of protesters’ grievances. I classify the
permitting of land development, land seizure, demolition, problems related to the particularities of
planned construction and the actual construction itself as grievances arising in the policymaking
phase. Though these issues are not normally considered policymaking per se, they do represent
the government taking a deliberate action (e.g. making a decision about land use) that alters the
status quo ante. The example in this chapter of the For Ramenki! campaign and the case study in
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Chapter 6 of Save Park Dubki! both illustrate conflicts over land use and development.
I classify grievances as arising around status quo policies if the grievance pertained to the vi-
olation or insufficiency of an existing policy or issue, with no evidence of a recent government-
initiated change in that policy, and no articulation by the campaign of a recent government-initiated
change in that policy. For example, campaigns against the non-payment of wages or housing dis-
putes were classified as arising against status quo policies.
Measuring the availability of information to the government is more complex. Uncovering
what government agents knew what, when they knew it, and what they did with that knowledge is
challenging for a single case, on a single issue, in an open government; PCoM contains 66 cases on
diverse policy issues, from an authoritarian government. I use proxies to estimate the information
available to the government. Because the institutional setting depending on whether a policy is
being changed or in place as part of the status quo, I use different proxies to identify information
in each phase of the policy’s lifecycle.
When policies are changing, avenues for gathering information are abundant. Broad-purpose
sources, like Moscow’s polling website or surveys, are well suited to measuring support or opposi-
tion in direct questioning about new policies. New policies are also subject to approval processes
that can entail consultation with working groups, citizen roundtables and other experts. For con-
struction projects, public hearings are required for local residents to voice concerns. Many mu-
nicipal policies, from construction to the allocation of social services, affect a known population,
concentrated in a specific area or neighborhood. This makes localized survey work or focus groups
possible. Municipal deputies from that district can monitor the sentiment and hold meetings with
affected citizens. Other new policies affect well-defined and accessible populations, for example
users of a particular transport network or members of a professional sector, who can easily be con-
sulted. Overall, policy change is likely to occur in an information institution-dense environment.
However, this proliferation of consultative mechanisms can pose a problem for a government
agent who wants to implement his desired policies without taking citizens’ opinions into account.
First, collecting information about citizens’ opinions can be perceived by citizens as consultation,
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which creates the expectation of government responsiveness. When that feedback is subsequently
not incorporated into policy, it can generate an undesirable backlash. Second, consultative institu-
tions give citizens advanced warning about the upcoming implementation of an unpopular policy,
providing ample time to organize against it. Finally, the government learns from past opposition to
its policies. There are situations where a negative response from the public should be expected as
a baseline reaction, though questions about the intensity of opposition may remain. For instance,
medical workers were unlikely to support a 2014 restructuring of the healthcare system that was
planned to eliminate thousands of jobs, nor could residents of the Khoroshevo-Mnevniki neigh-
borhood be expected to support the construction of a new highway under the windows of their
apartments. If opposition is anticipated, the added investment of time and money into gathering
information, given the aforementioned downsides, may not be pursued. In all these cases, the gov-
ernment may deliberately manipulate, misuse or avoid consultative institutions that interfere with
their goal of policy implementation. By avoiding consultative institutions, the government can
prevent citizens from learning of a new policy until it is in effect or irreversible, when resistance
is significantly more difficult or even impossible. To be clear, the deliberate misuse or avoidance
of consultative institutions does not indicate that the government lacks information; rather, it indi-
cates that it has sufficient information to expect that the policy in question is unpopular enough to
generate some opposition.
For each campaign in PCoM, I recorded whether protesters identified the absence of consul-
tation or the abuse, manipulation and misuse of existing consultative institutions as part of the
grievance. Many campaigns explicitly incorporated the absence of consultation into the overall
framing of the campaign. Examples include barring citizens from entering the auditorium of a
public hearing, changing the time and place of public hearings or failing to announce them so citi-
zens cannot attend, claiming that permit hearings for a project were held ten years prior, conducting
fraudulent surveys, and passing a policy that exclusively impacts a specific group of profession-
als without consulting them or organizations representing their interests. This operationalization
risks including cases where consultation did occur as required and citizens disgruntled with the
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result misrepresented the government’s behavior. While I cannot be sure that this did not occur, I
would expect that it affected a small number of campaigns. In many cases, documentary evidence,
such as photos from public hearings where violations occurred, was circulated among campaign
members. Moreover, these violations were discussed in detail on social media sites and sometimes
multiple corroborating accounts were presented. I did not encounter any evidence that campaign
members conspired to misrepresent the government’s adequate use of information-gathering mech-
anisms. Indeed, it is difficult to imagine why a campaign would fraudulently use this framing, as
it would be easy for the City to demonstrate that proper channels had been followed, and therefore
to discredit the campaign.
Considering policies that are part of the status quo, the information environment is markedly
different and widely varied. Status quo policies are incredibly numerous; they essentially constitute
all laws, regulations, programs and so on that are not actively being updated at any given moment.
Many status quo policies are monitored and evaluated on a regular basis. This is particularly true in
a high capacity state. Thus in most cases, status quo policies are situated in a sufficient information
environment that allows the government to resolve policy grievances before they produce protest.
Yet even the highest capacity state cannot fully eradicate policy grievances; it is unavoidable
that some problems with status quo policies will slip through the cracks. That should happen
particularly often when the institutional mechanism to collect information requires citizens to vol-
untarily report problems. These institutions can fail in a number of ways: citizens may not be
aware of them; complaint processes can be complicated and resource-intensive; citizens may fear
retaliation for complaining; the institution may fail to aggregate related complaints to identify
a larger issue; and officials within the institution may deliberately conceal information that im-
plicates themselves or their allies in misbehavior. These problems should be ameliorated when
an organization exists to advocate for complainants. Organizations, such as unions or advocacy
groups, help reduce the cost that individuals are subjected to for reporting problems, from provid-
ing guidance on navigating the process to protecting individuals from retaliation. These groups
can also aggregate complaints themselves, negotiate with the government, and support collective
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bargaining.
In light of this, I assume that the government should have sufficient information about status
quo policies when at least one organization exists that both the government and the affected group
see as legitimate to aggregate grievances. This criteria is violated in one of three ways. First, an
organization exists that is recognized by citizens but not by the state; for example, people involved
in housing disputes often turn to the Movement of Moscow Hostels for support, which lacks legal
status and therefore is not an entity the government collaborates with. Second, the organization is
state-approved but illegitimate in the eyes of citizens. Most official labor unions fall into this cate-
gory; for instance, the Trade Union of Healthcare Workers of the Russian Federation is the largest
and oldest registered union for healthcare workers, however it offers little resistance to govern-
ment policies, even when they violate workers’ interests. The campaign against the restructuring
of healthcare in Moscow was organized by the independent Interregional Professional Union of
Health Workers “Action”. Finally, no organization may exist, meaning that information is only
collected when citizens volunteer it to the government. A campaign over the difficulty of enrolling
children without local residence permits in kindergartens across the city is an example.
Table 4.2: Classification of observed everyday protest campaigns (n=66)
Information
Insufficient Sufficient
New/Changing Policy 3 40
Policymaking Exclusion
Status Quo Policy 22 1
Policy Performance
Using these operationalizations, I classify the 66 campaigns in PCoM. Table 4.2 shows the dis-
tribution of campaign types. As expected, most campaigns were classified as about policymaking
exclusion or policy performance. One campaign5 was observed in the status quo policy/sufficient
information condition. Three campaigns6 were classified as changing policy/insufficient informa-
5This campaign was a strike by ambulance drivers that involved their official union.
6Of these campaigns, two strongly resemble policy exclusion campaigns, but activists never explicitly complained
about consultation (in one case because the campaign held only one event). The remaining campaign was against a
political firing at a university.
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tion. The four campaigns are dropped from analysis.
4.2.1 Validation of Campaign Types
I have contended that everyday protest campaigns about policymaking exclusion and policy per-
formance arise in meaningfully different informational settings. If this is the case, everyday
protesters—who are incredibly well informed about their grievances—should be aware of how
those conditions influenced their policy grievance and calibrate their tactics accordingly. Thus, to
validate whether these types capture salient variation, I consider the campaigns’ choice of protest
tactics.
Policy performance campaigns occur when the government lacks sufficient information about
grievances to redress them. If this missing information problem is truly at the root of these cam-
paigns, protesters should use tactics that exploit institutional pathways to increase government
information. The most direct avenue to doing so is filing complaints with government offices en
masse. This tactic entails a group of aggrieved individuals visiting a local or federal government
office and demanding to be seen by an official who can formally record or resolve their complaint,
or provide an update about its progress. A mass complaint is distinct from filing a petition, in that
the complainants are physically present in the space in a manner that is purposefully confronta-
tional. Several dozen affected individuals may gather at once. They often refuse to leave until
their complaints are submitted, sometimes leading to a sit-in, or attempts to overcome security and
forcibly enter the building. These collective events aim to overcome the institutions that failed
to detect the policy grievance and to provide a physical demonstration of the extent to which the
policy has failed. Often, the targets are institutions that require engagement with arduous, individ-
ual filing processes for a complaint to be registered, like the Housing Inspectorate or the Ministry
of Labor and Social Protection. Occasionally officials escape their offices through windows or
backdoors to avoid dealing with the issue.
Meanwhile, policymaking exclusion campaigns arise in high information conditions. Tactics
that convey information about the grievance are less necessary, because campaign members should
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expect that the governments has disregarded their opposition to the changing policy. Instead of
using tactics like complaint-filing, policymaking exclusion campaigns should use tactics that ob-
struct the implementation of the policy change. Blockades are particularly effective at impeding
construction projects, as protesters place their bodies between crews and worksites; in several cases
these tactics have delayed construction for years. Protesters also use blockades to stop traffic on
major streets outside prominent government offices.
The difference in usage of these tactics across campaign types is striking. The 22 policy per-
formance campaigns held 38.3% of protest events overall, but accounted for 80.7% of the mass
complaints. Policy performance campaigns deployed this tactic 167 times in the five year period
that the data covers. Policymaking exclusion campaigns were far more likely to blockade. These
campaigns were responsible for 61.7% of all events, but held 88.6% of all blockades. Policy per-
formance campaigns held only five blockades over five years.
This difference in choice of protest tactic is also statistically significant. Figure 4.1 is a coeffi-
cient plot of a series of negative binomial regressions assessing the relationship between everyday
protest campaign type and counts of the incidence of each tactic. Controls were also included for
the total number of events that the campaign held and the logged average turnout at demonstra-
tions, marches, strikes and pickets. (See appendix B for full regressions results.) Policymaking
exclusion campaigns were significantly less likely than policy performance campaigns to use the
mass complaint tactic, the focus of which is conveying information to the government. Instead,
policymaking exclusion campaigns were significantly more likely to resort to blockades to interfere
with the implementation of unsupported policies.
The differential use of tactics by these campaigns supports the proposition that fundamentally
different process produce the policy grievances that underlie them. Policy performance campaigns,
which are a response to a policy about which the government has limited information, are signifi-
cantly more likely to try address that deficiency by filing mass complaints. Conversely, policymak-
ing exclusion campaigns are far more likely to use tactics that obstruct because these campaigns
object to the government’s attempt to implement an unacceptable policy change.
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Figure 4.1: Everyday Protest Campaign Type is Correlated with Tactic Choice
Policymaking Exclusion







Policymaking exclusion campaigns are more likely to use blockades than policy performance campaigns. Negative
binomial regressions with 95% confidence intervals. Reference campaign type is Policymaking Exclusion. For full
results see Appendix B.
∗ Models include control variables for total number of events and log of average turnout at demonstrations, marches,
strikes and pickets.
4.3 Everyday Protest Campaigns: For Ramenki! and the
workers of Mosmetrostroy
To illustrate the variation in the ideal campaign types and to provide preliminary support for the
hypothesized government responses, I provide examples of each campaign type here. For Ra-
menki!, a policymaking exclusion campaign, began in 2014 in opposition to the city’s decision to
construct a multi-lane roadway through a local park. The strike at Mosmetrostroy—whose name
is an acronym of “Moscow Metro Builders”—broke out in 2014 over wage arrears and is a typical
policy performance campaign.7These examples draw on the case histories I compiled that are the
basis of the coding in PCoM. Both campaigns received a fair amount of coverage in the media, but
the sources I use here are largely from activists themselves. The case study of For Ramenki! relies
on the LiveJournal blog the campaign maintained; many posts were written by the local municipal
deputy who led the campaign. In presenting the strike at Mosmetrostroy, I draw on updates from a
7Mosmetrostroy was privatized in 2010, however its primary client is the city of Moscow and the company holds
billions of rubles in government contracts (Liauv, 2011). As one worker explained, “Metrostroy is Moscow, is [Mayor
Sergei] Sobyanin!” (Torocheshnikova, 2016).
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site that monitors social and labor conflicts, run by the Federation of Independent Trade Unions of
Russia and the St. Petersburg Humanitarian University of Trade Unions8 as well as accounts from
liberal-opposition media.
4.3.1 Policymaking Exclusion: For Ramenki!
Ramenki is a neighborhood located in Moscow’s Western district, near Moscow State University
(MGU). In 2013, local residents discovered a plan to construct a multilane roadway through a
small park when the tender for the project was posted (Arkaun, 2013). The proposed road was in
the vicinity of five kindergartens and three schools, and the fact that many children crossed through
the park to get to school, but would now have to cross a multilane road led the campaign to coin
the project the “killer road” (doroga-ubiytsa). This location also made the area subject to special
urban planning regulations that activists believed disallowed the construction of the road (Arkaun,
2015d).
Activists noted violations in the legally-required public hearing process. By June 2014, the
campaign was sufficiently concerned that hearings would be held during the summer holidays that
they began submitting requests to the prefecture administration and the mayor’s office that they
guarantee the hearings would not be held until September(Arkaun, 2014). Through 2014, the cam-
paign filed complaints and requests at the City Prosecutor’s Office, the City Property Department,
the City Department of Construction, the Mayor’s Office, the Ministry of Construction and the
Presidential Administration, and filed a petition with over 2,000 signatures (This list is not exhaus-
tive, additional complaints were filed later with other agencies). After some delays, public hearings
were announced on July 16, 2015, again during the summer holidays when many residents were
away (Arkaun, 2015e). The timing was ultimately irrelevant because these hearings were not in
fact held. Their absence became central complaint of the campaign.
Construction equipment was moved onto the site on August 4, although permits had not been
issued and proper land surveying had not occurred (Arkaun, 2015c). Members of the campaign
8Sotsial’no-Trudoviye Konflikti (Social-Labor Conflicts), industrialconflicts.ru
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demanded that workers produce permits (a common tactic for delaying construction, as it requires
work to stop until police can verify the documents) and were shown permit documents for a differ-
ent plot of land (Arkaun, 2015c). Construction began at the end of August, although according to
the campaign no hearings had been held, no permit secured, no approval from the district prefect
had been issued, and no sign-off from the Department of Education on the proximity of the road
to the schools has been made (Arkaun, 2015b). Any one of these issues would make the project
illegal.
In sum, then, by the time construction began on the killer road, the city had two years’ worth of
information about local opposition to this project. During that time, it had also taken steps to avoid
gathering more information, by preventing the holding of public hearings where locals would have
the opportunity to detail their opposition to this project. This is typical of a policymaking exclusion
campaign.
By September, residents had organized a round-the-clock watch to ensure that illegal construc-
tion did not proceed (this common tactic is discussed in greater detail in Chapters 5 and 6), and
blockaded the site with their bodies on several occasions. Additional protests were also held. In
response, dozens of private security agents dressed in black paramilitary uniforms began patrolling
the site (Arkaun, 2015a).
Shortly thereafter, the campaign received a response to the complaint it had filed with the Presi-
dential Administration that officially suspended construction “until the issue is resolved” (Regnum,
2015). However, the campaign did not report evidence of any kind of investigation or effort to can-
cel the construction during this period. Activists were invited to a meeting with the developer and
the “Moscow Urban Development Policy Complex”, but ultimately, this was used as an opportu-
nity to present the project, not to discuss the opposition or work out a compromise (Ramenki Men,
2015a).
In an innovative turn, during this pause, the campaign funded and constructed a memorial mon-
ument to the neighborhood’s heroes of the Great Patriotic War (World War II) in the park, and held
a well-attended consecration ceremony (Ramenki Men, 2015c). While the monument did appear
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to have great value to the community, it could plausibly have been a strategy to delay construction.
Victory in the Great Patriotic War and the sacrifices made to achieve it continue to be keenly impor-
tant to Russian national identity and for many Muscovites.9 For Ramenki! may have expected that
the government would be hesitant to destroy a popular monument such as this. It is also telling that
although Ramenki has many parks, the monument was built in the only one slated for destruction.
By November 2015, although the conflict had not been resolved per the Presidential Admin-
istration’s commitment and no permit had been issued, the construction company returned to the
site. Their strategy was to approach the park from a different geographic entry point that was less
well-patrolled by residents (anna nik0laeva, 2015). This initiated a two-month long stand-off be-
tween the builders, who attempted to move equipment onto the site and begin construction, and
residents, who used blockades and flash gatherings to prevent them. The campaign did not receive
the support of the authorities in ensuring that construction remained suspended; in fact, in De-
cember the local official responsible for construction in the district told activists that he had never
heard of the order from the Presidential Administration (Ramenki Men, 2015b). The official then
called the police to assist in removing protesters from the site, rather than the builders who were
there illegally.
The stalemate continued until February 2016, when activists were violently attacked. The in-
cident began when workers refused to present permits, but according to a leader of the campaign,
claimed that they had been “given a command from the city...to start construction and crush people”
(Ramenki Men, 2015a). Activists also reported that the police were apparently no longer interested
in checking documents on the legality of construction (Ramenki Men, 2016b). Several protesters
blockading the site were hit with construction equipment, and two were hospitalized, while oth-
ers were beaten by plain-clothes individuals that activists identified as private security. Activists
reported the presence of 20 plain-clothes security agents and 40 police, against 30 activists (Ra-
9In polling conducted from 1999 to 2017, victory in the Great Patriotic War was a source of pride for 82-89% of
Russians, far more than any other achievement(Levada-Tsentr, 2017). Around the time that For Ramenki! installed
the memorial, 68% of Russians identified as having a relative who died during the war (Levada-Tsentr, 2018). Addi-
tionally, during interviews I conducted with activists in Moscow, it was not uncommon for subjects to recount where
in Moscow their relatives had died during the war.
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menki Men, 2015a). Police did not intervene to protect activists (Ramenki Men, 2016b). Instead,
four activists were detained.
By March, construction was proceeding. At a roundtable (without activists’ presence) was held
on March 3 on the fate of the citizen-funded monument to the Great Patriotic War, and a decision
was made to relocate the memorial to a nearby military office (Ramenki Men, 2016a). At this
point, ceremonies had been held at the site of the monument and it had been recognized by the
Commission for Monumental Architecture (Ramenki Men, 2016a). Activists feared this meant
the destruction of the memorial was imminent and prepared to organize an overnight watch to
protect it, but construction crews surprised them by demolishing it in broad daylight, the following
day (Ramenki Men, 2016a; anna nik0laeva, 2016e). Following this, residents mounted a few more
protests, but construction had reached a point where locals felt the cause was lost.
The government’s response to this policymaking exclusion campaign, launched in concert with
the developer, featured promises of concessions with no evident effort to actually implement those
promises, as well as high-intensity repression. A municipal deputy attributed the intensity of the
repressive response and the city’s investment in the road to another major development in the
area (Radio Svoboda, 2016). Ramenki was formally targeted for the creation of a “tech valley”
associated with MGU and at the instruction of President Vladimir Putin in 2015 (MSU.ru, 2019).
Although the killer road predates the official start of the “tech valley” project, a representative
of the Department of Construction admitted in Fall 2015 that the road would connect an elite
residential housing to the “tech valley” (anna nik0laeva, 2015). It bears mention that the company
responsible for building the “tech valley” is associated Katerina Tikhonova, who is widely believed
to be Vladimir Putin’s daughter (Radio Svoboda, 2016).
4.3.2 Policy Performance: Strike at Mosmetrostroy
On July 20, 2017, approximately 70 laborers engaged in building the new Petrovsko-
Razumovskaya metro station halted work in a one-day warning strike. Most to all of the strik-
ers were employed by Mosmetrostroy. Strikers complained that they had not been paid for two
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months of work, arrears had become a chronic problem, and they were responsible for work-
related expenses like tools (Sotsial’no-trudoviyte konflikti, 2015c). These issues, coupled with
other on-going issues with metro working conditions, threatened to create unsafe conditions for
passengers (Torocheshnikova, 2016). Workers said that if their arrears were not resolved, a longer
strike would be called.
Prior to the strike, Mosmetrostroy workers had filed a report with the Prosecutor’s Office but
did not receive a response (Vesti-Moskva, 2015). Additionally, workers reported that the trade
union had been ineffectual in responding to the conflict, despite a union representative attempting
to settle the dispute once the strike began. Workers stated, “This is all the initiative of the work-
ers, not the trade union. And the trade union simply doesn’t exist. It only collects contributions
from us” (Vesti-Moskva, 2015). This is thus a case where both an existing policy—labor protec-
tions—and information-gathering institutions—the Prosecutor’s Office and the union—failed to
identify a grievance. Moreover, if unresolved, that grievance had potential to lead to negative con-
sequences beyond the labor dispute itself, in generating safety issues and construction delays in
the Moscow metro, which is one of the busiest in the world and which Mayor Sergei Sobyanin has
prioritized expanding. The first deputy head of the Moscow Construction Department identified
the situation as an emergency (Marsh Nesoglasnikh, 2015). These features are typical of policy
performance campaigns.
The response to the strike was immediate. The General Director of Mosmetrostroy promised to
pay the arrears in a televised interview (Vesti-Moskva, 2015). The city government held a meet-
ing with representatives of the striking workers the following day (Sotsial’no-trudoviyte konflikti,
2015a). The Moscow Prosecutor’s Office launched an investigation that identified unpaid wages to
900 employees and other violations of labor law, and ultimately compelled Mosmetrostroy to pay
52 million rubles in back wages along with 253,000 rubles in additional compensation (Sotsial’no-
trudoviyte konflikti, 2015b). Mosmetrostry paid these back wages, although they failed to meet
the delivery schedule. (Marsh Nesoglasnikh, 2015). Mosmetrostroy’s ongoing financial difficulties
(and eventual bankruptcy in 2018) made arrears a recurrent problem and led workers to attempt
94
to affiliate with independent trade unions to advocate for their interests (Torocheshnikova, 2016).
Still, the specific promises that the workers received—that their wages would be repaid and in-
vestigation would be held—were fulfilled, even if they failed to eliminate the problem of arrears.
Striking workers were not met with repression from the government, although some felt their
wages were later cut in retaliation for the strike (Marsh Nesoglasnikh, 2015).
Though this campaign held only one protest event before receiving a concession, this is not
unusual for strikes of government employees or employees of state-owned enterprises and major
city contractors. In fact, it is consistent with the features of policy performance campaigns that I
theorized above: these campaigns emerge around problems that the government would prefer to
solve, had it had prior knowledge of them, to avoid escalating negative consequences in the future.
A quick resolution obviates the need for more intense repression. However, the case of Mosmet-
rostroy also demonstrates that while the government uses concessions to resolve the immediate
problem, that does not mean it takes steps to correct the underlying systemic issue. The strike
at Mosmetrostroy occurred at a time when wage arrears were rampant (due to the financial crisis
provoked by Russia’s annexation of Crimea and subsequent sanctions) and were known to have
affected many companies engaged in city-funded construction projects (NewsRu.com, 2015). The
city’s failure to address this problem likely stems from the fact that these companies are owned by
oligarchs and in at times, former officials, and these construction contracts, which can be billions
of rubles, generate enormous illicit income (RBK, 2015).
4.4 Quantitative Analysis
The case studies of For Ramenki! and Mosmetrostroy provide support for the hypothesized re-
lationship between government response to protest campaigns and campaign type. I now turn to
quantitative analysis to interrogate this relationship.
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4.4.1 Dependent Variables and Controls
To aggregate data about concessions to the campaign level, I use the count of concessions that the
campaign was promised between 2013 and 2018. To assess the quality of concessionary promises,
I use a binary indicator to identify core concessions, which address the central demand expressed
by the campaign (see 3.2.3). I measure reneging with an indicator of whether at any time in up to
four years following the concessionary promise, no or negligible elements of the concession were
in effect (see 3.2.4). To aggregate to the campaign level, the concession variables are summed.
To test hypotheses related to repression, I operationalize low and high intensity coercion as
follows. Lower-intensity coercive acts are less violent and less visible, and do not involve the co-
ordination of actors at multiple levels of government to achieve. To capture low intensity coercion,
I use the count of protest events at which campaign participants were verbally threatened (e.g.
reminded that they may be arrested if action continues) or implicitly threatened (e.g. dispropor-
tionate police presence) at least one event. (Note that this excludes intimidation that occur outside
of protest events.) This variable relies on protesters’ sense of threat or intimidation, as reported
in their accounts of their events. It therefore captures a subjective impression of events. If no
written account is available, I also identify a threat as occurring if posted photos emphasize police
presence, such as photos of police watching protesters or photos of vans or buses for transporting
detainees. These threats can be considered the lowest possible bar of repression; indeed, most other
datasets do not document them despite collecting a large number of variables about repression.
To capture high intensity coercion, I consider forms of repression that result in visible acts
of violence and/or require the coordination of multiple actors. First, I use the count of protest
events at which a protester was injured. Injuries resulted from beatings by police, from aggressive
detention tactics, and from attacks by non-state actors, for instance hitting protesters with cars or
construction equipment. Second, I use a count of protest events at which police did not intervene
to prevent non-state actors from harming or harassing protesters. Non-state actors include soccer
hooligans, motorcycle gangs, counter-protesters, religious gangs, or private security forces. These
groups may or may not be paid, and can appear at the request of the government, a third party to
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the conflict, or under their own initiative.
Third, I use a binary indicator of whether a campaign member was indicted on a charge related
to protesting at any point in the period covered by PCoM. Because detention is often used synony-
mously with prosecution or conviction, it bears underscoring that these are different phenomena.
A detention occurs when an individual is taken into the custody of the police. The decision to pros-
ecute a detained individual is a separate act, entailing collaboration between police and prosecu-
tors. Many detentions do not lead to prosecution.10 Normally prosecution relates to administrative
charges that pertain to the legality of the protest event (e.g. holding or attending an illegal event) or
disobeying police orders.11 Penalties are typically fines but more severe consequences involve, for
example, brief custodial sentences. Consequences escalate for repeat offenders, protest organiz-
ers and protest permit-holders, who may bear responsibility for the behavior of other protesters.12
While it would be preferable to have more granular data about prosecutions, such as the number of
individuals charged, the timing of those charges, and sentencing, collecting consistent data about
prosecution is challenging. While the cases of political or anti-regime detainees are often closely
observed, everyday protesters do not attract the same attention and may not publicize their case,
seeing it as a private matter.
Although detentions are a common measure of repression and PCoM records the detention of
approximately 500 individuals, I do not use detentions in this analysis. While detentions can in-
dicate repression in general, my hypothesis requires that I discriminate between low intensity and
high intensity coercion. This is impossible. Detentions can result from an of-the-moment, unsuper-
10Many detainees are processed and released without charges, meaning the major consequence of the detention is a
few hours spent at a police station and what Russian activists often call a “corrective conversation” or warning. Some
activists, especially campaign organizers, are detained repeatedly, held for longer periods in worse conditions and
subsequently prosecuted.
11The primary articles under which protesters were charged—Article 20.2 of the Administrative Code (20.2 KoAP
RF), which governs violations of procedure for organizing or holding a demonstration, march or picket or similar
event, or prosecution under other articles, and Article 19.3 (19.3 KoAP RF), which pertains to refusing to comply
with orders from police or similar authorities—allow for significant discretion in sentencing. For instance, penalties
associated with Article 19.3 are either a fine of 500-1000 rubles (less than $15) or two weeks of detention. Article
20.2 allows for fines up to hundreds of thousands of rubles, but not detention. Both include escalating consequences
for repeat offenders.
12In 2014, the consequences for violations of 19.3 and 20.2 were increased, see Federal’nyy Zakon ot 21.07.2014
N 258-FZ “O Vnesenii Izmeneniy V Otdel’nyye Zakonodatel’nyye Akty Rossiyskoy Federatsii V Chasti Sovershen-
stvovaniya Zakonodatel’stva O Publichnykh”
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vised decision by police on the scene, which suggests low intensity coercion. They can also be part
of a coordinated, sustained effort to repress a campaign or persecute certain individuals—evidence
of high intensity coercion. Finally, detentions can arise from protesters’ actions, such as the tactics
that antagonize police or that deliberately violate the law. Here a detention would be better consid-
ered evidence of the enforcement of law and order rather than political repression. Appendix ??
presents regression results that support the absence of a defined relationship between the campaign
type and detentions.
I control for factors that could contribute to concessionary or repressive state responses. First,
the number of events the campaign organized during the five-year period, the log average turnout
at events that require mass participation (demonstrations, strikes, marches and full pickets)13 and
the number of years the campaign conducted protests during the five-year period control for the
campaign’s overall organizational capacity and the number of people affected by the grievance.
Binary variables indicate whether the campaign has held an illegal (non-permitted) demonstration
and whether it organized at least one blockade or sit-in. (While policymaking exclusion campaigns
blockade more often, policy performance campaigns held the majority of sit-ins.) To capture the
salience of the campaign, I control for whether the campaign held at least one event at the Moscow
City Duma, the seat of the Moscow City government. Finally, I include an indicator of the par-
ticipation of the Communist Party of the Russian Federation (KPRF). The KPRF is a sanctioned
opposition party and the country’s second most popular political party, with representation at ev-
ery level of government. The participation of the KPRF in a protest could make concessions more
likely, as it may lead to the elevation of citizens’ grievances, and it may affect repression, particu-
larly as the attendance of an elected politician at a protest in some conditions grants the gathering
legal status. In models where the unit of observation is the concession, I also control for the total
number of concessions the campaign was promised.
To investigate how features of the grievance affect contention, I use regression analysis. Unless
otherwise indicated, I use quasi-poisson regression, as the dependent variables are counts with
13To account for protest campaigns that never held an event that requires mass participation, meaning that the
un-logged value of this variable is 0, I take the log of average turnout plus one.
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limited dispersion. The independent variable, campaign type, is categorical. Throughout, the
reference category is campaigns about policymaking exclusion.
4.4.2 Analysis and Results
4.4.2.1 Concessions
Above, I argue that everyday protest campaigns about policymaking exclusion and policy perfor-
mance should be promised concessions at a similar rate; however concessions made to policy per-
formance campaigns should be more likely to meet the campaign’s primary demands, and should
be less likely to be undermined with reneging.
Considering first the rate at which campaigns won the promise of concession, overall, 43 of the
62 campaigns were promised a total of 121 concessions. Eighty four, or 69.4% of these conces-
sions were made to campaigns against policymaking exclusion, with the remaining 37, or 30.5%
going to campaigns against policy performance. Of the 40 policymaking exclusion campaigns,
32.5% did not achieve the promise of a concession, whereas this number is slightly lower for pol-
icy performance campaigns, where 27.3% of the 22 campaigns were not promised concessions.
The maximum number of concessions a single campaign received was nine, promised to a policy-
making exclusion campaign against a city-wide housing renovation program. Figure 4.2 and table
4.3 provide summary information about the number of concessions promised to each campaign
type.
Table 4.3: Total of Concessions per Campaign by Type
Policymaking Policy
Exclusion Performance
n Campaigns 22 40
n Campaigns Promised Concessions 16 (72.7%) 27 (67.5%)
n Concessions 37 84
Avg Concessions per Campaign
all campaigns 1.7 2.1
receiving 1+ concessions 2.3 3.1
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At first glance, these data support the proposition that policymaking exclusion and policy per-
formance campaigns are promised concessions at a similar rate. Policymaking exclusion cam-
paigns on average received 2.1 concessions each, while policy performance campaigns on average
received 1.7 concessions each. Pearson’s Chi-squared test of the relationship between campaign
type and the number of concessions does not suggest an association between these variables (χ2
(7, N = 62) = 4.44, p = .73), nor for the binary indicator of receipt of a concession (χ2 (1, N = 62)
= 0.02, p = .89).
Figure 4.3 summarizes the results of regressing the campaign type on the number of concessions
that each campaign was promised; full regression tables are presented in Appendix C. As expected,
in no model specification is this relationship statistically significant. Of note is the fact that the
rate of concessions appears unrelated to other control variables, with the exception of the number
of events the campaign held, which is a positive and statistically significant effect. Turnout and
the number of years the campaign was active did not have a significant effect. This suggests
that concessions may partly be a function of a campaign’s shorter-term capacity to mobilize and
organize protest events, even if those events are not massive in scale.
Overall, concessionary promises hewed closely to campaign demands. 42.1%, the largest
100















There is no statistically significant difference in the number of concessions received by policymaking exclusion and
policy performance campaigns. Dependent variable is the number of concessions. Quasipoisson regressions.
Reference campaign type is Policymaking Exclusion. For full results see Appendix C.
share of concessions promised to everyday protest campaigns, addressed the core demands of the
protest campaign, with 33.1% addressing subcore demands, meaning that in total three quarters of
promised concessions met a demand that the protest campaign specifically expressed. 21.5% of
concessions promised policy changes that were adjacent to the campaign’s demands and only 3.3%
were largely unrelated to the campaign’s concerns. This suggests that everyday protest campaigns
indeed have the potential to affect governance in settings where traditional democratic forms of
consultation are suppressed. Further, it demonstrates that concessions are distinct from patronage
or transactional distribution: because everyday protest campaigns center on a specific problem,
concessions that entail general financial or material benefits that did not redress the grievance were
classified as wildcard concessions, which were rarely used. Last, the quality of these concessions
provides perspective on the risk of protest diffusion. It is often assumed that the government should
hesitate to grant concessions because other groups may be inspired to mobilize for similar benefits.
This data indicates that the government of Moscow makes concessions that are tightly linked to
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campaign demands, and therefore also particular settings and conflicts, rather than promising more
generalized benefits. This likely lessens the risk of diffusion, by making concessions specific to
unique features of the grievance, though more research is needed on this topic.
Which campaign is more likely to be promised concessions that actually address the underlying
grievance? Figure 4.4 presents the relationship between everyday protest campaign type and qual-
ity of concession. 59.5% of the concessions promised to policy performance campaigns addressed
the campaign’s core demand, whereas only 34.5% of concessions promised to policymaking ex-
clusion campaigns did so. Policy performance campaigns were about as likely to receive adjacent
concessions that pertained to the grievance more broadly without corresponding to a specific cam-
paign demand as they were to receive a core concession. Logistic regression models using a binary
indicator of whether the campaign received a core concession (regressions are summarized in fig-
ure 4.5; full results are in Appendix C) also demonstrate that policymaking exclusion campaigns
are indeed less likely to be promised core concessions, and that this relationship is statistically
significant. In regression analysis on the 121 concessions, a concession to a policy performance
campaign is more likely to be a core concession than a concession to a policymaking exclusion
campaign; this relationship is also statistically significant (see Appendix C).
Table 4.4: Quality of Concessions per Campaign by Type
Wildcard Adjacent Subcore Core
Policy Performance 3 3 9 22
Policymaking Exclusion 1 23 31 29
Regardless of the quality of the promised concession, it will have little impact on real policies
if reneging occurs. Broadly, reneging is common, affecting 54 of the 121 all concessions during
this period, or 44.6%. Disaggregating by campaign type, 43 of the concessions promised to pol-
icymaking exclusion campaigns, or 52.1%, at some point had negligible impact on real policies.
For policy performance campaigns, only 11 concessions, or 29.7%, were similarly affected by
reneging.
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Percentage of all concessions that each campaign type received that addressed primary grievance that motivated the
protest (core), secondary demands that the campaign expressed (subcore), aspects of the grievance about which the
campaign did not make demands (adjacent), and unrelated issues (wildcard).
Regression analysis supports this relationship. I subset the data to include only the 43 cam-
paigns that received at least one concession, as this is a necessary precondition for reneging to
occur. Figure 4.6 summarizes regressions of campaign type on a count of concessions affected by
reneging (for full results, see Appendix C). All model specifications point to a statistically signif-
icant relationship in the hypothesized direction. The total number of concessions that a campaign
received is also positively and significantly correlated with reneging, indicating that as a campaign
receives more concessionary promises, the less likely it is to see those promises realized. Simi-
larly, in models analyzing the individual concessions, a concession to a policymaking exclusion
campaign is more likely to have no real-world impact on policy and behavior, compared with a
concession to a policy performance campaign; this finding is also statistically significant.
4.4.2.2 Repression
I expect that policymaking exclusion and policy performance campaigns experience repression at
different levels of intensity. Policy performance campaigns, which arise around grievances the
government intends to address, should be subject to low intensity coercion, as characterized by
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Policymaking exclusion are less likely to receive core concessions than policy performance campaigns.
Dependent variable is an indicator of receipt of one or more core concession. Binomial logit regressions. Reference
campaign type is Policymaking Exclusion. For full results see Appendix C.
threats and harassment. Policymaking exclusion campaigns, in contrast, should encounter high
intensity coercion. These tactics include the use of violence against protesters, police inaction to
protect protesters from non-state actors and the prosecution of activists on protest-related charges.
Figure 4.7 depicts the relative rates of repression used against the two types of campaigns,
where the percentages capture the share of campaigns that encountered the use of that tactic at
least once. Policy performance campaigns were most likely to receive threats or warnings, but
these threats were comparatively unlikely to be followed by higher-intensity coercive methods.
Policymaking exclusion campaigns were more likely to encounter two types of coercion that I
identify as higher-intensity: the use of violence at protests, and the inaction of law enforcement to
protect protesters from non-state actors. Both campaigns experienced the prosecution of campaign
participants on protest-related charges at a similar rate, around one third. The experience of re-
pression was not universal. Sixteen campaigns, about one quarter, encountered none of these four
coercive responses, nor did they experience a detention.
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Policymaking exclusion campaigns encounter reneging significantly more often than policy performance campaigns.
Dependent variable is the number of concessions affected by reneging. Quasipoisson regressions. Reference
campaign type is Policymaking Exclusion. For full results see Appendix C.
Figure 4.8 presents a coefficient plot summarizing regression analysis of the relationship be-
tween campaign type and these different forms of repression. Full regression results, using both
binary and count variables where applicable, are presented in Appendix C.
I operationalize low intensity coercion as the occurrence of threats or warnings, which could
be verbal, as in cues to disperse, or non-verbal, such as the presence of large number of police or
transport for detainees at an event. Unsurprisingly given their low cost, threats are overall the most
common form of repression, occurring at 95 of 677 individual protest events across all campaigns.
52 of these (54%) occurred at events organized by policy performance campaigns, which is dis-
proportionate given that only 38% of the events in PCoM are associated with policy performance
campaigns. In total, 37 campaigns encountered threats; of these 15 were policy performance cam-
paigns and 22 were policymaking exclusion campaigns. All models demonstrate the relationship
as theorized: policymaking exclusion campaigns are less likely to encounter threats than are policy
performance campaigns.
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While both policy performance and policymaking exclusion campaigns encountered threats and warnings, a greater
share of policymaking exclusion campaigns experienced more intensive coercion in the form of instances of violence,
the inaction of police to protect protesters, and prosecution on protest-related charges.
I measure high-intensity coercion in three ways: using the incidence of events involving vi-
olence, events where the police deliberately failed to intervene to protect protesters from other
actors, and the incidence of prosecution of a member of the campaign on protest-related charges.
Of the 30 violent events recorded in PCoM, 25 affected policymaking exclusion campaigns. This
included 18 unique policymaking exclusion campaigns, but only 4 unique policy performance
campaigns. Similarly, of the 22 instances where the police failed to protect protesters, 21 affected
policymaking exclusion campaigns (15 unique campaigns). Regression analysis of binary measure
of violent instances experienced by each campaign indicates that policymaking exclusion cam-
paigns indeed encounter a higher rate of violence than policy performance campaigns, though the
association using the count variable is weaker. Similarly, all model specifications point to the fact
that policymaking exclusion campaigns were less likely to be protected by law enforcement when
experiencing violence from non-state actors, at a statistically significant level.
The rate of prosecution between both campaigns is more comparable. An instance of prosecu-
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tion affected about one third of both types of campaigns (8 policy performance campaigns and 13
policymaking exclusion campaigns). I run two sets of models with an indicator of prosecution as
the dependent variable, one using the full dataset of 62 campaigns, and one using data subsetted to
the 32 campaigns that experienced at least one detention at a protest.14 Logistic regression analysis
does not support a relationship between campaign type and prosecution. This null result poten-
tially arises from the coarseness of the data, which does not measure the number of prosecutions
nor the consequences. It is also possible that prosecution is driven by external trends, such as an
increased city-wide emphasis on prosecuting protesters.








n Police Inaction Events
Prosecution
Policymaking exclusion campaigns are less likely to experience threats or warnings than are policy performance
campaigns, but are more likely to encounter violence and incidents where the police fail to protect protesters. There
is no significant relationship between campaign types and prosecution.
Notes: All models are bivariate, see regression tables for full model specification. Reference category is Policymaking
Exclusion campaigns. Outer bars represent .95 confidence interval; inner bars represent .9 confidence interval. Unit
of observation is the protest campaign except where * indicates that unit of observation is the concession.
14Two campaigns saw individuals prosecuted on protest-related charges but they were arrested after a protest event.
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4.5 Alternative Explanations
In the foregoing, I have provided strong evidence to support the theory that underlying features
of the grievance that motivates a protest campaign plays a decisive role in how the government
response to that campaign, and policymaking exclusion and policy performance campaigns are
met with different responses by the government. In this section, I discuss alternative explanations
for the government’s differential treatment of these campaigns.
4.5.1 Concessions as Political Distribution
Some approaches see concessions as political patronage— benefits distributed to supporters or
potential supporters—yet it is unlikely that patronage is driving these dynamics. The groups re-
ceiving these concessions are generally far too small to represent any kind of an electoral force, and
often, they are politically neutral or supporters of the government. Policy performance campaigns
are more likely to actually receive the benefits associated with a concession, yet the members of
these campaigns are often particularly politically disempowered. Labor disputes, like the one at
Mosmetrostroy, are 14 of the 22 policy performance campaigns. The workers involved in these
disputes are often migrant workers. If Russian, they are often not permanent residents of Moscow,
meaning they do not vote locally. In some cases, they are not Russian citizens: two campaigns
included the involvement of an organization to support Tajik migrant workers and one involved the
local Kyrgyz embassy.
It is possible that concessions could be used to distribute benefits specifically to members of
a governing coalition. While that may occur in other settings, it does not drive concessions in
Moscow or likely anywhere in Russia. Russia is not governed by coalition, but by a dominant
party, United Russia. United Russia also supports a significant number of independent candidates
for local legislatures, a strategy that has become more common as the popularity of the party has
declined. In the 2014 Moscow City Duma election, United Russia and UR-supported independents
won 38 of 45 seats. On the national level, cooperation between parties is slightly more important,
108
as UR does not always hold a majority, but the so-called systemic opposition parties are generally
compliant. Most of parties rarely participate in protest. The parties that do protest tend to be non-
systemic communism or liberal-democratic, and do not hold seats in government outside of the
municipal deputy level, the lowest-level office in the city. The exception to this is the KPRF, which
is the largest systemic opposition party and does support protest in Moscow, however I included its
involvement with the campaign as a control variable in regression analysis and it is not associated
with receipt of concessions. Regardless, concessions to everyday protest would not be an efficient
way to distribute benefits to those coalition members because the concessions typically do not
entail high-value benefits.












Concessionary promises do not appear linked with the electoral cycle in Moscow.
There is also little evidence to support the proposition that concessions are driven by the elec-
toral cycle. In the five-year period I collected data for, Muscovites went to the polls five times,
for three city-level races and two national elections. Figure 4.10 presents a density plot of conces-
sions over time with the dates of these elections indicated. While there is a higher concentration
of concessions beginning in late 2015 and lasting until late 2017, there is no evident increase of
concessions around local or national elections. Surprisingly, in the lead-up to the two executive
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elections, for president and mayor, the rate of concession declines. It is possible, however, that the
decline in concessions in late 2017-2018 may be the result of a decline in protest that also occurred
at this time.
Finally, alternative explanations that characterize concessions as a valuable benefit must be
reconciled with reneging. If concessions are a form of patronage or the distribution of benefits
to coalition partners, why would half of those benefits never be delivered? In fact the credibility
problem would be alleviated if patronage or coalitions were driving these concessions, because
those benefits are distributed to buy long-term political support. It is therefore in the government’s
interest to make sure the benefits are actually transmitted, to uphold their end of the exchange.
Reneging would therefore be much rarer than it is. Last, these approaches to concessions do not
explain the observed variation in repressive responses encountered by the different campaign types.
4.5.2 Campaign Capacity
It is possible that another campaign-level feature is responsible for the variation in government
response: capacity. I control for the number of years the campaign was been active, the number
of events it held, and the average turnout at mass events to capture capacity, but these are rough
measures, as well as time invariant. Capacity might be measured in the ability to hold certain types
of events, to attract media attention, to withstand repression, to mobilize financial resources, and
more. Yet these is limited evidence that higher capacity is connected with more concessions or
less reneging. Higher-capacity campaigns are able to hold more events, yet campaigns are much
more likely to get a concession when they have held fewer, not more, events. Figure 4.10 is a
density plot of the number of protest events held prior to a concession demonstrates this. One third
of concessions are promised at a point when the campaign has held three or fewer protests. The
high incidence of early concessions means that the government likely begins making concessions
before a campaign has fully developed capacity. On the other hand, concessions also made to
campaigns that have held more events: 9.8% were promised to campaigns that had held twenty or
more protests. This suggests that sometimes capacity is important to the timing of concessions. In
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the next chapter, I explore the timing of concessions in a campaign’s lifecycle in more detail, as
well as the campaign’s ability to hold continuous events like strikes or round-the-clock watches.
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A significant share of concessions are made when campaigns are comparatively new, and have had less time to
develop capacity.
Capacity might also matter in the presence or absence of a mobilizing structure or group. Most
of these everyday protest campaigns involved some formalized mobilizing structure. There is vari-
ation in whether this structure pre-existed the campaign, but in the majority of cases, it did. Mo-
bilizing structures included neighborhood initiative groups, independent unions, laborers’ rights
groups, tenants’ rights groups and student organizations. (Political parties were generally not ob-
served originating protest campaigns.) Many of these groups had already organized protest cam-
paigns in the past. However, these groups are distributed fairly evenly across the distinct campaign
types I identify, meaning that they are unlikely to explain variation betweem them.
4.6 Conclusion
How does a high-capacity authoritarian regime respond to everyday protest campaigns, which
make policy-focused demands? Everyday protest occur even in repressive states, meaning that
authoritarian subjects likely see them as a meaningful opportunity to affect policymaking in their
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communities. At the same time, most approaches to concessions imply that these campaigns,
which seldom threaten the foundations of the regime, should not be promised concessions and
instead be ignored or repressed.
I have advanced a theory that the regime’s response to everyday protest campaigns is deter-
mined by underlying features of the grievance that generated the protest campaign. These features
are whether the policy is in an active state of change and the availability of information about
opinion on the policy. Protest campaigns that arise against a status quo policy about which the
government has limited information are policy performance campaigns, whereas policymaking
exclusion campaigns occur when the government is aware that a new or changing policy is not
popularly supported but chooses to pursue it anyway. To support this classification, I show that
policy performance campaigns are more likely to use protest tactics that convey new information
whereas policymaking exclusion campaigns are more likely to engage in protest that obstructs
policy implementation.
I analyze an original dataset on campaigns, concessions and protests in Moscow to demonstrate
that concessions are widely used. Yet in many cases, the promised concessions were not realized
as intended, with policy exclusion campaigns bearing the brunt of reneging. Policy exclusion
campaigns were also more likely to experience higher-intensity coercion than were policy erosion
campaigns. These differences in response arise because, when faced with policy performance
campaigns, the government has acquired new information about an on-going issue that it is in its
interest to fix. Concessions are one avenue to make those policy modifications. At the same time,
high intensity coercion is unnecessary because once the concession is completed, the grievance will
be eliminated and the campaign can be suspended. With policymaking exclusion campaigns, the
government has deliberately ignored what the protesters want to pursue its own agenda. It therefore
has limited incentive to comply with protesters’ demands. The promise of a concession to these
campaigns is a diversionary tactic designed to undercut mobilizing capacity, rather than an attempt
to resolve the grievance. For this reason, the rate of reneging is high. High intensity coercion is
more common to raise the cost of on-going participation, to try to demobilize a campaign that is
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potentially longer lasting.
In some cases, everyday protest is an effective way to escalate complaints, win government
assistance and affect policymaking. However, this is conditional on the government having a pre-
existing need—information—and interest in making that reform, as is the case with policy erosion
campaigns. In other cases, protesters who have put themselves at great personal risk will struggle
to see the concessions that they won bear fruit, as the regime reneges on its promises. In all cases,
however, it is clear that concessions are not a strategy of last resort or a sign of regime weakness,
but rather another tool of control at the disposal of authoritarian governments.
Throughout this chapter, I have assumed that concessions have a demobilizing effect on protest
campaigns and that in some cases, this effect motivates the government’s use of concessions. This
assumption is critical: if concessions are not associated with demobilization, then I cannot argue
that the government is using them to undermine policymaking exclusion campaigns. While exam-
ples of concessions leading to demobilization are abundant, the poor quality of concession data
has prevented quantitative analysis of this association. In the next chapter, I turn to the relationship




Some of them, of course, get scared if they were detained one time, or fined....and
they stop protesting. But if people are stubborn and do not get scared, and they con-
tinue to protest [at the site] no matter what, then there is a chance to win. There is a
good chance to win if people don’t give up, but stubbornly continue to protest.
— Interview with an ecological protester, Moscow, September 2019.
Governments make concessions with the goal of demobilizing protest. Protest is disruptive,
even threatening, and government agents under any regime type generally prefer it not to occur.
The extent to which concessions are effective at achieving that goal remains an open question. Do
concessions, in fact, drive demobilization? If so, under what conditions do concessions diminish
protest? Is that demobilizing effect conditioned on campaign-level features? Are there settings in
which concessions do not contribute to demobilization, and why? My data provides insight into
this relationship for the first time. In this chapter, I inductively theorize about the link between
concessions and demobilization.
Analysis of demobilization, however, presents multiple challenges. First, demobilization is a
multi-causal outcome. Multiple factors contribute to demobilization, making the effect of conces-
sions difficult to isolate. Protest campaigns can demobilize out of success or failure, if resolving
the grievance as desired becomes impossible. Individual-level factors, such as exhaustion or rising
costs like those accrued through repression, contribute to demobilization, too. Perceived prospects
of success or failure and individual commitment may have an effect. On the campaign level, lower-
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capacity campaigns may never truly get off the ground, while higher-capacity campaigns may carry
on after the resolution of the initial grievance to encompass other causes. It is unsurprising then that
the large body of literature on the repression-dissent nexus, which seeks to understand repression’s
effect on mobilization, continues to grow. The main finding of that work is that repression does
not have a straightforward or consistent effect on the level of protest: it can increase it, decrease
it, or do either depending on the setting and intensity of the repression. Concessions should be no
different. The objective of this chapter is to uncover potential regularities and patterns, rather than
to develop a definitive theory.
Second, assessing demobilization requires its operationalization and measurement. At one ex-
treme, demobilization can be defined as the total cessation of protest by a given campaign. Be-
cause my data does not include a lower-participation limit and therefore observes protest events
with a single participant, this approach risks both conceptually stretching and over-identifying
mobilization. Additionally, parsing demobilization—where a protest is not possible—from peri-
ods in which the campaign is able to hold a protest but does not presents challenges, because the
everyday protests included in my data are relatively low-capacity and many are involved in years-
long disputes. This means that long spells where no protests are held are common. In the next
section, I discuss issues with measuring demobilization in greater depth, then motivate the oper-
ationalizations that I use through this and the following chapter. While these operationalizations
are imperfect, they allow insight into two important aspects of demobilization: the comparative
incidence of large protests before and after a concession, and the duration from a concession to the
next large protest.
Using these measures, in section 5.2, I examine trends of demobilization. To do this, I bundle
the concessions into concession-events that summarize all concessions received by an individual
campaign on a specific day. I also set aside concessions that were undermined by reneging within
the first three months, because the government’s failure to fulfill its promises can aggravate mobi-
lization and the purpose here is to understand the effect of the concessionary promise itself, rather
than reneging. Chapter 6 takes up reneging in greater detail. Throughout the chapter, I also provide
115
empirical examples based on the histories I created for each campaign to allow additional insight
into on-the-ground campaign dynamics that are not visible in aggregate analysis.
First, I show that in nearly half of all cases, concessions are associated with a comparative
reduction in protest and are not followed by a large protest within thirty days. This demobilizing
effect, however, declines with time. To contextualize this finding with other strategies of protest
demobilization, I compare the demobilizing effect of concessions to that of detentions at a protest.
An analysis of cases where the concession included a deadline for implementation illuminates
how campaigns adjust their protest behavior in response to concessions. I then explore how facets
of the campaign alter the demobilizing impact of concessions, using the campaign’s prior event
history as an indicator of campaign capacity. In section 5.5, I look at how the quality of the
concession is associated with demobilization, specifically whether the concession addresses the
campaign’s core concern and whether the entity promising the speaker was affiliated with the
national government, rather than the Moscow government. Finally, it is clear throughout this
analysis that the demobilizing effects of concessions are highly time-dependent. Thus, in section
5.6, I use case analysis to unpack cases where a concession was followed by another protest in
less than a week and cases where the campaign demobilized at the time of the concession, but
re-mobilized after six or more months. To conclude, I summarize these findings with an eye to
future hypothesis testing.
5.1 Data and Analysis
While in section ?? I described approaches to conceptualizing mobilization, the following analysis
requires that concept to be operationalized. To achieve this, I first create an event catalog for each
protest campaign that chronologically combines protest events and concessions.1 In the event that a
protest and a concession occur on the same date, I assume that the protest precedes the concession.
For four concessions and 11 protests, the event date could not be determined. These are estimated
1Petitions and open letters are excluded from the event catalog, as they do not require the physical presence of
protesters.
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to the first of the month. For two protests, neither date nor month was available; these are dropped.
These corrections should have a limited effect on understanding mobilization for these campaigns,
as six of the 11 protests with missing dates and both excluded protests did not meet the threshold
for mobilization described below.
5.1.1 Concession Events
In order to render the concession-level data compatible with the format of the event catalog, I ag-
gregate concessions that occur on the same day, for a given campaign, into a single concession
event. In the case of seven campaigns, the Moscow City government promised protesters con-
cessions on two separate dates although no intervening protest had occurred. This issue affected
18 concessions, with on average just over 15 days elapsing between concessions. In all but one
instance, the concessions were promised within 30 days of each other and in several cases, on
successive days. As my concern here is time from concession to the next large protest, I aggre-
gate these concessions into a single concession-event occurring on the earliest date. This process
reduced the 122 observed concessions to 85 concession-events.
In this chapter, I am interested in how the initial concessionary promise impacts mobilization,
rather than the effect of its realization or implementation. For that reason, I exclude concession-
events where reneging later occurred, to focus on cases where the demobilizing effect of the con-
cession was not mitigated by reneging. The concessions data in PCoM contains an evaluation of the
concessions implementation over four three-month periods for the first year following the promise.
In the majority of this chapter, I look at mobilization in the 90 days following the concession-event.
I therefore exclude concession-events that included a concession that was rated as having no or
minimal effect on policy in the first three month-period. This reduces the 85 concession-events to
53. When I examine mobilization at six months and one year after the concession-event, I exclude
concession-events that had no impact in either of the first two periods, or in any of the four periods
as needed. Last, it is not uncommon for a single campaign to experience multiple concession-
events. Fourteen campaigns had from two to five concession-events; 33 campaigns had only one.
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This means that some campaigns are observed multiple times in the data; I also include analysis
for the first concession-event to eliminate this.
5.1.2 Operationalizing Demobilization
Measuring mobilization is difficult, as discussed in 2.6. Observing turnout at a protest can provide
an instantaneous snapshot of mobilization. Often turnout is included in protest event catalogues,
but this data is frequently missing, and estimates can range widely depending on the source. The
fact that periods in which a campaign has the capacity to hold a large protest, but chooses not to, are
observationally equivalent to periods in which the campaign does not have that capacity and does
not attempt to hold a protest, creates an additional wrinkle. In other words, we cannot distinguish
days of demobilization from days of non-mass mobilization. I use the term demobilization for
simplicity here.
I assume that mobilization is observed on a day in which a large protest event occurs. I define
a large protest as 1) any protest event of 20 or more estimated participants, or 2) if no turnout
estimate is available, an event that took the form of a demonstration, march, strike or full picket.
The threshold of 20 participants is set with the aim of identifying events that attracted the atten-
dance beyond the core of campaign organizers, though this may not always be the case.2 It also
includes protests where turnout was described non-numerically in sources as “a few dozen” or “a
small crowd” as well as some cases where turnout at small gatherings was determined from pho-
tographs; such events are recorded in PCoM as having 24.9 participants. I identify demonstrations,
marches, strikes and full pickets as mobilization because to be successful, these events require
more participants (although they can be held with just a few protesters).
I do not imply that no campaign activity occurs during a period of demobilization. In fact, a
variety of different actions may be taking place. Most notably, small protests may occur. Small
protests are those that have estimated turnout under 20 participants or have no turnout estimate
2For instance, in an interview, an activist who had been involved in a campaign to protect a public park said that
25-26 individuals organized the campaign.
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but take the form of a single person or relay-single person picket, sit-in, blockade, self-mutilation,
leafletting or hanging banners, or were categorized as “other”. Per my approach, the small size of
these events means that they cannot be used to infer that the campaign has mobilized participants
who are not campaign organizers. Small events are excluded from the analysis here. This reduces
the number of events from 795 to 415.
It is also worth noting that my data does not account for every action a campaign could possibly
undertake to elicit a reaction from the government. Campaigns also organized legal challenges,
petitions, social media campaigns, media coverage, collaboration with international NGOs, direct
appeals to various government actors, including the President, and other tactics. I do not consider
these types of actions as mobilization here for a few reasons. The first relates to data availabil-
ity. I only collected data on tactics that were documented online in venues that were accessible to
me. Information on these strategies was not consistently available across cases. For instance, some
campaigns posted on their social media communities asking supporters to call or write to a govern-
ment office using a form complaint, but I cannot know how many members undertook this action
nor if other campaigns that did not publicly post such calls did not undertake this action. Second,
throughout this dissertation I have focused on physical protest as an event of salient concern to the
government. Although I have argued that everyday protests are not as threatening as campaigns
with revolutionary or transformational aims, they are still an undesirable event for an authoritarian
regime and risk escalation into more regime-challenging movements. I therefore assume that the
regime would rather that protest not occur, even if the campaign is engaging in the other forms of
activism listed above. Last, this chapter does not look at determinants of concessions, but rather
the effect of concessions on the incidence of physical protest. Whether concessions depress the
rate of protest is of interest regardless of the factors that produced the concession itself.
5.1.3 Evaluating Relative Demobilization
I employ two methods in this chapter of measuring the demobilization of a campaign around a
concession-event. First, I compare event counts of large protests in periods of 30, 60, and 90
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days before and after the concession event. This measure is useful in that it facilitates within-
campaign comparisons. This is important given that the wide variety of campaigns in this data
depletes the value of more generalized comparisons, for instance comparing the level of protest
in a single campaign to the average across all campaigns. When using this measure, I drop cam-
paigns for which protest data was not collected for the full 30, 60 or 90 day period before or after
the concession-event. I identify demobilization as occurring when the total incidence of protest
decreases following the concession, with comparison to the preceding period of the same length.
This measure is not without issue. Within-case comparison assumes that the campaign would
have behaved similarly in the next thirty days as it had in the previous thirty, had the concession not
occurred. That assumption does not apply in all cases, because many campaigns receive conces-
sions very early in their lifecycle, after just a few events. Eight campaigns received a concession
after only one protest. In these cases, it is not clear what the comparison is indicative of, and
particularly as the window of comparison grows, it may appear that concessions cause mobiliza-
tion here. I look at these cases of early concessions more closely later in the chapter. Second, 17
concession-events went to campaigns that had not held a protest in over thirty days, and of those,
12 had not held a protest in at least 90 days. Lags between protest of this nature are not unusual
in this data. Some campaigns do not hold an event for over a year before reactivating. Bearing
in mind that demobilization and non-mobilization are observationally equivalent in this event cat-
alogue, these concessions are likely happening during periods where the campaign is engaged in
activism outside of mass protest. They could also be cases where the government simply took
more time to formulate a concession. Regardless, the meaning of comparison in these cases is
again unclear. Finally, there are cases where protest was frequent before and after the concession
event, so an observed reduction or increase of protest may in fact be random. Because of these
issues, I focus on the 30-day comparison in the text and present the 60 and 90 day results in tables,
unless relevant.
To complement this within-case comparison, I also measure demobilization by calculating the
duration in days from the concession-event to the next protest. This measure captures the demo-
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bilizing outcome the government likely prefers: the cessation of large protests. Using the raw
duration (i.e. the count of days to the next large protest) is complicated by the issue of censoring,
to use the language of survival analysis. I collected protest data through September 18, 2018. This
means that for concession-events that had not been followed by a large protest at that point, the
duration to the next protest is calculated using the date of the end of data collection. This is equiva-
lent to observing a large protest on September 18, 2018. While statistical analysis can compensate
for such cases, here I am employing a descriptive approach. I correct for these inflated durations
manually by creating binary indicators for whether the campaign held at least one large protest
within 30, 60 and 90 days, six months (183 days) and one year after the concession. Concession-
events for which sufficient data was not collected are dropped as needed. This measure is allows
for cross-case comparisons, at the expense of some campaign-specific context.
5.2 Do concessions contribute to demobilization?
It seems straightforward that promising benefits to protesters would contribute to demobilization
by eliminating the need to protest. However this outcome remains uncertain. In particular, it is
often argued that concessions can produce adverse effects from the government’s perspective: by
demonstrating the effectiveness of protest, concessions actually encourage mobilization. Per this
argument, protesters are like mice who have been given cookies: once rewarded, their demands
rapidly escalate.3 Further, scant data has been deployed in service of this question. Here, I explore
how often concessions are associated with demobilization, and if a demobilizing effect seems to
exist, how long it persists.
Overall, the data suggests that concessions are associated with demobilization, although the
strength and duration of this effect varies. First, I compare protest event incidence before and after
a concession-event. Table 5.1 presents the percentage of concessions associated with an increase,
3To my knowledge this argument has not been formally theorized and tested. This protest diffusion argument
usually takes two forms. First, concessions encourage a single campaign to escalate its demands, which I can consider
here. Second, concessions encourage activists in other campaigns to use protest tactics, which I cannot address.
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Table 5.1: Comparative Rate of Protest, 30-, 60- and 90-Day Periods around a Concession
30 Days 60 Days 90 Days
All Concession-Events Increase 17.0% 20.4% 20.8%
No Change 32.1% 20.4% 20.8%
Decrease 50.9% 59.2% 58.3%
n=53 n=49 n=48
First Concession Increase 18.2% 24.1% 42.9%
No Change 39.4% 27.6% 28.6%
Decrease 42.4% 48.3% 28.6%
n=33 n=29 n=24
Later Concessions Increase 15.0% 15.0% 10.0%
No Change 20.0% 10.0% 10.0%
Decrease 65.0% 75.0% 80.0%
n=20 n=20 n=20
decrease or no change in protest in the 30, 60 and 90-day window around the concession. Of the 53
concession-events for which a thirty-day assessment of protest around the concession was possible,
50.9% are associated with a decrease in the number of protests. Protest was only increased in
17.0% of cases. For a large share of cases (32.1%) the protest incidence was unaltered by the
concession. This is largely driven by concessions to campaigns that were already demobilized,
which includes 11 of those 17 cases. The demobilizing effect increases over time. When comparing
the incidence of protest in the 60 days before and after a concession-event, 59.2% of concession-
events were associated with a comparative reduction of protest.
The demobilizing effect also holds when the data is restricted to the campaign’s first recorded
concession-event (table 5.1). 42.4% of first concessions are associated with a decrease in protest
within 30 days, and 18.2% with an increase. Concessions that were not the first concession a
campaign experienced were considerably more demobilizing. 65.0% of later concessions were
linked to a 30-day decrease in protest. Further, that figure continues to grow as the period of
analysis extends: by 90 days of the concession, 80% of later concessions are associated with a
decrease of protest, while only 42.9% of first concessions are. It is somewhat surprising that first
concessions appear somewhat less demobilizing than the full sample, as one might imagine that
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earlier in a protest campaign, participants and organizers would be more likely to trust authorities
to resolve their grievances. However, as I explore further below, it may be that the government
adopts a bargaining approach, and initially offers more minimal concessions, and only with more
sustained mobilization can protest campaigns win satisfying concessions.
Table 5.2: Duration from Concessions to Next Protest
30 Days 60 Days 90 Days 6 Months 1 Year
Protest 47.2% 60.4% 62.3% 69.4% 81.0%
No Protest 52.8% 39.6% 37.7% 30.6% 19.0%
n=53 n=53 n=53 n=49 n=42
To what extent are concessions associated with the total suspension of protest? Table 5.2
presents the share of concessions that were or were not followed by a protest within five intervals
after the concession. Again, there is strongly suggestive evidence that concessions are linked with
demobilization. 28 of the 53 concession-events, or 52.8%, were not followed by a large protest
within 30 days. Strikingly, in 24 of those 28 cases (45.3% of all observed cases), no protest of any
size occurred within 30 days after the concession. This suggests that concessions do not merely
undermine a campaign’s ability to hold mass events, but smaller events as well. Yet by the same
token, these figures indicate that 47.2% of concession-events fail to demobilization. Moreover, the
immediate demobilizing effect declines with time. Within 60 days of a concession-event, the ma-
jority of campaigns, 60.4%, have remobilized, with only 39.6% not holding protest. By 90 days,
62.3% have protested; within six months, 69.4% and at one year, 83.3% of concession-events have
been followed by another large protest.
Concessions do appear to have an immediate demobilizing effect within 30 days of the
concession-event. From the comparison of event incidence in periods preceding and following
the concessionary promise, concessions mitigate a campaign’s capacity to escalate protest or to
sustain protest at the prior level. At the same time, some protest campaigns appear to ramp up
their activity when a concession is promised—a phenomenon I explore below. However, this does
not occur in a significant portion of cases. Setting aside within-case comparison and examining
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the duration to the next protest provides support for an immediate demobilizing effect, but this
declines sharply as time passes.
The immediate suspension of protest coupled with its longer-term resurgence suggests that con-
cessions may not provide enduring, satisfactory redress for protesters’ grievances. It is possible
that campaign organizers adopt a “wait and see” approach to concessions, maintaining vigilance
and, ideally, capacity to mobilize while allowing the government to begin implementing the con-
cession. I explore this possibility in section 5.2.2 by looking at protest behavior when a concession
includes a timeline by which it must be implemented. Alternatively, the suspension of protest
and longer-term resurgence could be driven by exhaustion effects. Regardless of the mechanism,
these results do militate against the argument that concessions cause the escalation of protest. If
campaigns responded to concessions by demanding additional concessions, one would expect an
immediate increase in protest after a concession to be more common, as protesters attempt to strike
while the iron is hot. Finally, it is worth noting that, because concessions affected by reneging are
excluded from this analysis, failure to implement promised policy changes is not driving the later
shift back toward mobilization. It is likely spurred by the continued failure to fully resolve the
grievance or escalating issues related to it. These findings also suggest that, although these ev-
eryday campaigns are relatively low capacity, organizers are able to achieve remobilization after
months of inactivity.
5.2.1 Comparison to Detentions and Demobilization
Concessions seem to contribute to demobilization in around half of cases, and likewise fail to do
so in half of cases. With these figures alone, it is not possible to say whether concessions are
effective at demobilizing protest or not. To put this effect in context with other governmental re-
sponses to protest, I compare it to the demobilizing effect of detentions. I discuss in the previous
chapter that detentions are not necessarily indicative of a concerted effort to eradicate a campaign
with repression, meaning that the purpose of every detention is not necessarily demobilization.
Nonetheless, detentions are a good benchmark for comparison for a few reasons. First, detentions
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are one of the most common forms of protest repression. PCoM records detentions at 79 protest
events, 9.9% of all recorded events. Second, while the government has other strategic responses to
protest at its disposal, such as ignoring protest, detentions are events, and they are highly observ-
able, which facilitates comparison to concession-events. Last, the relative efficacy of concessions
and repressions in demobilizing protest has been a lasting question in the literature.
Table 5.3: Comparative Rate of Protest, 30-, 60- and 90-Day Periods around a Detention
30 Days 60 Days 90 Days
All Detentions Increase 23.1% 39.7% 41.6%
No Change 47.4% 21.8% 19.5%
Decrease 29.5% 38.5% 39.0%
n=78 n=78 n=77
First Detention Increase 33.3% 54.5% 56.2%
No Change 51.5% 21.2% 15.6%
Decrease 15.2% 24.2% 28.1%
n=33 n=33 n=32
Table 5.4: Duration from Detention to Next Protest
30 Days 60 Days 90 Days 6 Months 1 Year
Protest 53.7% 68.7% 74.6% 84.4% 85.0%
No Protest 44.8% 29.9% 23.9% 14.1% 13.3%
n=66 n=66 n=66 n=63 n=59
I isolate the 79 protest events at which a detention occurred, and again compare event counts of
large protests in periods before and after the detention (table 5.3). Within 30-days, a detention was
followed by a reduction of large protest in only 29.5% of cases—21.4 percentage points fewer than
concession-events. 23.1% of detentions are associated with an increase of protest over 30 days,
about 5% more than concessions. The majority of detentions had no effect on the level of protest
within the first 30 days. When considering a campaign’s first detention, the demobilizing effect
is even weaker: first detentions reduced protest within 30 days in only 15.2% of cases—roughly
one third the figure for first concessions. A first detention increases mobilization within thirty
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days in 33.3% of cases. Looking at the 60 days before and after a detention, the evidence for a
demobilizing effect remains limited. An equal share of detentions were associated with increasing
and decreasing protest (39.7% and 38.5%). This balance remains similar in the 90-day period, with
39.0% of detentions associated with decreasing protest and 41.6% with increasing protest.
I also calculate the duration from a detention to the next protest (table 5.4). 44.8% of deten-
tions are not followed by a large protest within 30 days—8% lower than the comparable number
for concessions. By 60 days, only 29.9% of detentions are demobilizing, compared with 39.6%
of concession-events. Within 90 days, only 23.9% of detentions have not been followed by a
large protest, while 37.7% of concessions continue to have a demobilizing effect. By 6 months,
only 14.1% of detentions are linked with demobilization, less than half the comparable rate for
concession-events. Within one year, however, these figures converge: 13.3% of detentions and
19.0% of concession-events are demobilizing after one year.
Overall, both the within-campaign comparisons and duration analysis provide strongly sugges-
tive evidence that the demobilizing effect of concessions is greater than that of detentions. Conces-
sions reduce protest more often and extend the time to the next protest. Further, the comparative
ineffectiveness of detentions at achieving demobilization of everyday protest campaigns deserves
greater exploration. Not only are detentions unlikely to immediately reduce protest, they are as-
sociated with increased protest over time. This is somewhat surprising, given that most everyday
protesters are not professional activists, and they would therefore seem to be less prepared to face
detention and its consequences. On the other hand, many everyday protesters see their demands as
legitimate and reasonable; often, they envision themselves as asking the government to act “nor-
mally”, that is, in compliance with the rule of law and in the best interest of its citizens. In this
context, arrests of peaceful protesters may be seen as morally outrageous, which contributes to the
escalation of the campaign.
Finally, the comparison to detentions suggests that among campaigns that are demobilized by
concessions, the period between six months and one year is potentially critical. The duration data
indicates that a good share of campaigns remobilize between 30 and 60 days after the concession,
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but thereafter the decline slows. The rate of demobilized campaigns is 37.7% after 60 days and
falls to only 30.6% over the following four months. However, by the end of that year, only 19.0%
of campaigns are demobilized. This is a drop of 11.6%. The detention data does not replicate this
drop-off after 6 months. In fact, only one campaign remobilized between 6 months and one year
after a detention. Below, I examine this dynamic of late remobilization in greater detail.
5.2.2 Concessions on a Timeline
While the aggregate data show that concessions associated with demobilization in many cases,
case study analysis can build insight into how concessions demobilize. How do protesters and
campaign organizers think about concessions and demobilization? Do they suspend protest while
waiting for the government to implement the concession? Or do they believe that sustained protest
is needed for the concession to be realized? In an attempt to gain some insight into these dynamics,
I look at concession-events where the government specified a date by which the concession would
be implemented. With these concessions, the government establishes its intention to implement
the concession by a certain date in the near future. This means that campaigns are more likely to
set a particular strategy for their actions during that period, and that the strategy may change when
the period ends. Here, I am looking only at concessions that were implemented, so I would expect
protest to end around the date established by the concession, if it continues at all.
Concessions can include a timeline in two ways: the exact date can be set or the date can be
implied. The latter includes language such as “in the coming days” or “within a few months”. I
estimate these as two weeks or two months. Concessions in which timelines were specified and
that were not affected by reneging are relatively rare. There are only eight cases of this occur-
ring, and two were concessions to a single campaign. All but one of these campaigns were about
labor disputes with the city of Moscow, meaning that these concessions were largely about the
payment of back wages, layoffs and working conditions. Also, they were almost exclusively core
concessions, which, as discussed below, are much more strongly correlated with demobilization
than other concessions.
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Overall, campaigns that were promised a concession with a timeline had three reactions. The
largest group of four campaigns demobilize for the specified period. A few hold lower-stakes
events, such as distributing leaflets or participating in protests to support other causes. For example,
ambulance workers demanding improved working conditions and higher pay attended a protest
against the reform of the Moscow healthcare system. Given that the timelines for these concessions
was usually just a few days to weeks, it is unlikely that exhaustion would explain this pause in
protest. It seems probable that these campaigns suspended protest while the government worked to
fulfill its promises. This “wait and see” approach may explain the immediate decrease in activism
following a concession.
Another set of campaigns carried on with their previous protest activity for the duration of
the specified period, then ceased. These two campaigns were construction workers who had been
denied their wages by a major city contractor and metro workers who were threatened with layoffs.
The construction workers had been regularly filing complaints at various offices meant to protect
workers’ rights, and they continued to do this while their concession was being implemented, while
the metro workers reliably continued holding pickets every two weeks until the specified deadline,
then stopped. This may be suggestive of a lack of trust in authorities to fulfill the concession if the
campaign reduces pressure.
Last, there is one case where a campaign received a concession that members deemed unsat-
isfactory. Construction workers employed by a city contractor were attempting to reclaim four
months of unpaid wages by threatening to strike. They were first promised that their wages would
be paid within a few months, a timeline that was evidently unacceptable. This concession kicked
off a strike that lasted nearly a month, and ultimately led to the promise that their wages would
be repaid within a week. Here, the first concession failed to resolve the conflict and perhaps in-
flamed it. While I do not have an overall measure of the “acceptability” of a concession to the
campaign, this example makes it clear that there are cases where the concession may contribute to
the conflict’s escalation rather than resolution.
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5.3 Campaign Capacity and Event History
What is the relationship between campaign capacity and demobilization around concessions? This
relationship is difficult to assess directly, because turnout and the number of events are usually used
to measure capacity as well as mobilization. Higher capacity campaigns may be more likely to get
concessions and are also able to hold large events more easily. At the same time, if concessions
are used as a demobilizing tool, then they may be deployed to prevent newer campaigns from
developing and enhancing their capacity. In light of this, I look at campaigns that got concessions
when they had held very few events, and campaigns that were promised concessions after a high
number of events.
I start by considering how the number of events that a campaign held prior to the concession
event might condition the demobilizing effect. I use a count of all events (of any size and type)
that the campaign held. About half of all concession-events I consider here, or 50.9%, occur when
the campaign has held fewer than five events. 15.1% of concession-events happened when the
campaign had held only one event. Further, because these prior event counts include all events, not
just the large protests I have identified as mass mobilization, some of these concessions have been
made after events with very low turnout. This is interesting in its own right because it runs against
the theory that protests are more successful, or more likely to get concessions, when they are more
disruptive. Instead, it would seem that concessions are being used when campaigns are still in
an early phase, perhaps as a pre-emptive strategy to curtail mobilization and the development of
the capacity to sustain a longer campaign. Additionally, the high incidence of early concessions
bodes poorly for most campaigns in PCoM: the average number of events per campaign overall is
12, while on average, concessions that are not affected by reneging occur after 8.8 protests, with
a median of 5 and mode of 1. This suggests that campaigns continue holding events when the
likelihood of getting a concession is low.
Higher prior event count can also be understood as an indicator of high campaign capacity.
A large prior event count can occur in three ways: the campaign has been protesting for a long
time, if not necessarily frequently; the campaign protests very frequently, or the grievance that
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motivated the campaign affects an unusually large number of people. These are all features typi-
cally associated with higher capacity. Comparing event rates pre and post-concession is of limited
value here, so I look at duration to the next large protest. Figure 5.1 presents coefficient plots of
bivariate regressions of the relationship between the number of events the campaign held prior to
the concession-event and the number of days from the concession to the next large protest. These
regressions show that campaigns that have held fewer events prior to the concession are less likely
to hold events within 30, 60 or 90 days after its announcement. After the first three months, this
relationship is no longer statistically significant, but the direction of the effect remains the same.
This suggests two conclusions. First, concessions are effective at disrupting mobilization when
campaigns are new. An early concession can win the government up to three months or more
of suspended protest, and in some cases, pre-empt a campaign. Second, concessions are poten-
tially less effective at diminishing protest when the campaign has held a large number of prior
events. This suggests that higher capacity campaigns are perhaps more likely to understand that
the promise of a concession is not its delivery. Alternatively, this may simply be path dependence:
campaigns that hold more events, particularly those that affect a large number of people, continue
to hold events. Last, some of these higher-event count campaigns are focused on grievances that
have proven difficult for government to resolve—thus the need for continued protesting. These may
therefore be cases where the promised concession is simply unacceptable to protesters, whereas
earlier concessions are either addressing situations that are easier for the government to resolve.
To gain clarity on these dynamics, I examine cases of early and late concessions more closely next.
5.3.1 Early Concessions
In what kinds of cases do early concessions occur, and what is their effect? To understand this,
I look at cases where the campaign had held one or two events before the first concession. As
a precaution, I exclude campaigns that won concessions in the fall of 2013, because they were
likely active before the period of data collection. The ten remaining campaigns received 11 early
concessions. Six were about labor disputes with the city, two about construction issues, one about
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Concessions received earlier in a campaign’s lifecycle are associated with a lower incidence of protest within one and
two months. Inner bars represent 95% confidence interval; outer bars represent 90% confidence interval.
a housing conflict, and one about the 2018 World Cup.
To begin with, it seems that early concessions work in two potential ways. In some cases,
early concessions are providing an early resolution to a grievance that the government wishes to
remedy. The over-representation of labor disputes in the set of early concessions illustrates this.
About half of concessions made to campaigns about labor disputes (6 of 13) were made after only
one or two events. (In two cases, those early events were strikes.) This is more frequently than for
other grievance types. Labor conflicts, particularly the threat of strike, are a serious problem for the
government, which relies on construction workers, ambulance drivers, medical workers, snowplow
drivers, janitors and others whose labor rights have been violated to keep important systems and
services up and running. Allowing these workers to enter into extended strikes is undesirable.
Additionally, the potential for collective bargaining and the fact that these demands often do not
require formal policy changes to be satisfied contribute to a speedier resolution. In most of these
cases, the concessions were followed by demobilization.
In other cases, concessions were likely used to pre-empt a conflict that the government expected
to escalate into a longer or more disruptive campaign. The housing dispute that received an early
concession provides an example. This campaign pertained to the privatization of a workers’ dor-
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mitory (also called a hostel), instead of transferring the dormitory’s ownership to the municipality,
which would have allowed residents the opportunity to purchase their rooms or receive compen-
sation.4 Instead, they were facing eviction. This particular dispute, which related to a building
on Stavropol Street, began when the city was already dealing with several protracted conflicts of
the same nature. Residents of Stavropol Street received their concession after joining forces with
preexisting campaigns representing other dormitories (several of which are included in PCoM) and
a non-systemic Communist party, the Revolutionary Workers’ Party (RWP). RWP leads a number
of groups that assist workers in holding protests to defend their rights, including the Movement
of Moscow Hostels, which was involved in every campaign related to these privatization issues
around the privatization of workers’ dormitories. This early concession—which took the form of
an official meeting between residents, the Movement of Moscow Hostels, and the Federal Prop-
erty Management Agency—may have been an attempt to forestall the escalation of the problem at
Stavropol Street into a protracted conflict. It was not, however, successful, and Stavropol Street
remained the site of active protest for the duration of the period I collected data for. I discuss these
housing privatization issues, including why they are so difficult to resolve, in further detail below.
Another clear case of attempted pre-emption is presented by an early concession to the cam-
paign organized by Moscow State University (MGU) students against the decision to install
Moscow’s World Cup Fan Zone, a festival-like area where soccer matches would air on a big
screen, adjacent to the university’s campus, because the World Cup would overlap with the exam
period. This movement, coordinated by university students who made for zealous protesters, began
nearly a year before the 2018 World Cup and received concessions almost immediately. The capac-
ity of the Fan Zone would be reduced from 42,000 to 20,000, it would be placed an additional 310
meters further from the main university building, and fans would be prevented from entering the
campus. The fact that these concessions were made so quickly and about an event of such national
4The conflicting ownership of the workers’ dormitories stems from the privatization of property in the 1990s. To
simplify a complex issue, these dormitories continued to be managed by the companies (often state-owned enterprises)
whose workers lived there, though ultimately the rooms in which the workers should have acquired ownership of their
own residences. For this privatization to occur, the city had to designate the buildings as city property, which it had
not done. This allowed the dormitories to be sold to private developers, who wanted to evict residents.
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importance suggests that the government desired to preempt this campaign as much as possible.
Indeed, when protest returned in the following winter, a number of additional concessions were
made about the Fan Zone, and the government seemed to exhibit a special interest in generating
support for it among MGU’s student body, by distributing free tickets and raffling meetings with
star players.
5.3.2 Late Concessions
In what scenarios do late-arriving concessions occur? Because few concessions that are not af-
fected by early reneging are made to campaigns that have held more than ten protests, and because
most campaigns hold more than ten protests, understanding when these concession happen is im-
portant.
Above, I suggested that there are a few conditions that produce higher event counts before a
concession. One of these conditions is a grievance that affects a larger number of people. Many of
the campaigns in PCoM are relevant to a small group, such as residents of a certain neighborhood,
employees of a specific firm, or even residents of particular building. There are other campaigns,
however, that affect populations that are an order of magnitude or more greater. Two examples are
a campaign against the implementation of paid street and courtyard parking in residential areas,
and a campaign against a policy known as the renovation project, wherein the government would
exercise a form of eminent domain to seize apartment buildings it classifies as in poor condi-
tion, demolish them, and resettle residents in newly constructed high rises. The average turnout at
demonstrations for both these campaigns was over 800 people, and this average is more impressive
considering that the parking campaign held 23 events and the renovation campaign, 57, the max-
imum that I observed. At the same time, both campaigns were relatively atomized and although
both had an organizational group, it only coordinated the largest protest actions. Many protests
were organized by specific neighborhoods, by individual municipal deputies, or by residents of
a certain block of apartments. The campaigns thus rapidly accrued event numbers. By the same
token, they were not demobilized by concessions. The renovation campaign received the most
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concessions of any campaign, but they did not have a particularly demobilizing effect. Instead,
protest eventually declined as the legal process to seize the apartment buildings proceeded, and
residents who opposed it either gave up or were defeated. (Many who resided in affected build-
ings welcomed the renovation project.) Similarly, the campaign against paid parking exhibited no
decrease in mobilization following its concession, as events continued in districts across the city.
I also theorized that campaigns that receive late concessions center on grievances that are dif-
ficult to resolve. In several cases, this is clearly true. Three of the campaigns that received con-
cessions after a greater number of events were about housing issues that the city had struggled for
years to resolve. Two of these were related to the privatization of workers’ dormitories, and the
third was organized by the so-called “line-waiters” (ocheredniki) who had spent years on waiting
list for city-subsidized housing. These housing conflicts are some of the most persistent that I
observed. That can partly be attributed to the desperation of the affected protesters: they were
facing homelessness, family separation and other severe consequences; some had already expe-
rienced these outcomes. Residents of hostels faced extensive abuse and harassment from the os-
tensible owners of the properties that went beyond conventional repression, including beatings,
arson attempts, lack of access to heat and running water, and the welding shut of the doors of their
residences. Further, it was obvious that the government did not want to resolve these conflicts in
favor of the protesters. It attempted to address the line-waiters’ concerns on an individual level,
but this is a slippery slope: many thousands of people are waiting for housing in Moscow, some for
more than a decade. Particularistic distribution to squeaky wheels (rather those who are willing to
bribe to grease the wheels) could lead to bigger problems. Similarly, the dormitory residents were
requesting that the city maintain possession of buildings that were generally in poor condition and
which it had already sold for a profit, meaning that there was a strong financial incentive against a
resolution that would satisfy protesters.
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5.3.3 Sustained Events
The foregoing suggests that higher commitment by protesters affects concessions, and that this
may be an aspect of capacity. For another perspective on commitment, I look at campaigns that
held a continuous protest that lasted two weeks or more. While these events are coded in PCoM as
taking place on a single day (conventional for protest-event datasets), I unpack them here. Fifteen
campaigns held strikes, sit-ins, encampments, blockades, hunger strikes, and what protesters refer
to as round-the-clock watches (kruglosutochnoye dezhurtstvo). These events require continuous
commitment and often support, and many entail physical sacrifices. Five strikes were held, about
wage disputes and the restructuring of the healthcare system. Two separate groups with housing
demands held month-long hunger strikes, in an encampment outside the headquarters of United
Russia. One of these groups were state-employed medical workers and teachers who demanded to
be allowed to purchase their government-issued apartments, as stipulated in their contracts, instead
of being evicted, and the other was the previously discussed line-waiters movement.
The third, most common and longest lasting type of continuous event occurred at construction
sites and combined watches with sit-ins and blockades. Protesters involved in disputes about con-
struction in public parks often do not trust the government to suspend construction when it claims
to do so. There are numerous cases of irreparable harm befalling a contested site in the middle of
the night, or when attention flagged; this is the fate that befell the monument to the Great Patriotic
War constructed by residents of Ramenki, as discussed in Chapter 4. Once that damage occurs, it
is usually irreversible and signals defeat for the campaign. To prevent this, park defenders devel-
oped a strategy of round-the-clock watches, where small teams maintain 24-hour monitoring of the
site. This can be done from a van parked nearby or from overlooking apartment buildings. If con-
struction appears to be beginning, other campaign members are alerted and congregate at the site
to demand proper permits and if necessary position themselves between the site and construction
equipment. Many watches are sustained for a few weeks or months; one has been continuously
monitored its site for several years.
The ability to hold these sustained events demonstrates the campaign’s high capacity. They are
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difficult to coordinate, and require the continuous commitment and support of a large number of
individuals. Generally, these events also provoke unusually vicious harassment and violence from
state and non-state actors. Protesters have been deliberately hit with construction equipment, their
camps have been destroyed, and they are regularly attacked by private security forces. (Violence is
significantly less common against strikes.) Withstanding these attacks requires high commitment
from protesters, but it also tests the government, for whom these highly public, egregious conflicts
are undesirable. Beyond the violence, sustained events are also extremely inconvenient from the
government’s perspective: they disrupt workflows, publicly shame members of the government,
and in some cases, make it impossible to resolve the conflict.
How do concessions affect these highly committed, high-capacity campaigns? Seven of the 15
long-duration events received concessions that were not immediately impacted by reneging. In
the cases of the three labor strikes, those concessions appeared to satisfy the campaign and are
tightly linked to the end of the strike. Concessions had a mixed effect on the three park defense
protests that were operating watches. At Torfyanka Park, where park defenders sought to prevent
the construction of a Russian Orthodox temple, a concession was made after about one month of
watch; it had no effect, and the watch continued at this site at least until 2020. In the case of Park
Druzhbi, a concession was made two months into a watch that lasted 118 days; the watch was
ultimately terminated by escalating repression and the clearing of the camp by police.
The cases of Torfyanka and Park Druzhbi are noteworthy for other reasons. Defenders of
Torfyanka Park were the first to hold a round-the-clock watch and are credited with developing this
tactic. Park Druzhbi implemented the strategy two months after Torfyanka. Activists from these
campaigns trained other park defenders in setting up a watch. They were thus disproportionately
unlikely to believe the government would make good on its promises. Defenders of Torfyanka are
also highly skeptical of the government’s ability to control the Russian Orthodox Church, whose
desire to build a temple in the park has only intensified given locals’ resistance. Part of the rea-
son their watch continued so long was that Orthodox counter-protesters were as vigilant as the
opponents of the temple construction.
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Not all sustained events end this way. At another park, a concession did end the watch after
about three weeks. It also initiated a comparative decline in protest, from daily to monthly and
then even more sporadically. The line-waiters movement did not receive concessions in their first
30-day hunger strike and encampment, but several months later, five days into a second hunger
strike, they were promised a concession and halted the strike in response. Thus, in some cases,
these sustained events, which rely on high campaign capacity, can be demobilized by concessions,
although in others, mobilization continues almost unchanged.
5.4 Campaign Type
In Chapter 4, I argued that everyday protest campaigns can be sorted into two ideal types, cam-
paigns about policy performance and campaigns about policymaking exclusion. Campaigns about
policy performance bring the government’s attention to issues it is motivated to resolve, while pol-
icymaking exclusion campaigns arise in situations where the government has deliberately ignored
public feedback. Here, I consider whether these campaign-level features affect the extent to which
a concession is associated with demobilization. It bears repeating that the concession-events I ex-
amine here are not affected by reneging, and that reneging is more likely to impact policymaking
exclusion campaigns. The restricted sample in this chapter contains 32 concessions to policymak-
ing exclusion campaigns and 20 concessions to policy performance campaigns.
When comparing the 30 days before and after a concession, both campaigns reduce the level of
protest. 50% of concessions to policymaking exclusion campaigns are associated with decreased
protest, and 18.8%, with increased protest. For policy performance campaigns, the immediate
demobilizing effect is greater: 55% of concessions decrease protest, and 15% increase it. For both
campaign types, the percentage of concessions associated with demobilization increases over time.
This is likely due to the fact that these concessions were not affected by reneging and therefore may
actually provide resolution of the grievance. Table 5.5 presents these results.
Looking at the duration to the next protest supports the proposition that concessions are more ef-
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Table 5.5: Comparative Rate of Protest, 30-, 60- and 90-Day Periods by Campaign Type
30 Days 60 Days 90 Days
Exclusion Performance Exclusion Performance Exclusion Performance
Increase 18.8% 15.0% 24.1% 15.0% 21.4% 20.0%
No Change 31.2% 30.0% 17.2% 25.0% 21.4% 20.0%
Decrease 50.0% 55.0% 58.6% 60.0% 57.1% 60.0%
n=32 n=20 n=29 n=20 n=28 n=20
fective against policy performance campaigns. 60% of concession-events that involved policy per-
formance campaigns were not followed by a large protest in the first 30 days, whereas only 46.9%
policymaking exclusion campaigns suspended protest in that period. Within 60 days, 50% of
concessions to policy performance campaigns were still demobilizing, compared to 31.2% of con-
cessions to policymaking exclusion campaigns. This asymmetric demobilization persists through
the 6-month period, but by one year, the behavior of both campaign types converge: 84% of con-
cessions to policymaking exclusion and 76.5% of concessions to policy performance campaigns
have lost their demobilizing effect. Interestingly, the share of policy performance campaigns that
remobilize in the last 6-months of the 1-year period is twice that of policymaking exclusion cam-
paigns. This, coupled with the above observation about declining protest by policy performance
campaigns within the first three months after a concession suggests solutions to conflicts about
policy performance that are effective in the short-term are not long-term satisfying. This may be
because policy performance campaigns regularly ask for and win particularistic concessions that
do not entail lasting reforms. For instance, the labor disputes are generally resolved by the repay-
ment of stolen wages or a raise; they do not lead to changes that prevent wage theft or ensure that
workers will earn a living wage in the future.
5.5 Higher Quality Concessions
Given that this chapter examines cases of concession that were not affected by reneging, it provides
an opportunity to gain insight into how satisfaction with the concession affects mobilization. To
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do so, I look at concession-events that included at least one concession coded as core. These con-
cessions address one of the campaign’s top demands, and they comprise 27 of the 53 concession-
events. It seems straightforward that if a concession promises to resolve a core grievance that
motivates the campaign, protest should decline, particularly if reneging does not occur. This effect
is also called grievance depletion (Gamson, 1975). I explore the strength and persistence of this
effect here.
First, I compare the protest incidence in the 30 days before and after a core concession (table
5.6). Core concessions are associated with a decrease of protest in 55.6% of cases, compared
with 46.2% of other concession-events. Yet they are also associated with an increase of protest in
18.5% of cases. This share is higher than that for lower quality concessions, which increase protest
in only 15.4% instances. Accordingly, a comparatively lower share of campaigns maintain protest
at the same level following a core concession (25.9%) than following other concessions (38.5%).
Campaigns thus appear more reactive to higher quality concessions, either escalating protest or
demobilizing. This phenomenon persists in the 60 and 90-day periods, with the share of campaigns
increasing and decreasing protest activity both grow. By the end of the 90-day window, 70.8% of
core concessions are associated with demobilization, compared with 45.8% other concessions.
Table 5.6: Comparative Rate of Protest, 30-, 60- and 90-Day Periods by Quality
30 Days 60 Days 90 Days
Core Other Core Other Core Other
Increase 18.5% 15.4% 20.8% 20.0% 20.8% 20.8%
No Change 25.9% 38.5% 4.2% 36.0% 8.3% 33.3%
Decrease 55.6% 46.2% 75.0% 44.0% 70.8% 45.8%
n=27 n=26 n=24 n=25 n=24 n=24
Core concessions also associated the subsequent suspension of protest (see 5.7). Only 33.3% of
core concessions were followed by a large protest within 30 days, compared to 61.5% of other con-
cessions. This striking relationship is statistically significant at p<0.1 level in a Chi square-test.5
Yet this demobilizing effect declines within 60 days: where previously two thirds of campaigns
5χ2 (1, N = 53) = 3.17, p = .075
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Table 5.7: Duration from Concession to Next Protest, by Quality
30 Days 60 Days 90 Days 6 months 1 year
Core Other Core Other Core Other Core Other Core Other
Protest 33.3% 61.5% 55.6% 65.4% 55.6% 69.2% 61.5% 78.3% 68.2% 95.0%
No Protest 66.7% 38.5% 44.0% 34.6% 44.4% 30.8% 38.5% 21.7% 31.8% 5.0%
n=27 n=26 n=24 n=25 n=24 n=24 n-32 n=23 n=22 n=20
were demobilized, at 60 days, only 44.4% have not held a protest. For core concessions, these num-
bers remain roughly similar through the 6-month mark, then again drop dramatically. At one year,
31.8% of core concessions have forestalled a subsequent large protests. This is significantly higher
than the comparable figure for other concessions: only 5% of non-core concessions—accounting
for a single concession—were still associated with the suspension of protest after one year. This
relationship at the one-year mark is also significant at p<0.1 in a Chi square-test.6 Still, this again
points to a dynamic of later-remobilization.
Overall, it seems that core concessions are a major driver of the demobilizing effect of con-
cessions. This makes intuitive sense: core concessions come close to giving protesters what they
asked for, so they seem bound to be more satisfying. Non-core concessions still have some de-
mobilizing effect, but it is less robust, particularly in the long-term. This finding underscores that
concessions are more than the simple transmission of benefits from the government to the popu-
lation. Specifically, concessions are sometimes assumed to be equivalent to financial or material
benefits, meaning that making concessions is the same as paying off protesters or engaging in
patronal politics. It is clear here that if the government’s goal is demobilization, concessions of
that nature are unlikely to work. Although everyday protest campaigns are generally motivated by
concrete concerns, these protesters did not demand material or financial compensation (outside of
recovering losses or money owed, for example in labor disputes), which means that concessions
of that nature would not be considered core. Incidentally, the Moscow government rarely made
concessions that entailed distribution unrelated to the demands of the campaign, probably due to
the fact that such concessions would offer little strategic advantage.
6χ2 (1, N = 50) = 3.26, p = .071
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5.5.1 Who concedes?
Analysis of the effect of core concession shows that the quality is an important driver of demobi-
lization. Do other aspects of concession quality operate in the same way? To explore this, I con-
sider concessions that were made by an individual holding national-level office or representative of
a national-level institution. Examples of national-level figures who made concessions include Pres-
ident Vladimir Putin, the Presidential Administration, the Prime Minister, Deputy Prime Ministers,
the chairman or other members of the State Duma, and leaders of national universities. Local fig-
ures include members of the Moscow City government, including Mayor Sergei Sobyanin, Deputy
Mayors, Moscow-level institutional bodies like the City Property Office, and members of the City
Duma, as well as district-level officials and state-owned or affiliated enterprises. National-level
concessions were considerably less common than local concessions. Only 10 are included in this
data, and this small sample size is evident in the following analysis.
First, it bears discussing whether concessions from national-level actors are truly higher quality.
Because these everyday protests are about local issues, they are often seen as caused by the local
government. The Moscow government is widely considered corrupt, and protesters understand
many of the conflicts that appear in PCoM as fundamentally related to that corruption. Protesters
often have limited faith in the ability of the local government to resolve conflicts of its own making
in the public interest. In that context, a concession from a national-level authority could have the
effect of intercession from above; indeed, the tradition of the highest power in the land disciplining
bad local officials is as old as Russia itself.
At the same time, these national-level actors are also seen as corrupt. Their investment in the
public interest, rather than elite allies, is dubious. In Moscow, national-level actors are embedded
in the same corrupt networks as local politicians. As an illustration of this, Marat Khusnullin,
who served as Moscow’s Deputy Mayor for Urban Development and Construction from 2010 to
2020, was often targeted by protesters with construction-related grievances.7 These are conflicts
7Khusnullin was likely one of the least popular political figures in the city during this period. However, in inter-
views, it was clear that part of protesters’ animus against Marat Khusnullin and Sergei Sobyanin is that are “not from
Moscow” and are attempting to change the city without a legitimate claim to it or an understanding of it. Defenders
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in which hundreds of million dollars are regularly at stake, given the cost of land and real estate
in Moscow. Several development projects Khusnullin oversaw directly benefited national-level
elites, such as the MGU “tech valley” project discussed in Chapter 4, which produced multiple
land disputes and likely directly benefited Putin’s family.8 In 2020, Khusnullin became the Deputy
Prime Minister of Russia for Construction and Regional Development, an equivalent national-
level office. In sum, concessions from national-level actors can be interpreted as higher-quality,
but certainly not universally.
Within the first 30 days after a concession from a national-level actor, the effect on demobiliza-
tion is almost indistinguishable from local concessions (see 5.8). Both decrease protest compared
to the previous 30 days in 40-50% of cases, and leave protest unchanged in around one third of
cases. National level concessions were more likely to increase the incidence of protest; this oc-
curred in 20% of cases, as opposed to 16.3% of local concessions. When turning to data on time to
the next protest, however, it is evident that national-level concessions are considerably less likely
to contribute to demobilization. In no period that I assess do national-level concessions delay large
protests more than local-level concessions (see 5.9). Within 30 days, 60% of national-level conces-
sions have been followed by a large protest, whereas only 44.2% of local concessions have failed
to demobilize. By 60 days, that figure rises to 80%. The demobilizing effect of local concessions
appears to decline less quickly, too. By 6 months, only one of the observed nine national-level
concessions has forestalled another protest, whereas 35.0% of local concessions had not been fol-
lowed by another large protest. After one year, 20.0% of the local concessions were still associated
with demobilization.
What might be producing this effect? It may be the result of a selection issue: the campaigns
of Moscow’s architecture, parks and other urban features often mentioned this, and often brought up them up together
(For instance, “Khusnullin is a swindler, a thief, a corrupt official. He’s not from Moscow at all. Well, Sobyanin is
not from Moscow either. They all came here and are building these skyscrapers over our heads.”) However, many
members of the Moscow government are not from the city. In the case of Khusnullin and Sobyanin, there is an ethnic
dimension to this complaint. Khusnullin is ethnically Tatar and made his name in Kazan, the capital of the Republic
of Tatarstan. Sobyanin is from the Khanty-Mansi Autonomous Ethnic Republic and is of Mansi heritage.
8Khusnullin’s projects also directly benefitted himself, his family, and allies from his home city of Kazan. In 2016,
Khusnullin was the subject of an investigation by Transparency International, at the request of defenders of Dubki
Park (a case study of this campaign is included in the next chapter), which found evidence of corruption and conflict
of interest, and was submitted to Moscow’s Prosecutor’s Office (Transparency International Russia, 2016).
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Table 5.8: Comparative Rate of Protest, 30-, 60-, and 90-Day Periods around a Concession, by
Speaker
30 Days 60 Days 90 Days
Local National Local National Local National
Increase 16.3% 20.0% 23.1% 10.0% 23.7% 10.0%
No Change 32.6% 30.0% 17.9% 30.0% 15.8% 40.0%
Decrease 51.2% 40.0% 59.0% 60.0% 60.5% 50.0%
n=43 n=10 n=39 n=10 n=38 n=10
Table 5.9: Duration from Concession to Next Protest, by Speaker
30 Days 60 Days 90 Days 6 months 1 year
Local National Local National Local National Local National Local National
Protest 44.2% 60.0% 55.8% 80.0% 58.1% 80.0% 65.0% 88.9% 80.0% 85.7%
No Protest 55.8% 40.0% 44.2% 20.0% 41.9% 20.0% 35.0% 11.1% 20.0% 14.3%
n=43 n=10 n=43 n=10 n=43 n=10 n=40 n=9 n=35 n=7
that attract national attention are also higher capacity and better able to sustain protest regardless of
the concession. On average, national-level concessions went to campaigns that had held more prior
events (9.8 compared with 8.67 events to local concessions), and these campaigns are less likely to
be demobilized by concessions. Additionally, it is possible that increased attention associated with
a concession by national-level actors incentivized an uptick in protest.
Finally, concessions from these higher-ranking sources may not effectively resolve grievances.
Only half of national-level concessions address the campaign’s core concern. For instance, in the
Khoroshevo-Mnevniki neighborhood of northwestern Moscow, a park defense campaign formed
to prevent the construction of high-rise apartment buildings on the banks of the Moscow River. Not
only was this area designated as open space, its geology was too unstable to support large buildings,
which was an issue given that it was also situated closer to nuclear and high-pressure gas facilities
than was permitted for residential construction. After a round-the-clock watch forced a halt to the
project, a State Duma Deputy visited the site to meet with protesters. He promised to officially stop
construction until the permits were verified. As park defenders were aware, such a commitment has
little long-term impact, because the body that issues the permits, the Planning Commission, rarely
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reverses its decisions and operates without oversight. Eventually, the Presidential Administration
declared the permits legal, and the facility was completed by 2019.
5.6 Early and Late Remobilization
Throughout this exploration of demobilization, it has become evident that some campaigns hold
protests almost immediately after receiving a concession, while others wait months. To understand
why this occurs, I look more closely at these cases of “failed demobilization” and late remobiliza-
tion.
There are 14 concession-events, affecting nine campaigns, where the next protest occurred
within a week of the concession. In several of those instances, protest happened the following
day. For some of these campaigns, the continuation of mobilization appears to be the result of
unsatisfactory concessions. Only six of the 14 concessions were core concessions, and protesters
mainly carried on as before. In one instance of a workers’ dormitory protest, residents fighting for
their right to stay in their homes were told that if they voluntarily moved out, they would be reset-
tled in new apartments. This greatly angered protesters and initiated a sharp increase of protest.
In other cases, the campaign appears to have had an event previously planned and simply did not
cancel it after the concession, although protest subsequently tapered off. Last, as discussed above,
very large campaigns like the opposition to the renovation project, are weakly coordinated and
demobilization occurred unevenly.
As an illustration, consider the example of the Mitino district of northwest Moscow, where lo-
cals hoping to prevent the development of a shopping mall-hockey rink complex in a local park
“failed” to demobilize after concessions twice. On the first occasion, the concession only commit-
ted the government to organizing a public council of local initiative group leaders, residents and
municipal deputies to discuss the issue of construction. Not only does this concession in no way
address the core grievance, it is an attempt at cooptation, by drawing campaign organizers into
meetings with officials who are essentially unable to affect policy. A few days later, the campaign
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held a park clean-up in support of their cause. This event required a fair amount of preplanning, as
it was coordinated with the local district administration, and it had goals outside the expression of
dissent. Thus, even if the concession had been acceptable, the event would likely have been held.
The Mitino campaign continued protesting and was promised another concession two months af-
ter the first. This second concession was significantly more satisfying. A Moscow City Duma
Deputy told a local newspaper that construction of retail space in the park would be banned in the
near future. While this would not prohibit all development in the park—indeed, about a year later
attempts to develop the real estate resumed—it would prevent the construction of the shopping
center at minimum. Despite this promising development, the campaign held demonstration five
days later. This protest would be their last event for several months, concluding weeks of sustained
activism. Organizing this protest took notably more effort than most of Mitino’s previous events.
First, because it was expected to be a larger demonstration, in the weeks prior to the event, or-
ganizers had submitted notification to the government of their intention to hold a demonstration.
This request was denied. To avoid holding an illegal demonstration, the organizers recruited sym-
pathetic municipal deputies to attend, as the presence of an elected official technically qualifies a
gathering as a meeting with constituents. Additionally, one of the motivations for holding this event
was to celebrate the union of all citizens’ groups in Mitino into a single group, Our Mitino. This
was therefore a high-effort event that organizers worked hard to coordinate and were disinclined
to cancel because of the concession.
Why might some campaigns demobilize following a concession, only to protest again months
later? There are nine cases where this occurred, and in all of them, the remobilization was driven
by a resurgence in the importance of the grievance. In some cases this looks similar to reneging.
For construction disputes, there appear to be cases where the government reels back its efforts to
develop a plot of land, potentially in the hope that activism subsides and it can execute a similar,
but slightly different development. It is this phenomenon that leads to the round-the-clock-watches
I describe above. It also led to the late remobilization of the Mitino campaign, when the focus of
development shifted from a shopping mall-hockey rink to apartments and a hockey rink. Similarly,
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there are two cases of resurgent labor protests, in one instance because wage theft had occurred
again and in the other, workers wanted improvements over the earlier concession. The line-waiters
campaign for subsidized housing, however, remobilized for different reasons: the campaign began
to direct its energy into joining a national campaign about housing rights, and its demands evolve
from resolving the protesters’ immediate concerns to the prosecution of local government officials
who have violated their rights.
5.7 Conclusion
In this chapter, I have explored the extent to which concessions, when actually implemented, are
associated with the demobilization of everyday protest campaigns. By comparing the incidence of
large protests before and after a concession-event and by analyzing the duration to the next protest,
I have shown that concessions do appear to inhibit mobilization. Moreover, this association with
demobilization is stronger than that of detentions and demobilization. However, this effect of
concessions on demobilization declines over time: 81% of protest campaigns have held another
protest within a year of experience a concession-event. This is striking, given that concessions that
were undermined by reneging were not included in this analysis.
Why might this effect be short-lived? The findings from this chapter provide some insight.
First, as suggested by the analysis of concessions that entailed a timeline, campaigns may adopt
a wait-and-see approach and pause protest while the government implements concessions. Later,
however, they may feel that those concessions were unsatisfactory or the grievance may evolve,
spurring renewed protest. Second, the analysis of campaign event history suggests that the govern-
ment may use concessions in the very early stages of a protest campaign to contain it before the
campaign acquires the capacity to make greater demands. This does not appear to be effective in
most cases: it might forestall protest but does not seem to eliminate it longer-term, possibly because
the earlier-arriving concessions are less likely to tackle the campaign’s core concern. Third, it is
likely that the demobilizing effect of concessions arises from how closely the concession matches
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the campaign’s core goals. This factor was the most persistently associated with demobilization
of any that I considered here. Unsatisfactory concessions seem to be ignored by protesters. This
suggests that in some instances when core concessions are used, conflicts truly are resolved: the
central grievance is addressed and protest subsides.
Although the concessions considered in this chapter were not affected by reneging, they can
still tell us about the dynamics of concessions that are eventually undermined. It is clear that
the promise of concessions is linked to an immediate drop in protest, particularly in the first 30
days. During this period, protesters may not do not know whether the government intends to
renege (though in some cases they do, as I discuss in the case study in Chapter 6). This means
that a similar dynamic of immediate demobilization would likely occur in many cases where the
government reneges later on. This supports the theory I advanced in Chapter 4, that the government
makes empty promises to protesters in order to secure a few weeks of reduced protest. In the next




Well, if they promise something, as a rule, they usually deliver it.
— Interview with an ecological protester, September 19, 2019
We don’t have final victories here.
— Interview with park defender, September 22, 2019
The previous chapter examines concessions that were implemented, at least in large part, within
the first few months after they were made. This is not the fate of every concession. The city
promised protesting residents of dormitories owned by the Salyut Aircraft Engine Factory, the
Trekhgorny Factory, Centrotransstroy and other enterprises that these dormitories would be trans-
ferred to the city’s ownership so that their housing rights would be recognized, yet the city then
declined to accept the transfer that it had itself requested, extending these housing disputes. In
response to opposition to the restructuring of the healthcare system, the city guaranteed job search
assistance, access to training programs and a salary during retraining for laid-off workers, but
despite the fact that thousands of people should have qualified for these benefits, the city only
managed to distribute them to a few hundred. The campaign against park construction in Mitino
was promised that city authorities would not construct a hockey center in the park; the hockey rink
is due to be completed in 2021. These are all examples of reneging, or the deliberate failure to full
implement concessions as promised. 45.1% of all concessions are subject to reneging within four
years.
148
In this chapter, I analyze dynamics in the implementation of concessionary promises to derive
theoretical implications of how, when and why reneging occurs. Although it is widely acknowl-
edged that commitments by autocrats to future behavior lack inherent credibility and are subject
to reneging, this phenomenon has rarely been examined when it comes to protest, and never ex-
amined when it comes to protest by low-capacity campaigns on less politicized issues. How does
reneging happen? What features of a concession are associated with an increased or decreased
chance of reneging? What features are associated with a higher chance that the concession will
be fully implemented as promised? How does the level of government that makes the concession
affect reneging or full implementation? I address these questions using descriptive analysis of the
aggregate concessions data in the next section.
In the previous chapter, I exclusively focused on the relationship between mobilization and
concessions that were not affected by reneging in hopes of isolating how concessions themselves,
rather than reneging, influences mobilization. Identifying the relationship between reneging and
mobilization is not as straightforward. The implementation data I collected for each concession is
not optimally suited to disentangling the nature of this relationship. The implementation data is
observed on a different scale than the daily event data I used in the last chapter. Because of the diffi-
culty of associating implementation of a policy with a specific date, instead I score implementation
over a certain period, the shortest of which is three months. This means that the first three months
after a concession has a single implementation score. Based on the analysis in the last chapter,
protest activity varies greatly in that period. Aggregating that protest activity to match the level of
measurement of implementation will mask a lot of theoretically important protest dynamics.
In light of this, I present a case study of Save Park Dubki!, a campaign against the construction
of an apartment complex on the edge of a park. This campaign received five concessions, all
of which the government reneged on, in some cases virtually instantly. These concessions also
failed to demobilize the campaign. This case allows me to more closely examine the link between
reneging and mobilization in the context of a higher-capacity campaign against construction, which
is the modal grievance in PCoM.
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Next, I analyze data from 22 interviews that I conducted with urban activists in Moscow in
2018 and 2019 to clarify how activists perceive concessionary promises, the credibility of the gov-
ernment, the need to sustaining mobilization after a concession and obstacles to doing so. These
interviews illustrate the difficult position in which activists find themselves: they seek conces-
sionary promises from a government they believe is fundamentally untrustworthy, and to prevent
reneging, they must convince more credulous campaign members that their understanding of their
political system is wrong.
6.1 Quantitative Aggregate Analysis of Concessions and
Reneging
6.1.1 Data and Methodology
In this section, I analyze the dataset of 122 individual concessions that were made to protesters in
Moscow from September 12 2013 to September 18 2018. To be clear, these are not the concession-
events of the previous chapter; each concession is distinct. For each concession, I identify the
speaker or entity that issued the concessionary promise, the type of action promised in the conces-
sion and whether the promise corresponds to a core demand, which motivated the campaign and
was expressed by the campaign. Greater detail of the concessions coding is available in section
3.2.
Section 3.2.4 discusses the measurement of implementation of concessions and reneging, but I
briefly review these measures here. I assessed implementation in seven periods: first, in four three-
month quarters for the first year, and then for three additional one-year periods. Implementation
is scored on a four-point scale. Concessions scored as a 1 have no impact or a negligible impact,
with no evidence that any subcomponents of the concession have an influence on actual policies or
behavior consistent with the promise, or that any steps have been taken by the government to put
the concession into place. Descriptively, I refer to this score as reneging or full reneging, because
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there is no observable effort by the government to enact the promised concession. This is the level
of implementation used to generate the reneging variable in Chapter 4 and to exclude concession-
events in Chapter 5. Concessions scored as a 2 have a limited effect or the government has fulfilled
about 25-50% of the elements of the commitment. A score of 3 represents some or partial effect,
where more than half of the elements or steps of the concession have been implemented, but it
falls short of affecting actual policy and/or behavior as promised. This score can be thought of
as 50-75% implementation. Last, concessions scored at 4 are mostly or fully implemented. The
majority of or all steps associated with implementing the concession are completed. Concessions
at this level have the real, intended effect on policy and/or behavior of actors that is consistent
with the initial promise. In the following, I focus on comparing the frequency of concessions that
were scored at 1, full reneging, and 4, full implementation, because these are the two outcomes of
greatest interest. They also facilitate comparison, as I rely on descriptive methods here.
In addition to these implementation scores, in each period I identify concessions for which
implementation cannot be observed (also discussed in section 3.2.4). This occurs in several sce-
narios. I do not score implementation where fulfilling the commitment made in the concession has
become impossible, or where the concessions was completed in an earlier period and requires no
maintenance to be sustained. Also, concessions that were invalidated by other concessions, mak-
ing their fulfillment impossible, were not scored; promises from higher-ranking officials or with
more accelerated timelines are two examples of concessions that might supplant others. Last, I
do not score concessions where efforts to enact the concession were plausibly underway but could
not be observed, and that unobservability did not violate the commitment in the concession itself.
These missing observations mean that only about 65% of concessions are scored for implemen-
tation in any given period, and the sample ranges from 54-70% of the 122 concessions. In other
words, some concessions are observed at the beginning, some only later, and some for periods in
the middle.
To evaluate which concessions are more or less subject to reneging, I use frequency tables.
Of the concessions that are observed in each period, I calculate the percentage of those conces-
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sions that are at each category of implementation. When disaggregating by concession feature, I
calculate the percentage of concessions with that feature at each category of implementation.
6.1.2 An Overview of Aggregate Data on Reneging
How common is reneging? How does the quality of implementation of concessions change over
time? In this section I conduct an aggregate analysis of all concessions and their implementation
level over time. This data is presented in table 6.1 and summarized in figure 6.1.
First, regardless of temporal variation, the majority of concessions are either fully implemented
(4) or have no impact (1). Relatively few concessions are at a partial or limited level of imple-
mentation (2 or 3) at any given time. The government therefore appears to use an all-or-nothing
strategy when using concessions. This supports the proposition in Chapter 4, that in some cases
concessions are used to remedy grievances but in others, they are a strategy to distract protesters
and undermine mobilization. This bifurcation of concessions between the highest and lowest level
of implementation is potentially characteristic of a high-capacity autocracy that has the ability to
implement concessions and to use them as a form of manipulation. Were the government attempt-
ing and failing to implement concessions, the incidence of these middling levels of implementation
would be higher, since virtually any evidence of the government making an effort to implement a
concession was sufficient to classify implementation as partial.
Table 6.1: Implementation of Concessions over Time
1 2 3 4 n Scored 0 NA
n % n % n % n % n n
0-3 months 36 41.9% 9 10.5% 6 7.0% 35 40.7% 86 24 12
3-6 months 30 37.5% 12 15.0% 7 8.8% 31 38.8% 80 19 23
6-9 months 30 37.5% 15 18.8% 8 10.0% 27 33.8% 80 18 24
9-12 months 32 37.2% 17 19.8% 8 9.3% 29 33.7% 86 11 25
Year 2 32 39.5% 17 21.0% 8 9.9% 24 29.6% 81 2 39
Year 3 32 42.1% 16 21.1% 9 11.8% 19 25.0% 76 3 43
Year 4 30 46.2% 10 15.4% 6 9.2% 19 29.2% 65 3 54
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Percentage of concessions scored in each time period at each level of implementation
Looking at concessions that are not implemented, the share begins high, with 41.9% of all
concessions that are observed within the first three months. Though it appears that comparatively
fewer concessions have no impact at 6 months, this is likely an artifact of the sample. Seven of the
34 concessions that initially have no impact are not observed in the next quarter, mainly because
they pertain to actions the government promised would be undertaken immediately or that were no
longer relevant after three months due to developments in the conflict. In the following periods, the
share of concessions that were fully undermined by reneging consistently grows—again, despite
the reduction in sample size—until by three or more years out, 46.2% of concessions have no
impact. Concessions that were completely fulfilled in the first three months consistently decline
over the period of observation, from 40.7% to 25-29%.
Further, significant changes in the level of implementation are rare over time, particularly when
it comes to improving implementation. Of the 36 cases where a concession had no effect within the
first three months, none was ever fully implemented at any point. Only two of those concessions
ever reached partial implementation (score of 3). Concessions that were initially fully realized are
more likely to decline. Thirty five concessions were first observed at full implementation, but four
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of these ultimately had no effect and five eventually had limited effect (score of 2).
Taken together, this suggests that reneging has three core features. First, the majority of reneg-
ing is immediate. Second, in the cases where reneging is not immediate, the quality of implemen-
tation can decline with time, both with a higher incidence of reneging and a lower incidence of full
implementation, meaning that the apparent victory of a concession is challenging for a campaign
to hold onto. Even concessions that appear robustly implemented at the outset may not necessarily
be secure. Third, once total reneging has occurred, it is not reversed—though it may be supplanted
by a different concession.
6.1.3 Core Concessions
The quality of a concession—whether or not it corresponds to one of the campaign’s core de-
mands—is clearly important for demobilizing protest. Core concessions comprise 52 of the 122
total concessions, and just under half (31 of 66) campaigns received a core concession. To what
extent are these concessions impacted by reneging? In Chapter 5, I found these concessions were
most associated with diminished mobilization when they are fully implemented, but how often
does that occur? In table E.1, I compare the implementation of core concessions to other types of
concessions over time.
Figure 6.2: Comparison of Implementation over Time, by Concession Quality
Core Subcore Adjacent























Percentage of concessions scored in each time period at each level of implementation. Wildcard concessions (n=4)
are omitted.
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Table 6.2: Comparison of Implementation over Time, by Concession Quality
Quality 1 2 3 4
0-3 months Core 33.3% 15.4% 7.7% 43.6%
Other 48.9% 6.4% 6.4% 38.3%
3-6 months Core 33.3% 17.9% 12.8% 35.9%
Other 41.5% 12.2% 4.9% 41.5%
6-9 months Core 34.2% 21.1% 15.8% 28.9%
Other 40.5% 16.7% 4.8% 38.1%
9-12 months Core 34.1% 19.5% 17.1% 29.3%
Other 40.0% 20.0% 2.2% 37.8%
Year 2 Core 28.2% 20.5% 15.4% 35.9%
Other 50.0% 21.4% 4.8% 23.8%
Year 3 Core 30.8% 23.1% 17.9% 28.2%
Other 54.1% 18.9% 5.4% 21.6%
Year 4 Core 36.4% 12.1% 12.1% 39.4%
Other 56.3% 18.8% 6.3% 18.8%
For a table comparing all levels of quality, see Appendix E.
Core concessions are both more likely to be subject to initial reneging and more likely to be
fully implemented. In the first three months, only 33.3% of core concessions were reneged on,
whereas 48.9% of other concessions are immediately undermined by reneging. Beyond the first
three months, the share of core concessions that were not implemented holds steady over time,
between 28-36%, while the share of non-core concessions increases fairly consistently. Ultimately,
the government reneged on 56.3% of non-core concessions that were observed after four years.
Turning to full implementation, there is considerably more fluctuation overtime. In the first quarter,
43.6% of concessions are fully implemented, compared to 38.3% of other concessions, yet in the
second quarter, this ratio is reversed: 35.9% of core concessions were fully implemented, compared
to the 41.5% of non-core concessions. This effect may be driven by the fact that a large number of
non-core concessions are dropped from the sample: 10 non-core concessions are dropped from the
sample at 6 months, compared to 3 core concessions. This is likely because non-core concessions
tend to be shorter-term, and may pertain to temporary measures to pause the conflict pending its
resolution, for instance suspending construction at a contested site, compared with cancelling it
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altogether. The share of non-core concessions at full implementation steadily declines, hitting
18.8% at four years.
After four years, almost the same share of core concessions are fully implemented as have no
real-world effect. Why might this be? Some core concessions are in fact intended to resolve the
grievance: the concessions themselves address the motivating grievance of the campaign and in a
number of cases, those concessions were actually did what was promised. Yet in a large share of
cases of core concession, the government evidently does not intend for the concession to address
the motivating grievance, because it does not implement the promised change. In the previous
chapter, I showed that core concessions that were not affected by reneging were much more likely
to be associated with demobilization. Ex ante, of course, a campaign cannot know for certain if
a given concession will be undermined by reneging, meaning that demobilization can occur. In
sum, it seems likely that the government may falsely promise core concessions, without intention
of implementing them, to discourage mobilization.
If this is true, however, it begs an additional question: why does the government ever use non-
core concessions? First, a fair number of non-core concessions address an expressed, secondary
demand of the campaign, but not its core grievance. I call these “subcore” concessions. Subcore
concessions are neither a strict victory for protesters nor defeat for the government. They represent
a kind of compromise, where the government concedes to some of the campaign demands without
committing to resolving the grievance in their favor. They may therefore occur in cases where
the government is particularly unwilling to make a core concession, even if reneging is possible,
perhaps if the campaign is very high capacity. Subcore concessions are slightly less common than
core concessions (32.8% of all concessions are subcore, versus 42.6% core) and they constitute
the majority of non-core concessions that were used as a comparison group for the demobiliza-
tion analysis in the last chapter. In other words, the last chapter also demonstrates that subcore
concessions are less demobilizing than core concessions. Figure 6.2 depicts the comparison be-
tween core, subcore and adjacent concessions; the full table is available in appendix E . While
subcore concessions suffer from a high rate of reneging—higher than core concessions in every
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period and often around 50%—in some periods that are more likely to be fully implemented than
core concessions, particularly in the first year. Further, the share of subcore concessions that are
fully implemented changes little in the first year (36-37%), while the full implementation of core
concessions declines.
From this it seems that subcore concessions serve a few purposes. First, they can be an at-
tempt to resolve a conflict where the government is unwilling to make a core concession. These
would be cases where reneging might be less common. Alternatively, subcore concessions may be
an effort to disrupt mobilization with a concession that resonates with the campaign’s demands.
Here, reneging would be expected. It is possible that, because subcore concessions represent a
compromise, that they are used as a kind of bargaining process. If the government offers subcore
concessions in an effort to compromise with a campaign, but protest continues because the con-
cession is seen as insufficient, the government could choose not to implement the concession in
response.
Last, it is notable that adjacent concessions—which do not correspond to a demand expressed
by the campaign but still pertain to the grievance—are the most vulnerable to problems with im-
plementation. The high incidence of reneging suggests that adjacent concessions are more of a
gesture at responsiveness than a genuine compromise.
6.1.4 Official Rank
As the dissertation thus far has shown, concessions are not inherently credible. I argued in Chap-
ter 4 that this absence of credibility is a feature of authoritarian regimes, where the weakness of
institutions that represent the public interest means that citizens have limited means to hold the
government to its promises. While this is the case overall, the government itself is a hierarchical
structure. Within that structure, higher-level authorities do have the power to enforce commit-
ments implemented by lower-level officials. Higher-ranking government roles are increasingly
managerial, in that a greater bulk of their work is instructing lower-ranking officers in making and
implementing policies. It is fair to assume, for instance, that when the Mayor of Moscow promises
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the residents of the workers’ dormitory at Simferopol Street that they will be provided housing,
the Mayor will not be providing that housing himself, but is functionally instructing, in public, his
subordinates to resolve the issue. The threat of negative consequences for failing to complete an
assigned project should provide an impetus for those subordinates to fulfill the concession.
Additionally, in fieldwork interviews and in the course of reading hundreds of digital accounts
by protesters, it was clear that members of these campaigns see Moscow’s officials and bureaucrats
as corrupt, self-interested, dishonest and even criminal. After all, it is not uncommon for a cam-
paign to have to appeal for a concession to the same officials that they viewed as responsible for
the grievance in the first place. As I discussed in the last chapter, this may create the impression
of national-level actors as more credible, because they are potentially less enmeshed in the con-
flicts that spawned these protest campaigns in the first place, and therefore better able to resolve
them. All this would suggest that concessions made by higher-ranking officials are less likely to
be affected by reneging, and lower-level officials are more likely to make false promises.
Yet the reality is likely less straightforward. Generally speaking, I cannot know if a lower-
ranking official makes a concession at the behest of a superior—in effect, an instruction issued
behind the scenes. Further, analysis of the data in the last chapter provided strong evidence that
concessions from national-level actors are not particularly demobilizing, even when reneging does
not occur. Moreover, national-level actors often made concessions that failed to resolve the un-
derlying grievance, which based on the foregoing analysis of on quality, may mean national-level
concessions are also subject to reneging more often. Also, as previously discussed, national elites,
particularly national elites in Moscow, participate in local corruption. Corruption in Russia is also
hierarchical, with profits shared up the ladder as officials pay off the superior officials who protect
them. In this light, lower- and higher-level officials are situated in dual principal-agent relation-
ships: one where intervention by the principal may be used to force a lower-level agent to serve
the public interest, and another where the principal and agent are united in serving their private
interests.
Adding a final layer of complexity is the possibility of fragmentation or competition within the
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government. The foregoing explanations assume that either the interests of government agents are
aligned, or singular, or that they are diverse but higher-ranking agents can discipline lower-ranking
agents. This may not be the case if factions within the government have divergent interests. It may
be possible that some members of government promises a concession without intent to renege, but
other members who prefer that the concession not be implemented force reneging to occur. These
dynamics may plausibly arise in China, where the government is known to be highly fragmented
along center-local lines. While I cannot test with my data whether fragmentation or rivalry within
government drives concessionary dynamics, these phenomenon are less likely to be at play in
Moscow, where fragmentation is not known to be a common problem. Also, given that it is the
capital city, the problems associated with monitoring and disciplining agents far from the center,
which have contributed to fragmentation in China, are less likely.
How, then, does government hierarchy affect reneging? Do lower-ranking agents renege more
often? Are concessions from national-level actors in fact more credible? Local-level officials make
the gross majority of concessions, given that PCoM focuses on local issue. Of local actors, whose
concessions are most likely to be fully implemented? Are concessions made by the highest-ranking
executive—Mayor Sergei Sobyanin—actually implemented?
I begin by categorizing the individual or entity promising the concession as local or national
and comparing the frequency of each level of implementation, during each time period. Initially,
national-level concessions are less likely to suffer from reneging, with 23.5% having no impact in
the first three months, compared to 46.1% of local concessions. Over time, however, reneging rises
for national concessions. The share of national-level concessions with no impact steadily increases,
until, by four years after the concession, 44.4% of national-level concessions are fully undermined
by reneging. A different trend applies to local-level concessions. The share of local concessions
that were rated as having no impact decreases within six months to around 40% and holds at
that level. Interestingly, national-level concessions were not consistently more likely to be fully
implemented than local-level concessions. Instead, a higher share of national-level concessions
attain a middling level of implementation, where some or partial elements of the concession have
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Table 6.3: Comparison of Implementation over Time, by Concession Speaker
Speaker 1 2 3 4
0-3 months Local 46.4% 8.7% 4.3% 40.6%
National 23.5% 17.6% 17.6% 41.2%
3-6 months Local 40.6% 14.1% 7.8% 37.5%
National 25.0% 18.8% 12.5% 43.8%
6-9 months Local 40.3% 17.7% 8.1% 33.9%
National 27.8% 22.2% 16.7% 33.3%
9-12 months Local 38.8% 17.9% 9.0% 34.3%
National 31.6% 26.3% 10.5% 31.6%
Year 2 Local 40.0% 20.0% 10.0% 30.0%
National 36.4% 27.3% 9.1% 27.3%
Year 3 Local 43.1% 18.5% 12.3% 26.2%
National 36.4% 36.4% 9.1% 18.2%
Year 4 Local 46.4% 14.3% 10.7% 28.6%
National 44.4% 22.2% NA 33.3%
an impact, but it falls short of full implementation.
I draw the following implications from these figures. First, concessions from national-level
actors are more likely to affect real-world policies, which is consistent with the notion of national
concessions as directives to local government. Yet at the same time, reneging on those concessions
steadily increases and they are more likely to be only partly implemented. This potentially points to
a principal-agent relationship where national-level principals attempt to force local agents to com-
ply with policy changes that are not in the interests of those local agents. Otherwise, if national and
local-actors’ priorities were aligned, one would expect a higher incidence of full implementation of
national actors’ concessions and less attrition over time. This dynamic warrants further research.
Second, the decline over time in implementation of national-level concessions may explain the last
chapter’s finding that these concessions lose their demobilizing power within a year. At that point,
the share of national-level concessions that are fully implemented is actually lower than the same
figure for local-level concessions, and equal to the share of national-level concessions that have
no impact. It may be possible that protesters initially have greater faith in national-concessions
but that this erodes with time and diminishes the demobilizing effect. Third, protesters have good
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Figure 6.3: Comparison of Implementation over Time, by Speaker
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Percentage of concessions scored in each time period at each level of implementation, by local and national
government.
reason to feel that concessions from local-level actors are low-credibility. Although many local
concessions are fully implemented at first, it becomes increasingly rare over time and total reneg-
ing is common.
To dig into the local dynamics more deeply, I disaggregate the local speakers into district agents
or institutions (neighborhood-level representatives like municipal deputies, prefects of Moscow’s
subdistricts, known as okrugs), city government agents (representatives of the Moscow Govern-
ment including Deputy Mayors, members of the Moscow City Duma, and representatives of city-
wide organizations, like the Department of City Property), and the city’s executive, the Mayor.
These findings are summarized in figure 6.4 and the full table is available in Appendix E. Within
the first year, concessions made by Mayor Sergei Sobyanin were implemented significantly better
than concessions by other municipal officials. 50-80% of his concessions were in full effect during
that period, and 12.5-20% had no effect. These figures make concessions from the Mayor among
the best performing of any dimension of concessions I examine—but only within that first year.
Following that, there is a striking reversal. After the first year, only around 10% of Sobyanin’s
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concessions are fully implemented, and around 55% have no effect on real policy or behavior. In
fact, after the first year, Sobyanin’s concessions are the worst performing of any local or national
actor. The fact that Sobyanin’s concessions are the worst-performing is not an artifact of a high
rate of implementation by other officials. Concessions from district officials are more likely to be
reneged on than implemented in every period. Concessions by district-level agents in particular
are markedly unlikely to be fully implemented; after one year, only 12.5% of their concessions
are fully in effect. For city-level officials, this is generally true as well, though a higher share of
municipal-level officials are fully implemented, compared with other local officials.
Figure 6.4: Comparison of Implementation over Time, by Local Speaker
District Municipal Sobyanin























Percentage of concessions scored in each time period at each level of implementation, by level of office-holder in
Moscow.
Given the high incidence of reneging on local concessions, why are local concessions more
demobilizing than national concessions, as discussed in the previous chapter? This may be because
local concessions are much more likely to be core concessions: 43.5% of local concessions are
core, but only 24.2% of national concessions.
6.1.5 Type of Promise
Officials can obligate the government to take different types of actions when making a concession.
Throughout, I have been referring to these commitments as policy change. In reality, there is
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significant variation in what the government is actually promising when making a concession.
This has already been clear in the analysis of concession quality in this and the previous chapter:
what is considered a “good” concession depends on the campaign and its specific demands. Still,
variation in the type of action may be linked to reneging. In this section, I assess how different
types of concession—distribution, enforcement, investigation, recognition or reform. Are some
types of commitments more likely to be realized than others? Over time, does the government
renege on some types of promises more than others?
To begin, I briefly review my typology of concessionary policy change, which is also described
in 3.2.2. Recognition of the campaign or the grievance involves holding roundtables, sets up ad-
visory councils or working groups, or pledges to consult the affected population in the future.
In other words, these are meetings between citizens and government representatives that in some
fashion formally recognize the grievance. Next, investigation entails opening a criminal or civil
case by the Prosecutor’s Office or the verification of compliance with legislation by another insti-
tution. Enforcement pertains to how existing laws and policies are put to use and where they apply.
Whereas investigation is about culpability or violation of the law, enforcement is about whether a
particular policy should govern the given situation. Next, reform requires formal changes to a law,
policy or rule. Reforms affect not only the grievance at hand, but potentially other conflicts as well
and can constrain the behavior of actors into the future. Last, when committing to distribution, the
government promises to disseminate material benefits, in the form of public or private goods.
Figure 6.5 compares the implementation over time of concessions by the type of promised pol-
icy change; the full table of results is available in Appendix E. Of these types of concessions,
investigations are overall the least likely to be affected by reneging. Two thirds of investigations
are fully implemented within three months, with the government reneging in only 11.1% of cases.
In fact, of any dimension of concessions that I look at in this chapter, investigations were the most
likely to be associated with the full realization of the concession: campaigns promised an inves-
tigation are more likely to see that concession implemented within three months than campaigns
promised a concession by Vladimir Putin. There is also limited change in the fulfillment of com-
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Figure 6.5: Comparison of Implementation over Time, by Type
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Percentage of concessions scored in each time period at each level of implementation, by promised policy change.
mitments to investigate over time. This is partly because investigations normally wrap up fairly
quickly: of the nine cases of investigation that were initially observed, six were no longer observed
after the first year. (Several investigations were scored for the first time at six or nine months.)
Concessions promising recognition were also implemented comparatively often. 44.4% of these
concessions were fully implemented within the first three months. However an equal share of
recognition concessions were not implemented at all in the same period. Over the first two years,
the implementation of recognition concessions slightly improves, in that fewer such concessions
have been completely reneged on, and the share that is fully implemented remains strong.
Reneging was most common in concessions about enforcement and reform. 42.4-51.5% of
concessions about enforcement had no impact on real-world policies in any given period. The rate
of reneging on enforcement-related concessions decreases slightly after the first three months, but
after two years, it rises again. A third or fewer of these concessions were fully implemented at any
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point. Concessions about reform are likewise subject to reneging in the first three months: for half
of these concessions, the government took no steps to implement the reform within the first three
months. There is, however, a decrease over time in the incidence of total reneging on concessions
about reform, reaching 33.3% by the end of four years. Yet this decrease was not accompanied
by an increase in fully implemented reforms. Initially, the share of fully implemented reforms is
high—42.9%— within two years it drops to 15.4% and continues to decline. Interestingly, a large
share of reforms were implemented incompletely; after the first two years, 46.2-53.8% of reforms
were implemented at the limited or partial level (2 or 3).
What might explain this variation? To begin with a caveat, while it may be tempting to compare
the types of concession using the language of cost, I avoid doing so here. In a monetary sense, I
cannot observe the cost of virtually any concessions. Further, even if I had significantly more finan-
cial information, the meaning of cost in this setting is unclear. Cost may refer to money invested
by the government in resolving the concession, but in many cases, the opportunity cost is actu-
ally much higher; in the many conflicts over development, not developing the land is conceivably
cheaper but foregoes potentially enormous profits. Cost could also refer to the time and resources
of individual actors spent implementing the promise. Given that the Russian government is a highly
corrupt system that runs on informal networks (Ledeneva, 2013), members of government often
rely on personal resources, such as calling in favors (blat’), to get things done. Opportunity cost
applies to these individuals too: in resolving a conflict they might be foregoing personal income
from kickbacks and embezzlement, or depriving their allies of the same. These difficult-to-observe
features make anything more than a relative estimation of cost, in general, untenable.
One key vector of variation that appears important is the extent to which the concession con-
strains the government’s behavior long-term. Concessions like reform and enforcement affect
more than the conflict at hand. Reforms create new laws and policies that the government must
comply with in the future. Enforcement decisions are less restrictive than reforms, but can still
constrain later behavior. For instance, decisions about which zoning laws apply on a plot of land
determine the ways that land can be used in the future, even if they do not alter zoning laws in
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general. Fully implementing reform and enforcement may therefore be particularly undesirable to
the government, because they can affect its behavior in other settings as well.
In contrast, concessions related to investigation and recognition do not constrain the govern-
ment’s behavior beyond the immediate conflict. Investigations have a specific target and the out-
come of an investigation has a limited effect on future action, as Russia does not have a precedent
legal system. Further, an investigation can always find that no wrongdoing has occurred or that the
alleged perpetrator of a criminal act is innocent—particularly in a country, like Russia, where rule
of law is weak. Thus technically, reneging would not have occurred although the outcome of the
investigation may be unsatisfactory to protesters. Of course, investigations can reveal wrongdoing
that the government acts on, but this allocates blame to a specific bad actor, rather than the gov-
ernment as a whole. This could be productive for the government, because it corresponds to how
individuals who are more trusting of the state understand their conflicts, as I discuss further using
interview data below.
Similarly, recognition—meetings with protesters or affected populations and the acknowledge-
ment of their grievances—does not entail an obligation to meaningfully incorporate that feedback
into policy. Despite this, meetings can create the appearance of consultation, which the govern-
ment may find advantageous in the midst of a conflict; this provides another incentive for the
government to fulfill these concessions rather than renege. In an interview, one park defender de-
scribed these meetings as a “steam release valve” that lower-level government agents use when
they think a campaign is preparing to hold another large protest (and that they are alerted to that
intention by permit applications).1 In line with this, concessions related to recognition went almost
exclusively to protest campaigns that I identify as policymaking exclusion campaigns, where the
government’s deliberate disregard for citizen feedback generated the grievance. One campaign
against construction developments in the Trinity Forest—territory that had been newly incorpo-
rated into Moscow City from the Oblast—was promised recognition on three separate occasions.
Prior to these concessions, citizens had so thoroughly been prevented from participating in public
1Interview with park defender, September 22 2019.
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hearings that a State Duma Deputy from the Communist Party officially requested that the federal
Prosecutor General investigate the violations.
6.1.6 Conclusions from the Aggregate Analysis
Overall, the aggregate analysis of concessions and reneging presents the following implications.
Reneging, as indicated by previous analysis, is quite common. The bulk of concessions are either
fully implemented or never implemented at all, with limited movement between these categories.
This means that for many concessions, the immediate level of implementation, within the first
three months or the first period in which it can be implemented, is key in determining its effect on
real-world policy and behavior. This is particularly important for reneging, because when reneging
is immediate, a concession never reaches full implementation. In a smaller set of cases, the con-
cession is fully implemented at first, but that implementation is eroded over time, so that ultimately
it has a diminished impact or no impact on policy.
Disaggregating the data to look at specific features of individual concessions presents mixed
results. Most features of a concession that are associated with full implementation are also associ-
ated with reneging. For instance, even though 43.6% of core concessions are fully implemented in
the first three months, reneging still occurs in one third of cases, which is still a significant share.
This supports the proposition that reneging is a strategic choice that the government pursues in
some cases and not in others. Generally, concessions that pertained to investigation and recogni-
tion, core concessions, and concessions by national-level actors were the least likely to have no
effect (i.e. least likely to be at an implementation score of 1). Reneging was most likely to impact
non-core concessions, concessions by local actors, and concessions about enforcement and reform.
These same features are associated with the lowest incidence of full implementation (i.e. they were
also least likely to be scored at implementation level of 4). Concessions about investigation and
recognition were the most likely overall to be fully implemented, but there are few other features
that are consistently associated with full implementation. Perhaps the most remarkable finding
here is that in the short term, concessions by Mayor Sergei Sobyanin were very unlikely to have
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no effect and most likely to be fully implemented, but after one year, this is totally reversed: the
Mayor’s concessions are least likely to be fully implemented and among the most likely to have no
real-world effect on policy or behavior.
These figures demonstrate that reneging is indeed prevalent and much of it is rapid, occurring
within the first three months after the concession is promised. This three-month window therefore
appears critical to determining the concessions subsequent effect on policy as well as the govern-
ment’s strategic use of concessions. To understand how this dynamic occurs, and the relationship
between concessions, mobilization and immediate reneging, I present a case study in the next
section.
6.2 Save Park Dubki! and Immediate Reneging
The aggregate concessions data points to several regularities that may make reneging more or less
likely, but cannot unpack the potential link between fulfilled concessions and demobilization, due
to reverse causality: reneging can affect demobilization or mobilization, and the level of mobiliza-
tion can affect reneging. To illuminate how reneging occurs and how it affects and is affected by
mobilization, I construct a detailed case study of the campaign Save Park Dubki!.
The campaign at Park Dubki opposed the construction of a 24-story apartment building on
the park’s border. It is an interesting case to consider for a few reasons. First, the campaign
received five concessions, none of which were implemented in any way. It therefore provides
several examples of the immediate reneging that the aggregate analysis indicates is most common.
Second, one of these was a core concession. Chapter 5 indicated that when core concessions are
implemented, they are closely linked with demobilization, yet the aggregate analysis suggests that
core concessions are roughly split between fully implemented and never implemented. The core
concession to Save Park Dubki! can illuminate the dynamic between core concessions, reneging
and mobilization. Third, by the standards I have employed throughout, this was a high-capacity
campaign: it held numerous events, some of which were reasonably large given the neighborhood-
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level conflict, and it held a round-the-clock watch for eight months. The capacity of the campaign
means that it is more likely to react to concessions strategically and to make a choice to continue to
protest or not, while with lower capacity campaigns, the abatement of protest may arise from lack
of coordination or exhaustion. Fourth, Save Park Dubki! is representative of anti-construction park
protests that were so common at this time. The following case study is based on online sources
that I used to code this campaign for PCoM.
The conflict at Park Dubki, in the Timiryazev district of northern Moscow began in early 2016.
Local residents feared that not only would the high-rise just outside the park destroy the natural
atmosphere, it would impinge on the park’s cultural and historical value as a monument to the
neighborhood’s past as a settlement of dachas (anna nik0laeva, 2016d). The underground parking
was also expected to damage the ground water that fed the park’s hundred-year oak trees, after
which it was named (Park of Oaks) (Activatica, 2016). At this time, in-fill development (tochech-
naya zastroika) had notably increased around the city, with small parks, courtyards and other areas
rezoned without public consultation for high-rise construction. Opponents of these projects, often
known as park defenders, sought to protect the city’s already limited green space and prevent den-
sification. In the Timiryazev district, local residents organized a campaign under the name Save
Park Dubki! The campaign initially expressed their grievance as violations related to Moscow’s
land use laws, the lack of public hearings for this development (hearings that included the specific
land plot had been held in 2004 about a different project and were not reconvened), and that the
building’s height violated regulations (anna nik0laeva, 2016d).
Efforts in the first two months of 2016 did not delay construction, which began on March 1
under cover of night (anna nik0laeva, 2016a). The area was fenced, and construction equipment
and materials arrived, along with a team of private security. Thirty-five trees were also destroyed.
The campaign held a protest against the beginning of construction that attracted several hundred
people later that week. After this protest, participants remained at the site in an attempt to prevent
construction; this was the beginning of a round-the-clock watch that would last until late November
2016 as residents sought to physically obstruct construction (Alla Che, 2016c).
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Private security2 employed by the developer quickly used violence to disperse the watch. In
the next two weeks, they twice attempted the forcible dispersal of the watch, once injuring a
woman (Marsh Nesoglasnikh, 2016), and hit a campaign organizer with construction equipment
(anna nik0laeva, 2016a). Additionally, the government held a fraudulent public meeting without
informing local residents; the hall was filled with individuals paid 500r (around $7.50 USD) for
their presence (Kasparov.ru, 2016a).
The first concession that Save Park Dubki! was promised came soon after, in mid-March 2016,
when Anton Kulbachevsky, head of Moscow’s Department of Nature Management and Environ-
mental Protection, visited protesters at the contested site.3 At this point, the round-the-clock watch
had been in session for two weeks, and a recent demonstration had attracted between 300 and 1000
people—the largest the campaign had held and large for a park defense protest. Kulbachevsky
affirmed the general legality of the construction and that he was unable to affect the developer’s
plans for the area; these comments seemed designed to convince protesters of the futility of their
campaign. This was likely strategic: several interview subjects cited “learned helplessness”, under-
stood as a perceived inability to effect change and a pessimistic perspective on protest, as a major
deterrent to mobilizing communities impacted by a grievance, and complained that the government
cultivated this worldview. Kulbachevsky then promised that the city would plant twice as many
trees as the developer cut down.
Protesters immediately objected to equating newly planted trees with hundred-year oaks, and
also did not see this as resolution to important aspects of the grievance pertaining to public hear-
ings, permitting procedures and long-term environmental damage. An observer who documented
this meeting for an activist networking website and who had participated in multiple environmen-
tal defense campaigns described the meeting as having “failed to achieve any result”. Despite the
perceived insufficiency of this concession, protesters do appear to have understood the meeting
with Kulbachevsky as an attempt to demobilize the campaign. After the meeting, park defend-
2Known as ChOP in Russian, short for chastnoye okhrannoye predpriyatniye, many of these agents wear blue
camouflage fatigues like those of the riot police, and are often able to commit violence against protesters with impunity.
3This account of meeting draws on reporting and video from Alla Che (2016a).
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ers were quoted as saying “We are not going to wrap up the protest and round-the-clock watch
at the construction site.”4 As promised, the watch continued, and a few days later, another large
demonstration was held. There is no evidence that the promised trees were ever planted, nor that
any efforts to document the number of damaged trees were undertaken. The continued to affirm
that the health of the park would not be affected, contra to the expectation of non-state ecologists
(Kantor, 2016).
This opening concession illustrates why non-core concessions fail to demobilize. This promise
was woefully far from satisfying the campaign’s stated demands, yet it was also presented as the
best the government could do against the developer. The purpose in offering it may have been to
convey to protesters that their likelihood of success is vanishingly low. If so, this concession failed:
the round-the-clock watch continued for around 250 more days.
On the last day of March, the conflict at the construction site escalated into violence. The
previous day, in a meeting with the developer, the Department of Nature Management and Envi-
ronmental Protection, the Department of Environmental Expertise in the Northern Administrative
District, and some locals, the government stated that the park would remain untouched and that
the project complied with building and ecological regulations (Ruzmanova, 2016). Rather than a
concession, which would entail the promise to change an element of the project, this meeting af-
firmed the pre-existing boundaries of the development, which was technically outside the borders
of the park. One activist called this meeting a “profanation” (profanatsiya) (Ruzmanova, 2016).
On March 31, in an effort to resume construction, the developer and the head of the Department
of Internal Affairs of the Northern Administrative District called the organizing team to the con-
struction site for negotiations. According to an activist involved in this meeting, “The developer
was asked to create a conciliation commission and declare a moratorium on construction during
the negotiations. The head of the Department of Internal Affairs of the [Northern Administrative
District] even promised us that he would lead the [private security forces] outside the gates [of the
construction site], close them and remove the [technical construction equipment].”5 Despite these
4“Svorachivat’ protest i kruglosutochnyye dezhurstva u stroyki my ne sobirayemsya.”
5“Zastroyshchiku bylo predlozheno sozdat’ soglasitel’nuyu komissiyu, a na vremya peregovorov ob’yavit’ mora-
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concessions, negotiations broke down.
Due to the rapid escalation of the conflict, there are no accounts of the negotiations or how
protesters perceived these concessions. It is plausible, however, that activists were not persuaded
by the commitment to form a commission to negotiate the issue—a concession of recognition—as
they had already conveyed their grievances to the government in numerous ways. While the inci-
dence of reneging on concessions of recognition is low, these concessions are unlikely to resolve
a conflict and are non-binding. The concession from the Department of Internal Affairs to enforce
the immediate suspension of construction during these negotiations is a concession of enforce-
ment, which are particularly vulnerable to reneging. This may have led park defenders to view the
concession with suspicion.
If they had, that suspicion would have been well-founded. The negotiations ended when a
physical conflict was initiated by private security forces, who attacked protesters. Park defend-
ers were beaten, and three were hospitalized (Domovoi Sovet, 2016). Police present at the site
did not protect protesters, and intervened only to detain 15 protesters, including two minors and
several elected officials; some of these detentions were themselves violent (OVD-Info, 2016b;
anna nik0laeva, 2016c; Kasparov.ru, 2016b) All but the minors were detained overnight, which
is both unusual and a violation of protesters’ civil rights (anna nik0laeva, 2016f). In response,
Moscow City Duma Deputy Leonid Zyuganov (KPRF) formally requested that the Prosecutor’s
Office investigate the event (anna nik0laeva, 2016c). This also brought increased attention from
the city’s Commissioner for Human Rights, who expressed a desire to resolve the conflict (Do-
movoi Sovet, 2016). Nonetheless, violence at the site continued to escalate. One defender was hit
by a car, several were beaten, another had his car vandalized, and members of the blockade were
threatened with being hit by construction equipment (anna nik0laeva, 2016b).
For the next few months, protest continued regularly. In addition to the round-the-clock watch,
Save Park Dubki! held demonstrations and pickets, and supported other park defenders from
around Moscow with advice and in attending their events. They also pursued non-protest forms
toriy na stroyku. Glava OVD SAO dazhe obeshchal nam, chto vot pryamo seychas zavedet ChOP za vorota, zakroyet
ikh i otpravit vosvoyasi tekhniku” (anna nik0laeva, 2016f).
172
of activism, such as filing appeals to investigate with the Prosecutor’s Office, collecting signatures
for petition and 1,800 residents wrote letters to the Mayor’s Office. In June 2016, the group re-
quested that Transparency International, the most prominent anti-corruption international NGO, to
investigate corruption related to the construction at Park Dubki. The resulting investigation (Trans-
parency International Russia, 2016) focuses on Marat Khusnullin, Deputy Mayor for Urban De-
velopment and Construction, and was made public on August 11. Transparency International also
filed a request with the Prosecutor’s Office to investigate Khusnullin for violating anti-corruption
legislation, although the date of that filing could not be verified.
At this time, two additional concessions were promised to the defenders of Save Park Dubki!
First, the Department of Cultural Heritage agreed to assess the building of a former kindergarten,
constructed in 1958, on the premises of the park for recognition as a historically valuable object
(Alla Che, 2016b). The assessment entailed a 90-day suspension of the construction permit, but
there were no reported efforts to enforce it. Reporters noted that sounds of construction could be
heard at the site (MosLenta, 2016). As a result, the watch and intermittent blockades continued.
Also at this time, the Public Council of the State Duma Committee on Housing Policy and Housing
and Communal Services attempted to investigate the situation at Dubki, but were not presented
with documentation by Khusnullin’s office (MosLenta, 2016). It also became known that the
Chairman of the Presidential Human Rights Council had expressed to Mayor Sergei Sobyanin
that the conflict at Dubki and another similarly contested park must be resolved (Kantor, 2016).
Although neither body is vested with the power to change policy and therefore make concessions,
these events were seen as contributing to the alleged suspension of construction.
At the same time, activists were able to prompt a response from Khusnullin himself about the
situation at Park Dubki by waiting for him outside his office (Makarova, 2016). Though Khusnullin
admitted no prior knowledge of activists’ grievance, he ordered, via an assistant, that the problem
would be “urgently sorted out,” as an eyewitness reported to the Save Park Dubki! Facebook
group. This was a core concession. While this wording is vague, Khusnullin’s status in the city
government—and his probable informal affiliation with this particular construction project—give
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him the power to in fact sort out the conflict. By one month later, September 1, a response had
been received and was discussed at a rally held at the construction site, in the shadow of the
already-6 story building. Khusnullin’s office affirmed that additional hearings and environmental
surveys were unnecessary, and that the building permit was issued legally (Kantor, 2016). To
protesters, who believed hearings and ecological surveys were both necessary and legally required,
and held evidence that the permit violated local and federal law, this response did not constitute
a “sorting out” of the problem. Additionally, there was no evidence, reported by the campaign,
that Khusnullin’s office attempted to consult with them, which would have been a sign that a real
assessment of the issue were underway.
Though protest persisted at Park Dubki through the fall and the round-the-clock watch was
sustained until at least late November 2016, it was evident by that point that the campaign had lost.
While construction had been delayed by their blockade, new floors were continuously added to the
building—though some activists held onto the hope that it might be dismantled. Members of the
Save Park Dubki! campaign eventually shifted focus to supporting other campaigns in Moscow.6
The apartment complex was completed in December 2018.
In the case of Park Dubki, concessions were clearly used as a demobilizing strategy, rather
than an attempt to actually resolve the grievance. The earliest concession—the promise to plan
trees—seemed designed to discourage optimism that a good outcome was achievable. Two subse-
quent concessions promised a short-term pause to construction—in one case to be strictly enforced
by the Internal Ministry—which would in principle obviate the need for the round-the-clock watch
and efforts to blockade, which had repeatedly delayed the project. The campaign to save Park
Dubki, however, could be considered unusually unlikely to demobilize. The organizers were highly
6One organizer, Yuliya Galyamina, went on to become an important figure in Moscow politics. Following the Park
Dubki campaign, she became increasingly involved the politics of the Northern Administrative District of Moscow,
published an independent district newspaper, created a union of residents in the Timiryazev district, and was elected to
the Council of Deputies for that district. She also co-founded the School of Local Self-Government (Shkola mestnogo
samoupravleniya), which trains people from around Russia in local activism and competing in local elections. In
2019, Galyamina attempted to run for election to the Moscow City Duma, but was illegally excluded from the ballot,
along with other opposition candidates. This provoked the largest protests the city had seen in years, which were
sustained over two months. These protests made Galyamina a national figure in the liberal-democratic opposition. In
December 2020, she was sentenced to two years probation for repeatedly organizing unauthorized mass protests aimed
at changing the constitutional order.
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committed, well-educated, and morally outraged by their treatment at the hands of the government.
Further, they had already been successful at gathering support from federal-level institutions, like
the Presidential Human Rights Council, and international organizations like Greenpeace and Trans-
parency International. They were thus unlikely to mistake these concessions for a full resolution of
their grievance and at least in the cases of the alleged suspension of construction, seemed to expect
reneging.
From the government’s perspective, the failure of these concessions to contribute to demobiliza-
tion was immediately evident: organizers told them as much and protesters were at the construction
site continuously. Conceivably, there would be little point in implementing the promised conces-
sions if the protesters would not back down. All these factors likely contributed to the prevalence
of immediate reneging in this case.
6.3 Activists’ Views of Concessions and Reneging
The case study of Park Dubki provides an example where concessions had no effect on demobi-
lization and were subject to virtually immediate reneging. At the same time, it is also clear that
in some settings concessions do lead to demobilization and provide at least some resolution for
grievances, even though reneging is both common and difficult to predict. How, then, do par-
ticipants in protest campaigns interpret concessions? Do they see these promises as potentially
credible? Do they understand concessions as a successful outcome? Why do they believe the gov-
ernment makes concessions? And how do they understand the link between concessions, reneging
and mobilization?
To address these questions, I analyze interviews that I conducted with 22 urban activists in
Moscow in 2018 and 2019. Interview subjects were recruited via snowball sampling and by di-
rect outreach. My objective was to speak with individuals who had participated in the campaigns
represented in PCoM, although several had participated in multiple campaigns, including those
not represented in my dataset. Most interview subjects were associated with campaigns about
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construction (park defense, opposition to the construction of churches in parks, resistance to high-
way expansion, protecting green spaces, and architectural preservation) and about the renovation
project. Also represented were housing activists, a campaign against a capital repair tax, and a
campaign against the expansion of paid parking. Although labor activism is an important source of
protest in Moscow, I did not succeed in making contact with participants in labor campaigns. Inter-
view subjects had been involved in campaign organization, such as running social media groups,
conducting public relations and media outreach, organizing round-the-clock watches, filing legal
proceedings, and participating in roundtables and meetings with government representatives, in
addition to arranging and participating in protest. At least five held or had held elected office as
municipal deputies and one was a career activist at a systemic opposition party.
I met most interview subjects in public; a minority I met at the subject’s home or office, one
preferred to speak over Skype and one provided additional responses over Facebook Messenger.
I asked interview subjects to reflect on the achievements of their campaigns, if any, and where
possible to comment on specific promises I observed in data collection. I also asked them to
comment on why the government makes promises to protesters, and whether these promises are
trustworthy. I used the word promise (obeshchaniye) rather than concession (ustupka) to avoid
biasing responses and because my definition of concession as any promised benefit differs from
the sense of concessions as the full achievement of campaign goals. It is important to note that
in almost all cases, the campaigns in question had concluded several years earlier, meaning that
these are retroactive evaluations. The language of conversation was at the subject’s discretion.
Most were conducted in Russian, in some I asked questions in English and they responded in
Russian, and in a few, subjects spoke a mix of Russian and English. On several occasions, the
subject’s spouse was present and contributed occasional comments. Interviews were recorded with
the subjects’ consent.
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6.3.1 Activist Trust in Government Promises
Do urban activists feel they can trust the Moscow government when they make promises to
protesters? Generally, at the point at which I spoke with them, most subjects did not feel the
government was trustworthy when it came to making promises. As one activist against the renova-
tion program succinctly put it, “I CATEGORICALLY do not trust the government of Moscow.”7
After providing several examples of the government’s failure to implement promised programs
and changes in her neighborhood, she added “How can you trust the mayor and the government
of Moscow if it is so openly deceiving you [obmanyvayet]?” A seasoned park activist when asked
about government promises said, “In most cases, they are disingenuous [lukavyat]”.8 One activist
protecting a forest from development, when asked about a promise her campaign had been made,
forcefully said “This is a lie. This is just a downright lie. This is just an absolute lie. There is
nothing to even talk about here.”9. Other activists felt that such promises were never made, despite
the fact that several were discussed in conversation, which may be due to the rarity of satisfying
concessions or to the low esteem in which subjects held the government. An interview subject who
trains citizens to engage in civic activism and run for local office asserted that this lack of trust was
common among protesters: “I think that no one has any illusions. I think that, specifically, those
who are protesting, they understand that the authorities cannot be trusted and they always cheat.”10
However, many interview subjects also agreed that sometimes the government does fulfill its
promises. The park activist admitted that “there are, as it were, cases when promises really corre-
spond to the truth” even if “nine times out of ten they are deceitful.”11 Another veteran defender
of the environment said, “Well, if they promise something, usually they deliver.”12 However, this
subject viewed such promises as rare, and the result of a strong campaign that the government
could not ignore, which was their preference. She also considered that the threat of remobilization
7Renovation activist, via Facebook Messenger, November 1 2019.
8Skype interview with park defender, September 25 2019.
9Interview with forest activist, October 31 2019
10Interview with civic activist, September 24 2019.
11Skype interview with park defender, September 25 2019.
12Interview with ecological protester, September 19 2019
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enhanced the credibility of these promises.13
Other protesters were able to think back to their feelings when their campaigns first received
promises from the government and recounted having believed them at the time. The activist for for-
est protection who now considered promises to be lies initially felt that the government would work
with them, and participated in several roundtables with the government to discuss the grievance.
When asked if members of the campaign thought these meetings were legitimate, she said, “We
all thought so at first.”14 In an interview with an active opponent of the construction of a church in
Park Torfyanka and his wife, I asked how it felt to receive a promise from the district prefect that
the construction would be cancelled and the fence and religious paraphernalia at the site removed.
The activist’s wife immediately said, “We didn’t believe it,” but he admitted “No, well, we did
believe that it would be so. But then the day passed, no one removed anything. Two days, no one
removed anything. A week, a month. And we understood that we had been deceived.”15 When
asked why he trusted that prefect would fulfill this promise,16 he explained, “We all believed he
would do something. It’s the prefect, after all. We believed that, after all, we live in a state gov-
erned by the rule of law and we have laws, and not the decisions of the patriarch [of the Russian
Orthodox Church].”17
For some activists, particularly those new to politics, this loss of faith in the government oc-
curred over time. An activist against the expansion of a highway in her neighborhood, who identi-
13“Well, most likely, if they have already said that there will be no construction, yes, when they have already been
forced to say that there will be no construction, they were made to say this, then, most likely, there will not be. Well,
because they will probably be afraid that people will arrange [opposition to it] again. If they come there again with
this one, the construction will start again, then they will already be afraid that people will come again. That is, they
are afraid of a scandal, in fact.” Interview with ecological protester, September 19 2019.
14Interview with forest activist, October 31 2019
15Interview with Park Torfyanka defender and wife, September 29 2019.
16The activists did not believe that the prefect had the power to fulfill this promise. Prefects, appointed executives for
Moscow’s regional districts (okrugs), often make concessions, and interview subjects’ response to these varied. Several
emphasized that their grievance could not be resolved by a prefect. For instance, the conflict at Park Torfyanka involved
the Russian Orthodox Church, which the prefect has no authority over. Several statements by prefects were seen as
throwaway remarks attempting to defuse tension. At the same time, participants in construction-related campaigns
often understood prefects to be representatives and mouthpieces for the real holders of power in Moscow, Mayor
Sergei Sobyanin and then-Deputy Mayor for Urban Development and Construction Marat Khusnullin. Promises from
prefects were thus both seen as commitments the prefect had no ability to implement personally and as decisions made
by the true power-players.
17Interview with Park Torfyanka defender and wife, September 29 2019.
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fied herself as someone who “had nothing to do with politics, nothing at all”18 before this campaign,
described her experience of working with the local government similarly. Initially, she described
her first encounter of government obstruction as “horrible, I was in shock at first,” but added,
“That is, for us the shock was constant, gradual.” She describes how she gradually understood that
regardless of what the government told them, the campaign would not be successful. The forest-
protection activist, who considered her reasons for activism “not political” described this process
of disillusionment:
And then little by little, we began to cooperate with public organizations, and with
political parties, and participate in some events, and we understood how all this is
done. We understood about the corruption of officials, and about how decisions are
made, and about how laws are not respected. When that is increasing every day, like
a snowball, well, you become a different person. Your thinking changes, you begin to
see more broadly, to evaluate things differently.19
6.3.2 Activist Perception of Public Trust in Government Promises
Most—if not all—interview subjects felt that the general public tended to believe the government’s
promises. As the civic activist explained, “People generally tend to believe in good things.” She
elaborated that people often responded to her descriptions of “what is actually happening in Rus-
sia” with disbelief: “They say, ‘Well, [government officials] can’t lie like that. They can’t really
act like that, can they? They can’t really be so cynical?’ Yes, they can be!”20 Several activists com-
plained that Russians suffer from learned helplessness—a tendency, supported by the government,
to feel that everything is decided for them and their actions are both unnecessary and incapable
of having an impact. The seasoned park activist noted there are civic protesters, particularly those
who are pro-government, who see individual officials as responsible for their grievances, reminis-
18Interview with highway activist, July 3 2019.
19Interview with forest activist, October 31 2019
20Interview with civic activist, September 24 2019.
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cent of a feudal dynamic where the “tsar finds out and punish the [bad] boyars.”21 “For them the
enemy is not the system itself, which gave rise to all this, but a specific official who gave some kind
of signature. That is, it is very difficult to explain to people that it is this system—this constructed
system—in which this is possible.”22 One urban activist attributed the widespread acceptance of
limited changes to the renovation program to a similarly low level of political consciousness: “That
people are being deceived in such very primitive ways—this is, well, evidence that people still do
not have enough experience, education, knowledge in order not to be deceived. But you cannot
blame them for this. You can’t blame the victim for being a victim.”23 Another anti-renovation
program activist put it more bluntly: “People are idiots.”24
The seasoned park activist elaborated on the role of politicization in these campaigns affects
this dynamic. According to him, many participants in these campaigns are not opponents of the
regime and are actively fearful of revolutionary-type politics.25 This was substantiated by several
of my interviews as well as the online data collection. When the government betrays its promises
and the people are disappointed, these people tend to blame the organizers who had tried to sustain
mobilization after the concession, which can fracture the movement. A similar experience was
also reported by the forest defender. Further, the seasoned park activist added, the members of a
campaign who best understand the political situation are also most likely to run for elected office or
transition into more oppositional politics, leaving a higher concentration of more trusting campaign
participants behind.
6.3.3 Activist Perception of Concessions
In addition to not seeing promises of concession as credible, activists also do not particularly as-
sociate them with campaign success. Although my data records at least one concession to each of
the campaigns associated with interview subjects, few of them could be considered successful in
21Skype interview with park defender, September 25 2019.
22Skype interview with park defender, September 25 2019.
23Interview with urban activist, November 14 2019
24Interview with renovation activist, October 26 2019
25Skype interview with park defender, September 25 2019.
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the sense of having fully achieved their demands. Even those campaigns that were comparatively
closer to that milestone (having achieved at least most of their demands) were often not remem-
bered as such by activists. One park defender reflecting on a campaign that managed to prevent
the construction of metro exits in the park, but could not fend off the construction of a commercial
building, said, “Part of the territory was stolen from us anyway. That is, it is not a 100% victory,
but it is an 80% victory. And taking into account what is going on in Moscow in general, this is a
direct one hundred percent victory.”26 The activist from Park Torfyanka, where the fenced area and
religious paraphernalia remain although the construction of the church has been cancelled was also
equivocal: “Yes, I think it was successful, because we defended the park, nothing was built in the
park. But there is [still] a fence, a construction trailer, a cross. They promise to remove everything
in the near future, except the cross...but we’re against that too.”27 An architectural preservationist
likewise called a campaign to protect a radio broadcast tower from the 1920s from demolition as
a “victory” only to clarify that in addition to leaving the tower in place, the government had com-
mitted to preserving and restoring it, but years later, only emergency measures had been taken.28
Campaigns that were less successful at achieving meaningful concessions, unsurprisingly, had
a more dismal view on the concessions they did receive. An opponent of paid parking expansion,
when asked about whether her campaign—which had delayed the program’s expansion—was suc-
cessful, said, “No, where’s the success? We didn’t want paid parking at all. What is there to be
glad about that we don’t have it in our courtyards yet? I don’t see any [success] here. I don’t
know, [I should I say] thank you for not killing me, but only cutting off my arms and legs?”29 The
opponent of highway construction reflected that concessions were mainly made on “little things”
because “on the main positions, they don’t let us get anywhere.”30
26Interview with park defender, September 22 2019.
27Interview with Park Torfyanka defender and wife, September 29 2019.
28Interview with architectural preservationist, October 16 2019.
29interview with parking activist, September 28 2019.
30Interview with highway activist, July 3 2019.
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6.3.4 Activist Perception of Concessions as a Strategy
If activists do not see these promises as credible commitments to future behavior and they do not
associate them with campaign victories, why do they believe the government bothers to make these
promises? Several activists expressed that they understood concessions as a manipulation designed
to reduce tension, calm people down and convince protesters to disperse. Others described con-
cessions as a method to split protesters. An opponent of the renovation program saw the proposed
changes to the law governing the program as an effort to atomize opposition to the program from
a city-wide campaign to the level of individual buildings.31 The seasoned park defender noted that
concessions also give the government an opportunity to smear activists in the media or to other
members of the campaign.32 An activist from Park Torfyanka, where the conflict had been contin-
uous for several years at the point of our meeting, noted that concessions allow the government to
appear as if it is preemptively extinguishing conflict.33
Many activists saw concessions as a strategy of delay, which is consistent with reneging. “They
freeze the process so that at any moment, as soon as someone relaxes, they can resume it,” one
urban activists said.34 Two defenders of Park Torfyanka expressed similar skepticism. One said
that “We are partly successful because they are not building [the church] at the moment. But if
you look at the big picture and if you look in future, I don’t think we are the winners...I have no
good forecast for the situation.”35 Another expressed that the campaign, which included a round-
the-clock watch, had to continue because “if we stopped, then they would say that everything is
extinguished there, there is no conflict, and they can continue what they were doing. But we are
trying to show that this is not the case.”36
31Interview with renovation activist, October 26 2019
32Skype interview with park defender, September 25 2019.
33Interview with Park Torfyanka defender and wife, September 29 2019.
34Interview with urban activist, November 14 2019
35Interview with Park Torfyanka defender and husband, September 30 2019.
36Interview with Park Torfyanka defender and wife, September 29 2019.
182
6.3.5 Analysis
Activists must depend on the government to make concessions to resolve grievances in their favor.
Yet simultaneously, either by their political opinions or experience in protest campaigns, they
generally have little faith that the government’s promises are credible, or that, if enacted, those
promises are enduring resolutions to grievances. Even beyond concessions to protest, activists
seriously doubted the government’s ability or intention to fulfill any sort of commitment to the
public. Many cited the prevalence of corruption at all levels of government as the cause of this. At
the same time, many subjects felt that members of their campaign along with the general public
were far more likely to put faith in the government’s words, as some of them had themselves in
the past. Typically this was attributed to a perceived lack of personal efficacy or efficacy of protest
methods, as well as to naı̈vité. Activists generally believed that if their aims were to be achieved, it
required far more continuous commitment than these credulous participants were willing to engage
in. Urban defense activists felt almost uniformly that once protest flagged, the government would
proceed with its original plans. Taken together, this findings suggest that reneging is both the
result of a lack of government intention to fulfill concessionary promises, and the limited ability
of campaigns to sustain mobilization at a level of commitment that might prevent the government
from reneging.
6.4 Conclusion
The findings presented in this chapter suggest overwhelmingly that promises made to protest cam-
paigns in Moscow are not credible. Even if in some situations, concessions are fully implemented
and may resolve the grievance, in many cases, the government uses concessions as a diversionary
tactic and deliberately betrays its promises. The case study of Save Park Dubki! demonstrates this
dynamic in action, as concessions to that campaign appeared designed to convince protesters to
clear the site and stop obstructing construction. This is again consistent with the theory advanced
in Chapter 4, of how the government attempts to use concessions to disrupt the organization of
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campaigns about policymaking exclusion. Evidence provided from interviews I conducted with
urban activists in Moscow only underscores this point.
If concessions are not credible in the majority of situations, and in particular, some campaigns
are likely never to achieve significant change from the outset, why do these activists engage in
protest in the first place? The activists I interviewed found organizing these campaigns valuable
regardless of their outcomes. A member of Save Park Dubki! reflected that even though the
campaign was unsuccessful, thinking about it in the terms of success or the lack thereof was fun-
damentally wrong. The value of the campaign was in developing a sense of civic empowerment
that was the antidote to learned helplessness: “In terms of the formation of civic responsibility,
I believe that it was successful, because in my area there are a lot of people who no longer live
on the principle that someone will come and do something, but begin to take initiative into their
own hands.”37 This sentiment was widely shared. Many others felt that because Russia’s tradi-
tion of civic activism is so weak, even the small achievements of their campaigns are meaningful.
The disillusioned subject who opposed the construction of the highway noted that members of her
neighborhood have since banded together and achieved other goals without protest, like the im-
provement of a local park, and they regularly talk with activists from neighboring districts; “Our
story continues, just on a smaller level,” she said.38 An activist engaged in campaigns about park-
ing admitted she knew that others felt that her achievements were limited, but that in the face of
the political system, small victories now were meaningful: “It may not be possible [to remove the
Mayor] for 10, 20 years. Maybe I won’t even live to see the moment when everything will change
in earnest. But why wait for that, when the issue [with parking] can be resolved now?”39
Finally, most activists also felt forcefully compelled to speak out against the injustices around
them. One woman, describing how her daughter begged her to stop organizing out of fear of
repression, said, “I can’t help but do it. I really can’t. Otherwise I will really feel like a pig, the
way [the government] sees us—as pigs, as slaves. Well, I’ll feel like a slave then. I’m not a slave.
37Skype interview with park defender, September 25 2019.
38Interview with highway activist, July 3 2019.
39interview with parking activist, September 28 2019.
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I would be happy to sit and rest, to do nothing, to grow flowers, to bake pirogi. But I can’t just. I
can’t, inside.”40




Concessions are more than simplistic benefits, compromise or cooptation. They are a strategic
response to protest that a high-capacity, authoritarian government can wield with precision. In
this dissertation, I have clarified the foundations of the strategic use of concessions with three
main contributions. First, I outlined an original conceptualization of concessions as a publicly
observed promise of a potential benefit to participants in protest—a benefit that may or may not
be delivered. Once that promise is issued, the concessionary process unfolds over time, as the
government purportedly takes the steps associated with implementing that benefit. The fact that
this process unfolds over time means that concessions are vulnerable to reneging, or the deliberate
failure to implement the concession as promised.
Second, in focusing on everyday protests targeted to the local government in Moscow, Russia,
I have shed light on how an authoritarian government responds to protests that are not existentially
threatening. Only the most severely repressive regimes manage to fully suppress protest; in other
words, most autocracies experience protest regularly, and many of these protests are everyday
protests. I have shown that there is good reason for this: in Moscow, everyday protests were often
promised concessions, and a considerable share never encountered severe repression. The conces-
sions that these everyday protests receive deserve attention. In some cases, as I demonstrated in
Chapter 4, these promises do compensate for deficiencies with information-gathering institutions
and allow the government to identify and resolve grievances. In these cases everyday protest may
constitute an alternative politics in a setting where authoritarian constrictions have weakened feed-
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back institutions. On the other hand, for a large share of campaigns, protest does not operate this
way. If the government wishes to ignore public opinion, it can use concessions as a diversionary
tactic, only to renege later.
Third, I have developed and demonstrated an original approach to collecting data about con-
cessions. I have also presented examples of how the concessions-level data can be used with daily
event data and campaign-level data. Concessions have been overlooked in datasets about collective
action, which typically contain observations at the protest-event or campaign level; the measures
in these datasets are either rough or absent entirely. This means that limited quantitative testing
of the effect of concessions on conflict, protest, and collective action has been done. Beyond the
theories I have explored here, there are numerous approaches to concessions that seem to be con-
ventional wisdom that have not, to my knowledge, been tested. The most salient of these is the
alleged trade-off between repression and concessions. Studies of this tend to take a nuanced view
of repression and a simplistic view of concessions. As another example, it is often suggested that
concessions lead to protest diffusion, by incentivizing other campaigns to mobilize for similar de-
mands, and that they lead to escalating demands within a single campaign. While I do not directly
address these theories, in data collection and exploratory data analysis, I found no evidence that
either phenomenon occurred. My approach to collecting data about concessions can help remedy
this issue.
In three empirical chapters, I have shown the following. In Chapter 4, I demonstrate that the
government’s response to everyday protest campaigns is conditioned on the institutional factors
that gave rise to the campaign’s grievance. As a result, in some cases concessions really do re-
solve the grievance, while in others, they are an attempt to undermine mobilization. In Chapter
5, I interrogate the mechanism underlying that theory by assessing whether concessions really do
contribute to demobilization. I find that they are associated with a reduction of protest and an
extended period to the next protest, but that this effect diminishes after about a year. In Chapter
6, I focus on reneging. The majority of reneging takes place within the first three months and
is never reversed. I explored how this immediate reneging arises with a case study that showed
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that in high-capacity, highly committed campaigns, the (justifiable) lack of trust in authorities to
fulfill concessionary promises diminishes their demobilizing effect. Then, using data from inter-
views that I conducted in Moscow with urban activists, I show that even though activists are aware
of reneging and are generally pessimistic about concessions, many protesters—including some
activists themselves—at some point believe in them.
7.1 Directions for Future Research
7.1.1 Other Responses to Protest and Broken Promises
Throughout this work, I have positioned concessions and repression as the two state responses to
protest of interest. While they are the responses that have elicited the greatest scholarly interest,
they are certainly not the only options the state has. The report from the pro-regime think tank
discussed in Chapter 4 includes other strategies, such as ignoring protest and attacks on organizers’
reputations. Positioning concessions alongside these non-violent forms of coercion and influence
is important because, as I have argued throughout, concessions are often used as a strategy of
manipulation.
Relatedly, it bears mentioning that reneging, as I have defined it, is not the only way the govern-
ment can betray protesters. I have defined a concession as the articulation of a specific promise of
policy change. Often, those promises, at least as I observed them, were very circumscribed. One
interview subject expressed that this was done so that future incursions could be made without
technically breaking their word. There are numerous examples of this with construction disputes.
The government will commit to not building a specific structure on a plot of land, but that rarely
means the government has lost interest in developing that plot. Many urban defense protest cam-
paigns have had to defend the same park or courtyard repeatedly, even though the government
has not technically broken earlier promises and by my definition, has not reneged. This dynamic
deserves further scrutiny.
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7.1.2 Mechanism: Undermining Mobilization
Throughout the dissertation, I have argued that concessions demobilization in two key mechanism:
through resolution of the grievance and by undermining coordination of the protest campaign. I
have presented evidence, in the analysis of core concessions and reneging, that concessions can
resolve grievances to the campaign’s satisfaction and this reduces, if not eliminates, mobilization.
The second mechanism is less well tested.
I believe the promise of concessions undermines mobilization when a sufficient portion of the
campaign’s supporters demobilize in response to the concession. Even if the activist-organizers
of the campaign view concessions with suspicion—as interview evidence in Chapter 6 demon-
strates—without supporters to participate in demonstrations and engage in other forms of activism,
the campaign loses capacity. Campaign supporters might demobilize because they believe the gov-
ernment will make good on the concessions it promised; this was mentioned by several interview
subjects. Alternatively, they might see unsatisfactory concessions as an indicator of the futility
of protesting; this is consistent with the learned helplessness perspective that interview subjects
mentioned. A third, slightly different possibility, also suggested by an interview subject, is that
concessions lead to splits in campaigns about whether the concession is good enough and how to
proceed afterwards. Fourth, campaigns may suspend protest to wait and see how the concession is
implemented, although this risks losing the ability to mobilize altogether. This approach may be
used by recipients of concessions on a timeline, discussed in Chapter 5.
Overall, then the data supports the proposition that concessions make coordinating protest cam-
paigns more difficult, but outstanding questions remain about how this occurs. What conditions
make concessions more likely to undermine mobilization? Who is more likely to demobilize after
the promise of concession, and what factors are associated with that decision? How can campaigns
prevent this?
Understanding of how less committed protesters or non-protesting individuals feel about con-
cessions is essential to gain insight into these questions, because these individuals are the audience
of protest organizers, yet their political outlooks are potentially very different. To address this, I am
189
preparing a survey of Muscovites that will present them with vignettes of concessionary promises
to protest campaigns and ask them what the campaign should do next. The population of interest
is what might be called casual protesters or potential protesters: individuals who have gone to a
protest or could see themselves doing so in the future. Because directly targeting these individuals
in the current political environment in Russia is not possible and a very low percentage of Mus-
covites have participated in a protest, the sampling strategy is to over-sample from postal codes of
Moscow that experienced a higher incidence of protest in the period PCoM documents and to use
screening questions. The survey will be fielded in Fall 2021 or Winter 2022.
7.1.3 Power, Corruption, Lies
Across the three empirical chapters, I have used examples and case studies to illustrate the dynam-
ics of these everyday protest campaigns. In all of these examples, I have alluded to the role of
corruption in producing these conflicts. Corruption is at the root of many conflicts in PCoM, from
wage theft to embezzlement from the sale of public assets, to kickbacks for construction devel-
opment, to extortion. Many everyday protest activists and political activists I interviewed largely
viewed the activities of the Moscow government through a lens of corruption. At the same time,
pinpointing the impact of corruption on everyday protest campaigns, including their emergence,
their framing, and the dynamic of the conflict including concessions and repression, is challenging,
given the covert nature of corruption. Further work is likely needed to identify whether and how
corruption structures these conflicts.
7.1.4 Nationally Targeted Protests in Moscow
Moving forward, a primary avenue for the development of this project is deepening my data to
include protests in Moscow against the national government. In collecting the initial dataset of
protest in Moscow upon which PCoM later built, I also compiled data about hundreds of protests
targeted to the national government. These were mainly about highly politicized issues, such
as political prisoners, human rights violations and so on, but a portion were consistent with the
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everyday protests I discussed here. While the largest of these protests receive much attention, little
is known about the small demonstrations against the national government that occur near-daily in
Moscow. Examining these movements will clarify how the government strikes a balance between
the management of threats and key functions of protests, such as the cultivation of a democratic
facade and information collection.
There is some evidence that the national government uses concessions to different ends than the
Moscow government. For example, in 2018, a reform of the pension system was announced that
raised the pension age by several years; in some areas, the pension age for men was set beyond
the average life expectancy. This led to protests around the country. Interestingly, many of these
protests were organized by the Confederation of Trade Unions. The Confederation of Trade Unions
is the largest labor organization in Russia, but it is not a body that engages in contentious politics
(nor, in the view of many, does it engage in the defense of labor). The KPRF also organized
many protests; this was less surprising in itself. The large number of protests these two groups
organized, when most other organizations were blocked from getting protest permits on the same
issues, suggested to many that the government was strategically allowing protest to gauge the level
of opposition to raising the pension age. While they knew people would be opposed, raising the
pension age was unavoidably necessary for the national budget. What they did not know was
how high they could set the pension age and what exactly the level of outrage would be. The
protests, organized by regime-allied groups, allowed them to gauge those levels. The subsequent
concessions then calibrated the pension policy to match. This is not a strategy that I observed the
Moscow government using.
However, collecting data on nationally-targeted campaigns and their protests will be signifi-
cantly more challenging than compiling PCoM was. Most of them hold events around the country
and some are about issues on which Russia is subject to pressure from international actors. It may
be that case studies should be used rather than a quantitative data collection effort like PCoM.
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7.1.5 Cross-National Data
The scope conditions for this project were (1) high-capacity states and (2) authoritarian regimes
that still permitted some protest. How do concessions work outside these scope conditions? Are
concessions used strategically in lower-capacity states, and is reneging more or less common? In
more authoritarian regimes, are concessions rare, and are they more or less associated with demo-
bilization? Additionally, other national-level factors may affect concessions, like personalization,
and natural resource wealth. To address these questions, I plan to collect data on local everyday
protests in the capital cities of Azerbaijan, Belarus, and Kazakhstan. The basis of these datasets
will be a protest dataset I compiled on regional protest from RFE/RL’s Newslines from 2000-2017.
Additionally, I had research assistants produce case histories for protest campaigns from approxi-
mately 2012-2017 which will serve as a jumping-off point.
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APPENDIX A
Appendix: Types of Policy Change
Reform Formal modification, ratification or repeal of new or extant laws, policies, rules, or
procedures. These are formal policy changes that relate to laws and policies as they are written,
not as they are actually practiced or enforced.
• Reverse or repeal a policy or law that already exists (ex. Lift ban on freedom of assembly,
cancel law requiring Russian classes)
• Stop new policy or law from being implemented (ex. Do not ratify the new election law, Do
not sign amnesty law)
• Amend constitution (ex. Modify a clause in the constitution)
• Reinstate a policy or law that has recently been repealed (ex. Restore Net Neutrality)
• Reverse a treaty ratification, formally withdraw from a treaty or decline to join new treaty
(ex. Do not join NATO)
• Formally grant new or enhanced rights by passing new laws or policies or constitutional
reforms enshrining those rights (ex. Introduce new electoral system)
• Alter policies or laws that already exist in some other way that relates to how they are written,
rather than how they are enforced (ex. Legalize marijuana)
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Enforcement Change in how existing laws and policies are used or enforced, without altering
how those rules are formally written. These concessions involve the informal use of rules, laws and
policies, as well as decisions about when and to what degree enforcement of formal laws should
occur and whom they should apply to.
• Permit or allow an action or process (ex. Grant permit for rally, Allow opposition party to
register, Appoint an individual to a government position)
• Stop the unfair enforcement of a law or policy (ex. Stop an eviction, Restore broadcasting
license)
• Enforce existing laws, adhere to better practices (ex. Stop government corruption)
• Suspend the use of repression (ex. Stop police brutality, Stop harassing journalists, Stop
illegal searches)
• Annul election result, call a new election or hold a referendum
• Resign, request resignation, remove, fire or dissolve a body (ex. Dismiss Election Commis-
sioner, Hold new elections, Dissolve the government)
Note that investigation, prosecution and impeachment fall under Investigation. Enforcement of
laws related to labor, utilities, social welfare, benefits, land tenure, taxes and fees are considered
Distribution.
Investigation Official inquiry into events or persons, via criminal proceedings, trials, tribunals,
committees, special investigations, or reports, including related process that take place within the
judicial system such as release of political prisoners.
• Impeach or remove the head of state/government through legal means
• To acquit or clear of charges a person being prosecuted (ex. Clear opposition politician)
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• Release political prisoners
• End an investigation (ex. Stop prosecuting opposition leader for tax fraud)
• Initiate an investigation (ex. Investigate election fraud)
• Prosecute or charge (ex. Charge police officers for shooting protesters)
• Establish a committee or tribunal, whose purpose is to investigate a recent event (Ex. Set up
committee to investigate a recent assassination)
Distribution Disbursement of material benefits, either directly (ex. Run power lines to town
without electricity), through changes to economic policies (ex. Increase electricity subsidies), or
the enforcement of existing economic policies (ex. The law guarantees electricity provision, bring
practice into line with law). These can be public goods that would benefit a large share of the
population (ex. Increase the pension rate), or they can be particular to the protesters (ex. Payment
of the protesters’ back wages). They also encompass both micro- and macro-economic concerns.
• Pay unpaid or overdue wages or some other form of direct monetary compensation
• Increase subsidies for utilities or other goods
• Reverse new changes in subsidies or other benefits (ex. Repeal increase in utility rates,
Restore old pension rate)
• Provide basic governance: suitable housing, electricity, water, security, TV cover-
age/communications technology
• Grant leases or ownership of private property such as apartments
• Reduce or alter taxes or fees
• Provide jobs, alleviate unemployment
• Reduce inflation, raise standard of living, end recession, end stagnation
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Recognition Consult or hold meetings with affected citizens in the future as publicly recognition
of the legitimacy of a grievance, claim or group.
• Hold meetings, discussions, dialogues or negotiations with a group (ex. Meet with commit-
tee of soldiers’ mothers)
• Take receipt of a petition or open letter
• Make a statement of condemnation (ex. Criticize new law on the media, Disavow recent
police brutality)
• Make a statement of support (ex. Publicly affirm support for democracy, Support for new
law on the media, Statement resisting Russian influence)
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APPENDIX B
Campaign Type and Tactic Choice
Table B.1: Everyday Protest Campaign Type and Protest Tactic Choice
Dependent variable:
n complaint n blockade
(1) (2) (3) (4)
iv exclusion −2.027∗∗∗ −1.935∗∗∗ 1.456∗∗ 2.178∗∗∗
(0.395) (0.346) (0.632) (0.814)
log(turnout large avg) −0.010 0.035
(0.118) (0.250)
n events 0.078∗∗∗ 0.099∗∗∗
(0.013) (0.024)
Constant 2.027∗∗∗ 0.689 −1.482∗∗∗ −3.762∗∗∗
(0.294) (0.446) (0.559) (1.103)
Observations 62 62 62 62
Log Likelihood −122.522 −108.547 −66.811 −60.592
θ 0.565∗∗∗ (0.163) 1.676∗∗ (0.718) 0.404∗∗ (0.173) 0.595∗∗ (0.246)
Akaike Inf. Crit. 249.044 225.094 137.622 129.184




Everyday Protest Regression Tables
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Table C.1: Everyday Protest Campaigns and the Promise of Concessions
Dependent variable:
concession binary n concessions
logistic glm: quasipoisson
link = log
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
iv exclusion −0.250 −0.609 −0.587 0.222 0.167 0.157
(0.586) (0.720) (0.767) (0.280) (0.326) (0.333)
log(turnout large avg) 0.280 0.251 0.115 0.134
(0.218) (0.236) (0.118) (0.132)
n events 0.077 0.057 0.030∗∗∗ 0.034∗∗∗
(0.054) (0.059) (0.009) (0.011)
years active 0.162 0.112 0.072 0.088
(0.327) (0.336) (0.086) (0.095)
blockade sit-in 0.494 −0.022
(0.844) (0.254)
illegal event 0.766 0.583
(0.816) (0.443)




Constant 0.981∗∗ −1.136 −1.189 0.520∗∗ −0.622 −0.985
(0.479) (0.956) (1.005) (0.233) (0.513) (0.610)
Observations 62 62 62 62 62 62
Log Likelihood −38.114 −32.799 −31.735
Akaike Inf. Crit. 80.228 75.598 81.470
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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Table C.2: Everyday Protest Campaigns and Core Concessions
Dependent variable:
core concession received core concession
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
iv exclusion −1.023∗∗ −0.986∗ −1.015∗ −0.965∗ −2.163∗∗ −2.779∗∗
(0.406) (0.527) (0.575) (0.548) (0.919) (1.126)
n conc −0.020 −0.059 1.152∗∗∗ 1.400∗∗∗
(0.130) (0.145) (0.330) (0.422)
log(turnout large avg) 0.046 −0.038 0.238 0.020
(0.176) (0.232) (0.289) (0.289)
n events −0.057∗∗ −0.049 −0.154∗∗∗ −0.202∗∗∗
(0.024) (0.030) (0.055) (0.071)
years active 0.248∗ 0.231 0.758∗∗ 0.837∗∗
(0.148) (0.152) (0.347) (0.408)
blockade sitin 0.195 1.480
(0.463) (0.909)
illegal event 0.771 0.421
(0.874) (1.015)




Constant 0.383 0.449 0.384 0.560 −1.803 −1.392
(0.335) (0.818) (0.864) (0.443) (1.186) (1.268)
Observations 121 121 121 62 62 62
Log Likelihood −79.114 −73.631 −72.987 −41.341 −26.100 −23.518
Akaike Inf. Crit. 162.228 159.262 165.973 86.682 64.201 67.036
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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Table C.3: Everyday Protest Campaigns and Reneging
Dependent variable:
renege binary n renege
logistic glm: quasipoisson
link = log
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
iv exclusion 0.908∗∗ 1.838∗∗∗ 2.172∗∗∗ 0.840∗∗ 1.020∗∗∗ 1.047∗∗
(0.421) (0.622) (0.694) (0.346) (0.368) (0.386)
n conc −0.226∗ −0.285∗ 0.200∗∗∗ 0.212∗∗
(0.131) (0.153) (0.069) (0.082)
log(turnout large avg) −0.403∗∗ −0.643∗∗ −0.219∗ −0.311∗∗
(0.193) (0.273) (0.114) (0.145)
n events 0.053∗∗∗ 0.069∗∗∗ 0.017 0.019
(0.020) (0.026) (0.011) (0.014)
years active 0.044 0.051 0.075 0.061
(0.138) (0.148) (0.082) (0.091)
blockade sitin −0.197 0.087
(0.438) (0.249)
illegal event 1.021 0.465
(0.988) (0.580)




Constant −0.860∗∗ 0.279 0.478 −0.375 −0.613 −0.651
(0.360) (0.810) (0.877) (0.309) (0.449) (0.494)
Observations 121 121 121 43 43 43
Log Likelihood −80.717 −76.367 −75.085
Akaike Inf. Crit. 165.434 164.734 170.170
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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Table C.4: Everyday Protest Campaigns and Threats
Dependent variable:
threat binary n threat events
logistic glm: quasipoisson
link = log
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
iv exclusion −0.417 −0.417 −0.706 −0.788∗∗ −0.726∗∗ −0.864∗∗
(0.708) (0.708) (0.769) (0.297) (0.323) (0.347)
log(turnout large avg ) −0.113 −0.113 −0.179 0.090 0.091
(0.209) (0.209) (0.223) (0.123) (0.138)
n events 0.160∗∗ 0.160∗∗ 0.131∗ 0.044∗∗∗ 0.037∗∗∗
(0.062) (0.062) (0.071) (0.009) (0.011)
years active −0.031 −0.031 −0.006 0.125 0.017
(0.323) (0.323) (0.337) (0.079) (0.096)
blockade sitin 1.002 0.424∗
(0.805) (0.248)
illegal event −0.061 0.080
(0.832) (0.399)




Constant −0.378 −0.378 −0.158 0.860∗∗∗ −0.666 −0.789
(0.908) (0.908) (0.941) (0.200) (0.502) (0.600)
Observations 62 62 62 62 62 62
Log Likelihood −33.447 −33.447 −32.431
Akaike Inf. Crit. 76.895 76.895 82.862
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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Table C.5: Everyday Protest Campaigns and Violence
Dependent variable:
violence binary n violent events
logistic glm: quasipoisson
link = log
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
iv exclusion 1.303∗∗ 2.301∗∗ 2.543∗∗ 1.012∗ 1.156∗ 1.179
(0.638) (1.029) (1.218) (0.515) (0.585) (0.734)
log(turnout large avg ) −0.018 −0.228 0.013 −0.085
(0.285) (0.294) (0.178) (0.207)
n events 0.167∗∗∗ 0.186∗∗ 0.041∗∗∗ 0.041∗∗
(0.061) (0.087) (0.013) (0.017)
years active −0.207 −0.212 0.103 0.038
(0.320) (0.367) (0.137) (0.183)
blockade sitin 1.784∗∗ 0.897∗∗
(0.837) (0.410)
illegal event −1.367 −0.655
(1.079) (0.656)




Constant −1.504∗∗∗ −3.758∗∗∗ −3.538∗∗ −1.482∗∗∗ −2.559∗∗∗ −2.526∗∗
(0.553) (1.428) (1.542) (0.470) (0.819) (0.990)
Observations 62 62 62 62 62 62
Log Likelihood −37.957 −29.826 −25.172
Akaike Inf. Crit. 79.913 69.653 68.344
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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Table C.6: Everyday Protest Campaigns and Police Inaction
Dependent variable:
inaction binary n inaction events
logistic glm: quasipoisson
link = log
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
iv exclusion 2.534∗∗ 3.170∗∗ 6.276∗∗ 2.447∗∗ 2.404∗∗ 2.957∗∗∗
(1.074) (1.399) (2.527) (1.109) (1.000) (1.066)
log(turnout large avg) 0.113 −0.385 0.161 −0.118
(0.320) (0.413) (0.211) (0.250)
n events 0.071 0.047 0.031∗∗ 0.049∗∗
(0.044) (0.051) (0.014) (0.020)
years active 0.204 0.353 0.135 0.213
(0.298) (0.465) (0.157) (0.174)
blockade sitin 4.814∗∗∗ 2.403∗∗∗
(1.534) (0.500)
illegal event −2.160 −0.608
(1.530) (0.708)




Constant −3.045∗∗∗ −5.567∗∗∗ −8.162∗∗∗ −3.091∗∗∗ −4.665∗∗∗ −5.466∗∗∗
(1.023) (1.925) (3.045) (1.084) (1.247) (1.418)
Observations 62 62 62 62 62 62
Log Likelihood −30.530 −26.993 −14.782
Akaike Inf. Crit. 65.061 63.985 47.564
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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Table C.7: Everyday Protest Campaigns and Prosecution of Protesters
Dependent variable:
prosecute
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
iv exclusion −0.171 0.272 0.317 0.164 1.009 1.075
(0.557) (0.801) (0.844) (0.725) (1.201) (1.210)
log(turnout large avg) −0.025 −0.001 −0.355 −0.472
(0.271) (0.281) (0.446) (0.510)
n events −0.096 −0.098 −0.063 −0.064
(0.075) (0.080) (0.075) (0.079)
years active 0.612∗ 0.598 0.487 0.446
(0.346) (0.370) (0.431) (0.479)
detention events 1.174∗∗ 1.247∗∗∗ 0.681 0.719
(0.456) (0.479) (0.460) (0.481)
blockade sitin −0.340 −0.514
(0.843) (0.938)
illegal event −0.583 0.019
(0.941) (1.414)




Constant −0.560 −2.538∗∗ −2.449∗∗ 0.288 −0.319 0.061
(0.443) (1.167) (1.184) (0.540) (1.646) (1.868)
Observations 62 62 62 32 32 32
Log Likelihood −39.644 −28.952 −28.503 −21.589 −19.234 −18.810
Akaike Inf. Crit. 83.288 69.905 77.005 47.178 50.468 57.621
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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APPENDIX D
Detentions and Everyday Protest Campaigns
Although a larger share of policy performance campaigns experienced at least one detention (figure
D.1), the difference is not statistically significant in most regression analysis (table D.1).

















Table D.1: Everyday Protest Campaigns and Detention
Dependent variable:
detention binary n detention events
logistic glm: quasipoisson
link = log
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
iv exclusion −0.760 −1.472∗ −1.546∗ −0.296 −0.394 −0.589
(0.545) (0.864) (0.907) (0.391) (0.373) (0.380)
log(turnout large avg) 0.193 0.186 0.101 0.088
(0.269) (0.293) (0.142) (0.162)
n events 0.223∗∗∗ 0.228∗∗ 0.059∗∗∗ 0.055∗∗∗
(0.078) (0.088) (0.008) (0.010)
years active 0.187 0.218 0.056 −0.059
(0.361) (0.373) (0.086) (0.101)
blockade sitin −0.055 0.537∗∗
(0.900) (0.249)
illegal event −0.412 0.874
(1.007) (0.570)




Constant 0.560 −2.537∗∗ −2.461∗∗ 0.435 −1.185∗∗ −1.894∗∗
(0.443) (1.186) (1.208) (0.297) (0.580) (0.798)
Observations 62 62 62 62 62 62
Log Likelihood −41.946 −26.595 −26.328
Akaike Inf. Crit. 87.892 63.191 70.656
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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APPENDIX E
Additional Tables, Concessions and Mobilization
Table E.1: Comparison of Implementation over Time, by Concession Quality
Quality 1 2 3 4
0-3 months
Core 33.3% 15.4% 7.7% 43.6%
Subcore 57.1% 3.6% 3.6% 35.7%
Adjacent 41.2% 11.8% 11.8% 35.3%
3-6 months
Core 33.3% 17.9% 12.8% 35.9%
Subcore 45.5% 13.6% 4.5% 36.4%
Adjacent 41.2% 11.8% 5.9% 41.2%
9-12 months
Core 34.2% 21.1% 15.8% 28.9%
Subcore 40.9% 22.7% NA 36.4%
Adjacent 44.4% 11.1% 11.1% 33.3%
9-12 months
Core 34.1% 19.5% 17.1% 29.3%
Subcore 40.9% 22.7% NA 36.4%
Adjacent 42.9% 19.0% 4.8% 33.3%
Year 2
Core 28.2% 20.5% 15.4% 35.9%
Subcore 47.8% 21.7% 4.3% 26.1%
Adjacent 50.0% 22.2% 5.6% 22.2%
Year 3
Core 30.8% 23.1% 17.9% 28.2%
Subcore 52.6% 21.1% 5.3% 21.1%
Adjacent 52.9% 17.6% 5.9% 23.5%
Year 4
Core 36.4% 12.1% 12.1% 39.4%
Subcore 52.9% 17.6% 5.9% 23.5%
Adjacent 60.0% 20.0% 6.7% 13.3%
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Table E.2: Comparison of Implementation over Time, by Speaker
Speaker 1 2 3 4
0-3 months
District agent or institution 42.1% 21.1% NA 36.8%
City government agent or institution 53.8% 5.1% 2.6% 38.5%
Sobyanin 20.0% NA NA 80.0%
National government agent or institution 20.0% 20.0% 20.0% 40.0%
Putin 50.0% NA NA 50.0%
Other 33.3% NA 33.3% 33.3%
3-6 months
District agent or institution 35.3% 29.4% 5.9% 29.4%
City government agent or institution 47.2% 5.6% 5.6% 41.7%
Sobyanin 16.7% 33.3% NA 50.0%
National government agent or institution 21.4% 21.4% 14.3% 42.9%
Putin 50.0% NA NA 50.0%
Other 40.0% NA 40.0% 20.0%
6-9 months
District agent or institution 38.9% 33.3% 5.6% 22.2%
City government agent or institution 44.1% 8.8% 8.8% 38.2%
Sobyanin 16.7% 33.3% NA 50.0%
National government agent or institution 25.0% 25.0% 18.8% 31.3%
Putin 50.0% NA NA 50.0%
Other 50.0% NA 25.0% 25.0%
9-12 months
District agent or institution 41.2% 35.3% 5.9% 17.6%
City government agent or institution 43.6% 10.3% 10.3% 35.9%
Sobyanin 12.5% 25.0% NA 62.5%
National government agent or institution 29.4% 29.4% 11.8% 29.4%
Putin 50.0% NA NA 50.0%
Other 33.3% NA 33.3% 33.3%
Year 2
District agent or institution 31.3% 37.5% 18.8% 12.5%
City government agent or institution 39.0% 9.8% 9.8% 41.5%
Sobyanin 54.5% 36.4% NA 9.1%
National government agent or institution 33.3% 33.3% 11.1% 22.2%
Putin 50.0% NA NA 50.0%
Other 50.0% NA NA 50.0%
Year 3
District agent or institution 35.7% 21.4% 35.7% 7.1%
City government agent or institution 42.1% 13.2% 7.9% 36.8%
Sobyanin 54.5% 36.4% NA 9.1%
National government agent or institution 33.3% 44.4% 11.1% 11.1%
Putin 50.0% NA NA 50.0%
Other 50.0% NA NA 50.0%
Year 4
District agent or institution 50.0% 14.3% 28.6% 7.1%
City government agent or institution 41.9% 9.7% 6.5% 41.9%
Sobyanin 55.6% 33.3% NA 11.1%
National government agent or institution 42.9% 28.6% NA 28.6%
Putin 50.0% NA NA 50.0%
Other 50.0% NA NA 50.0%
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Table E.3: Comparison of Implementation over Time, by Promised Policy Change
Type 1 2 3 4
0-3 months
Distribution 30.0% 25.0% 5.0% 40.0%
Enforcement 51.5% 6.1% 9.1% 33.3%
Investigation 11.1% 11.1% 11.1% 66.7%
Recognition 44.4% 11.1% NA 44.4%
Reform 50.0% NA 7.1% 42.9%
3-6 months
Distribution 38.1% 23.8% 9.5% 28.6%
Enforcement 43.3% 10.0% 10.0% 36.7%
Investigation 12.5% 12.5% 12.5% 62.5%
Recognition 25.0% 25.0% NA 50.0%
Reform 41.7% 8.3% 8.3% 41.7%
6-9 months
Distribution 39.1% 21.7% 8.7% 30.4%
Enforcement 43.3% 13.3% 13.3% 30.0%
Investigation 12.5% 25.0% 12.5% 50.0%
Recognition 28.6% 28.6% NA 42.9%
Reform 41.7% 16.7% 8.3% 33.3%
9-12 months
Distribution 34.8% 21.7% 8.7% 34.8%
Enforcement 42.4% 15.2% 15.2% 27.3%
Investigation 12.5% 25.0% 12.5% 50.0%
Recognition 28.6% 28.6% NA 42.9%
Reform 46.7% 20.0% NA 33.3%
Year 2
Distribution 36.8% 31.6% NA 31.6%
Enforcement 50.0% 8.8% 14.7% 26.5%
Investigation 12.5% 25.0% 12.5% 50.0%
Recognition 28.6% 28.6% NA 42.9%
Reform 38.5% 30.8% 15.4% 15.4%
Year 3
Distribution 42.1% 26.3% NA 31.6%
Enforcement 48.4% 12.9% 19.4% 19.4%
Investigation 14.3% 28.6% 14.3% 42.9%
Recognition 50.0% NA NA 50.0%
Reform 38.5% 38.5% 15.4% 7.7%
Year 4
Distribution 56.3% 6.3% NA 37.5%
Enforcement 46.4% 14.3% 14.3% 25.0%
Investigation 25.0% NA 25.0% 50.0%
Recognition 60.0% NA NA 40.0%
Reform 33.3% 41.7% 8.3% 16.7%
210
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Acemoglu, Daron and James A Robinson. 2005. Economic origins of dictatorship and democracy.
Cambridge University Press.
ACLED. 2021. “The Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project.”.
URL: https://acleddata.com
Activatica. 2016. “Park “Dubki”. Mnogoetazhka vmesto vekovykh derev’yev?” Activatica.org .
URL: http://activatica.org/problems/view/id/495/title/park-dubki-mnogojetazhka-vmesto-
vekovyh-derevev




Alla Che. 2016b. “Order na stroyku okolo parka “Dubki” v Moskve otozvan. Khusnullin
obeshchal “razobrat’sya”.” Activatica.org .
URL: http://activatica.org/blogs/view/id/2480/title/order-na-stroyku-okolo-parka-dubki-v-
moskve-otozvan-husnullin-obeshchal-razobratsya
Alla Che. 2016c. “V Moskve poyavilas’ novaya protestnaya tochka.” Activatica.org .
URL: http://activatica.org/blogs/view/id/1803/title/v-moskve-poyavilas-novaya-protestnaya-
tochka
Andersen, David, Jørgen Møller, Lasse Lykke Rørbæk and Svend-Erik Skaaning. 2014. “State
capacity and political regime stability.” Democratization 21(7):1305–1325.
Ang, Yuen Yuen. 2016. “Co-optation and Clientelism: Nested Distributive Politics in China’s
Single-Party Dictatorship.” Studies in Comparative International Development pp. 1–22.
anna nik0laeva. 2015. “Slovo deputatu: Marina Ivliyeva o narodnom skhode protiv stroitel’stva
dorogi-ubiytsy.” anna nik0laeva (blog) .
URL: https://anna-nik0laeva.livejournal.com/278230.html
anna nik0laeva. 2016a. “Napadeniye na zashchitnika parka Dubki. Stroitel’ na mashine
namerenno sbil aktivista.” anna nik0laeva (blog) .
URL: https://anna-nik0laeva.livejournal.com/341280.html
211
anna nik0laeva. 2016b. “Posle Gosdumy na bol’nichnuyu koyku. Aktivistu slomali nogu i otbili
pochki v Dubkakh.” anna nik0laeva (blog) .
URL: https://anna-nik0laeva.livejournal.com/364463.html
anna nik0laeva. 2016c. “Pyatnadtsat’ zashchitnikov parka Dubki zaderzhany politsiyey. Stroyka
aktiviziruyetsya.” anna nik0laeva (blog) .
URL: https://anna-nik0laeva.livejournal.com/358881.html
anna nik0laeva. 2016d. “Spasem park ”Dubki” !” anna nik0laeva (blog) .
URL: https://anna-nik0laeva.livejournal.com/304931.html
anna nik0laeva. 2016e. “Uroki litsemeriya. Prazdnovat’ yubiley Bitvy pod Moskvoy i vyrubat’
pamyatnuyu alleyu Narodnykh opolchentsev.” anna nik0laeva (blog) .
URL: https://anna-nik0laeva.livejournal.com/320782.html
anna nik0laeva. 2016f. “Zaderzhannykh na 48 chasov zashchitnikov parka Dubki razvezli po
raznym otdeleniyam politsii..” anna nik0laeva (blog) .
URL: https://anna-nik0laeva.livejournal.com/359299.html
Arkaun. 2013. “V Ramenkakh postroyat dorogu.” Za Ramenskiy Park (blog) .
URL: https://zaramenki.livejournal.com/105958.html
Arkaun. 2014. “Doroga-ubiytsa. Opyat’ pro proyektiruyemyy proyezd №3538.” Za Ramenskiy
Park (blog) .
URL: https://zaramenki.livejournal.com/140597.html
Arkaun. 2015a. “Den’ goroda v Ramenkakh: otryad CHOP, militsiya i stroiteli vstrechayut detey.”
Za Ramenskiy Park (blog) .
URL: https://zaramenki.livejournal.com/153211.html
Arkaun. 2015b. “Kontrol’ za Stroitel’stvom.” Za Ramenskiy Park (blog) .
URL: https://zaramenki.livejournal.com/152668.html
Arkaun. 2015c. “Ofitsial’nyy press-reliz dvizheniya Za Ramenki! po situatsii s dorogoy-ubiytsey
(pr.proyezd 3538).” Za Ramenskiy Park (blog) .
URL: https://zaramenki.livejournal.com/152400.html
Arkaun. 2015d. “Srochno! Protiv Proyezda 3538!” Za Ramenskiy Park (blog) .
URL: https://zaramenki.livejournal.com/146994.html
Arkaun. 2015e. “Video-lozh’ na ekpozitsii.” Za Ramenskiy Park (blog) .
URL: https://zaramenki.livejournal.com/150836.html
Bahgat, Karim, Halvard Buhaug and Henrik Urdal. 2017. “Urban Social Disorder Codebook,
version 2.0.”.
URL: https://www.prio.org/Data/Armed-Conflict/Urban-Social-Disorder/
Bellin, Eva. 2004. “The Robustness of Authoritarianism in the Middle East: Exceptionalism in
Comparative Perspective.” Comparative Politics 36(2):139–157.
URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/4150140
212
Bishara, Dina. 2015. “The politics of ignoring: Protest dynamics in late Mubarak Egypt.” Perspec-
tives on Politics 13(4):958–975.
Blaydes, Lisa. 2010. Elections and distributive politics in Mubarak’s Egypt. Cambridge University
Press.
Boix, Carles. 2003. Democracy and redistribution. Cambridge University Press.
Boix, Carles and Milan W Svolik. 2013. “The foundations of limited authoritarian government: In-
stitutions, commitment, and power-sharing in dictatorships.” The Journal of Politics 75(02):300–
316.
Brancati, Dawn. 2014. “Democratic authoritarianism: origins and effects.” Annual Review of
Political Science 17:313–326.
Bueno de Mesquita, Bruce and Alastair Smith. 2010. “Leader survival, revolutions, and the nature
of government finance.” American Journal of Political Science 54(4):936–950.
Bueno de Mesquita, Bruce, Alastair Smith, Randolph M. Siverson and James D. Morrow. 2003.
The logic of political survival. MIT press.
Bueno de Mesquita, Ethan. 2010. “Regime change and revolutionary entrepreneurs.” American
Political Science Review 104(3):446–466.
Bunce, Valerie J and Sharon L Wolchik. 2011. Defeating authoritarian leaders in postcommunist
countries. Cambridge University Press.
Carey, Sabine C. 2006. “The dynamic relationship between protest and repression.” Political Re-
search Quarterly 59(1):1–11.
Chen, Jidong, Jennifer Pan and Yiqing Xu. 2016. “Sources of authoritarian responsiveness: A field
experiment in China.” American Journal of Political Science 60(2):383–400.
Chen, Xi. 2012. Social protest and contentious authoritarianism in China. Cambridge University
Press.
Chenoweth, Erica and Christopher Wiley Shay. 2020. NAVCO 1.3 Codebook. In List of Campaigns
in NAVCO 1.3. Harvard Dataverse.
URL: https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/ON9XND/PTMCCV
Chenoweth, Erica, Jonathan Pinckney and Orion Lewis. 2018. “Days of rage: Introducing the
NAVCO 3.0 dataset.” Journal of Peace Research 55(4):524–534.
Chwe, Michael Suk-Young. 2013. Rational ritual: Culture, coordination, and common knowledge.
Princeton University Press.
Clark, David and Patrick Regan. 2016. “Mass Mobilization Protest Data.”.
URL: https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/HTTWYL
213
Cook, Linda J and Martin K Dimitrov. 2017. “The social contract revisited: Evidence from com-
munist and state capitalist economies.” Europe-Asia Studies 69(1):8–26.
Dahl, Robert A. 1971. Polyarchy: Participation and opposition. Yale University Press.
Davenport, Christian. 2007a. “State repression and political order.” Annual review of political
science 10:1–23.
Davenport, Christian. 2007b. “State repression and the tyrannical peace.” Journal of Peace Re-
search 44(4):485–504.
Davenport, Christian. 2014. How social movements die. Cambridge University Press.
della Porta, Donatella. 1997. “The policing of protest: repression, bargaining, and the fate of social
movements.” African Studies 56(1):97–127.
DeNardo, James. 1985. Power in numbers: The political strategy of protest and rebellion. Prince-
ton University Press.
Ding, Iza. 2020. “Performative Governance.” World Politics 72(4):525–556.
Domovoi Sovet. 2016. “V Moskve okhranniki stroyploshchadki izbili aktivistov parka “Dubki”.”
Domovoi Sovet - Novosti .
URL: https://domsovet.tv/articles/v-moskve-okhranniki-strojploshhadki-izbili-aktivistov-parka-
dubki/
Earl, Jennifer. 2003. “Tanks, tear gas, and taxes: Toward a theory of movement repression.”
Sociological Theory 21(1):44–68.
Earl, Jennifer. 2011. “Political repression: Iron fists, velvet gloves, and diffuse control.” Annual
Review of Sociology 37:261–284.
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